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Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines the Anglo-American Relationship around international drug control and 
addresses two main questions: first, was there a ‘special relationship’ in the field of drug 
control? Second, what impact did their relationship have on international control efforts? It 
highlights that the relationship was far from ‘special’ and was frequently strained. Further,  it 
argues that the outcomes of international drug control efforts, between the collapse of the 
League of Nations system during World War II and the coming into force of the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1964, derived from a triangulation of three international 
drug control blocs: control advocate states, led by the US; producing states and their non-
interventionist allies, led by Turkey and the Soviet Union; and moderate manufacturing and 
consuming countries, led by the UK. In this triangulation process the UK and US remained 
the lead international actors and represented the two core policy strands within the system: 
regulation and prohibition respectively. 
 
The Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division in policy interests, resulting 
in both cooperation and competition. They overlapped around pursuing a global regulatory 
system managing the flows of ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. They diverged around the 
peripheral or frontier aspects of this system: namely, where to draw the line between licit and 
illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit global production; how much 
national oversight and interference to provide international organisations; and how to deal 
with existing drug consuming populations. Where their policy interests overlapped, and when 
the UK and US consciously worked together, international political progress was possible. 
Where the two diverged, around strict adherence to prohibitionist principles; overly 
restricting the manufacturing sector’s ability to procure raw materials; and assuming national 
obligations for a repressive ‘closed institutional’ model of dealing with ‘addiction’, political 
momentum generally stalled. 
 
Finally, this thesis argues that the 1961 Single Convention evolved via Anglo-American 
‘competitive cooperation’ and was ultimately a joint Anglo-American creation: a regulatory 
system with prohibitionist aspects. However, the 1961 Single Convention ultimately 
represented a victory for the regulatory strand and the UK over the US-led prohibitionist 
strand. 
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Historical Overview: The International Drug Control System:1 
 
• 1907: Ten Year Agreement 
o Britain, China and India agree trilateral framework for ending Indian 
opium exports to China within ten years. 
o Agreement becomes model for future supply control system. 
• 1909: Shanghai Opium Commission 
o Initiated under American leadership. 
o First truly international drug control meeting. 
o The Great Powers examine ways to suppress international opium 
traffic – particularly traffic bound for China. 
o Largely ends in discord but leads to 1912 Opium Convention. 
• 1912: Opium Convention 
o Beginning of international drug control system. 
o States encouraged to end drug abuse. Remains vague on mechanisms 
to achieve this. 
o Signatories must prevent shipment of opium to states which bar its 
entry. 
o Enters into force in 1919. 
o Co-opted into new League of Nations. 
o United States’ leadership undermined by its ambiguous relationship 
with League administered system. 
• 1925: Geneva Opium Conventions 
o Establish first mechanisms to enforce supply control framework. 
o Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) created to monitor 
international imports and exports of narcotics. 
o United States fails to secure end to all ‘non-medical and scientific’ drug 
use. Walks out of proceedings and never signs. 
o Treaty gains widespread adherence over time. 
• 1931: Conventions 
o United States cooperates with UK, Germany, and other industrialised 
states to fashion a workable control scheme. 
o First introduction of ‘schedules’ into international treaties. 
o Creation of system of estimates. Administered by Drug Supervisory 
Body (DSB). 
o Formalises international distinction between licit and illicit drug trades. 
o Both PCOB and DSB function as quasi-judicial bodies independent of 
League of Nations. 
• 1936: Convention 
o Aimed at suppressing growing illicit traffic. 
o United States again fails to successfully advocate for end to all ‘non-
medical and scientific’ drug use. Its delegates withdraw active 
cooperation for remainder of treaty negotiations. 
o Eventually ratified only by Canada and a few other minor states. Never 
comes into force. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  overview	  is	  reproduced	  from	  John	  Collins,	  “The	  International	  Drug	  Control	  System,”	  ed.	  John	  Collins,	  
Governing	  the	  Global	  Drug	  Wars,	  LSE	  IDEAS	  Special	  Reports,	  October	  2012.	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• 1939-40:  
o States consider negotiating international supply control agreement. 
Interrupted by WWII. 
• 1939-1945: WWII 
o Certain PCOB, DSB and League functions transfer from Geneva to 
Washington. 
o Continue to function (minimally) throughout war. 
o United States extracts commitments from Britain and the Netherlands 
to end opium monopolies in the Far East.  
o Exceptions remain. France follows suit in 1945. 
• 1945-6:  
o United Nations becomes new custodian for administration of existing 
treaties. 
o Continuity with pre-war system maintained. 
• 1948: Convention 
o Brings synthetic narcotics under international control. 
• 1953: Opium Protocol 
o Prescribes more severe limitation of agricultural production of opiates. 
o Forced through by the US, France and other allies. 
o Rejected by agricultural producing countries and had little hope for 
gaining widespread acceptance. 
• 1961: Single Convention 
o Unifies previous Conventions (except 1936) into one document. 
o United States works to thwart its ratification, and instead bring 1953 
Protocol into force. 
o 1964: Single Convention enters into force. US initially refuses to ratify. 
o PCOB and DSB are merged into International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB). 
o INCB retains a ‘quasi-judicial’ role. 
• 1967: US ratifies Single Convention. 
• 1971: Convention 
o Brings Psychotropic (psychoactive) substances under international 
control, but in a less stringent form than applied to opioids, coca and 
cannabis. 
• 1972: Protocol Amending the Single Convention 
o Product of US efforts to strengthen Single Convention and INCB. 
o Six decades after first Opium Convention, international system remains 
overwhelmingly focused on supply control issues. 
• 1972: UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) created. 
o Nominally independent but reliant on US patronage. 
o Heavily supply control focused. 
• 1988: Convention 
o Primarily aimed at tackling organised crime and trafficking. 
o Addresses demand issues by recommending criminalisation of 
personal consumption. 
• 1998: United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
o States commit to massive reductions in drug use and supply within ten 
years. 
o Slogan: ‘A drug free world. We can do it!’ 
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• 2009: UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon claims criminalisation of 
injecting drug use is hampering HIV/AIDS fight. Calls for 
decriminalisation.  
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Introduction: 
The period 1939 to 1964 was perhaps the most important in the history of the creation of the 
modern international drug control system. It began with the collapse of the League of Nations 
drug control system and culminated in the coming into force of the 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs. The League of Nations system, which had its origins in the 1909 
Shanghai Opium Commission, collapsed with the outbreak of war. Its normative and 
technocratic underpinnings, however, were to survive the war. The former remained in the 
hearts and minds of the ‘gentleman’s club’ of narcotics control advocates.2 This was a small 
community of individuals committed to a vision of a tightly regulated international trade 
underpinned by prohibitions around non-medical and non-scientific usage. For many the 
ultimate vision would be, as Harry Anslinger wrote for the US in 1965, ‘to abolish legal 
opium production entirely’.3 For others, such as the UK, it was about creating a well-
regulated ‘ethical’ trade in a problematic international commodity.4 The latter aspect, the 
technocratic ‘system of estimates’ would survive via its guardians the Permanent Central 
Opium Board and Drug Supervisory Body, which escaped to Washington DC in 1940 and 
remained there for most of the duration of the war. 
 
World War II heavily reshaped international narcotics control in many respects. It achieved 
what previous conferences and conventions could not: a tangible commitment by colonial 
powers to prohibit and eradicate most non-medical and non-scientific consumption of opium 
in their colonies and end the monopolies that supplied them. These had represented the key 
stumbling block to control in the 1930s and, with their removal, states looked towards the 
possibility of an all encompassing international commodity control arrangement which would 
tightly regulate drugs from production all the way through to consumption. The framework of 
manufacturing regulation, created under the 1931 convention, remained the most consensual 
aspect of the international system. Reverse integrating production controls would be a far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan, and Ingemar Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs 
and Alcohol (University of Chicago Press, 1975). 
3 Statement by Harry Anslinger to 20th Session of CND, on the Review of the Commission’s Work 
During its First Twenty Years, 16 December 1965, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box124/File1230-1, United 
Nations 20th Session (1965). 
4 “Ethical” description comes from: William B. McAllister, “Reflections on a Century of International 
Drug Control,” ed. John Collins, Governing the Global Drug Wars, LSE IDEAS Special Reports, 
October 2012, 13. 
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more complex aspect, while issues around consumption and managing drug ‘addiction’ 
remained unresolved into the 1960s and beyond.5 
 
The 1961 Single Convention came into force in 1964 despite US efforts to kill it and secure 
the 1953 Opium Protocol in its stead. Behind this story lies complex and overlapping 
interests, processes, diplomatic struggles, Cold War politics and national idiosyncrasies. 
Nothing is more indicative and representative of these forces than the complicated and often 
contentious Anglo-American drug diplomatic relationship. This thesis examines the Anglo-
American Relationship around international drug control and addresses two main questions: 
first, was there a ‘special relationship’ in the field of drug control? Second, what impact did 
their relationship have on international control efforts? It highlights that the relationship was 
far from ‘special’ and was frequently strained. Further, it argues that international drug 
control efforts between the collapse of the League of Nations system during World War II 
and the coming into force of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1964 are best 
understood as a triangulation of three groups of international drug control blocs: control 
advocate states, led by the US; producing states and their non-interventionist allies, led by 
Turkey and the Soviet Union; and moderate manufacturing and consuming countries, led by 
the UK. In this triangulation process the US and UK remained the core actors in international 
drug diplomacy and represented the two main policy strands within the system: prohibition 
and regulation respectively.  
 
The Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division in policy interests resulting 
in both cooperation and competition. The overlap was around the pursuit of a global 
regulatory framework for managing the flows of licit ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. Their 
division centred on the peripheral or frontier aspects of this: namely, where to draw the line 
between licit and illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit global 
supplies; how much interference in national affairs to allow international organisations; and 
how to deal with existing drug consuming populations.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Evaluating social understandings of drugs and drug uses remain peripheral to this study and are 
conveyed through the lens of actors during this time period, hence the use of antiquated terms like 
'addict'. For an overview of drug use, dependence and addiction see: Mark A. R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. 
Caulkins, and Angela Hawken, Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2011), 5–9. 
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Where their policies overlapped and when the UK and US worked together, forward 
international political progress was possible. Where the two diverged, around strict adherence 
to prohibitionist principles, overly restricting the manufacturing sector’s ability to procure 
raw materials, and assuming domestic responsibilities for a repressive ‘closed institutional’ 
model of dealing with ‘addiction’, political momentum stalled. This thesis argues that the 
1961 Single Convention evolved via Anglo-American ‘competitive cooperation’ since World 
War II and ultimately was a joint Anglo-American creation, a regulatory system with 
prohibitionist aspects.6 However, the thesis also argues that the 1961 Single Convention 
ultimately represented a victory for the UK and the regulatory strand over the US and the 
prohibitionist strand. 
 
The UK, and other European powers such as the Netherlands, represented the deep regulatory 
strand of the control system. This strand sought to manage the global narcotics issues and the 
expectations of prohibitionist states by establishing a moderate international framework for 
managing commodity flows and gently encouraging states towards suppression and better 
domestic management of the issue. Its means to achieve this were consensus and multilateral 
decision-making, with the goal of utilising this issue to forward other international 
cooperative efforts.  
 
The US represented the strong prohibitionist, control advocate, strand within the system. It 
utilised diplomatic pressure, bullying, sticks and carrots to achieve its goals. Since early in 
the 1900s US policy maintained an almost fanatic belief in prohibitionism as the key 
mechanism to resolve the global drug issue. This stemmed from a belief that the cause of 
drug ‘abuse’ was excess and unregulated supplies of ‘addictive’ drugs. By removing the 
supply; instituting harsh and mandatory penalties for transgressing laws; and ensuring 
compulsory ‘treatment’ for ‘addicts’ the US believed the issue to be fundamentally soluble. 
 
Within this prohibitionist mentality, the core drug diplomat and key protagonist of this story, 
Harry Anslinger, looms large. He was, at base, a bureaucratic opportunist and key 
functionary in a broader US vision for international narcotics control based on the desire to 
pursue the ‘evil’ to all corners of the globe. Underpinning this approach was a self-interested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive 
Co-Operation (University of North Carolina Press, 1982). 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
14	  
	  
belief that prohibition, underpinned by police enforcement and political will, overseas was 
the best defence against increasing use in the US. Drug use, under this US vision, would 
disappear if states committed to eradicate it via strict regulation of medical use, prohibition of 
non-medical and non-scientific use and the diffusion of uniform police efforts globally.  
 
Anslinger essentially channelled the US approach to narcotics. The same impulses would 
likely have been present in his absence but would have likely gained far less national and 
international traction. He held almost four decades at the helm of US drug control, a 
formidable personality, a strong domestic constituency (‘Anslinger’s Army’) and intense 
bureaucratic and political savvy. 7 Anslinger’s ‘army’ was a mixture of domestic interests and 
lobby groups which supported stringent national and international controls. Part of the 
grassroots stemmed from traditional prohibitionist organisations such as the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union. Others represented the domestic drug manufacturing sector 
which looked to Anslinger to protect their interests in international negotiations. Others 
emerged within sympathetic members of US press institutions, most importantly the Hearst 
Press. Others still represented elite Washington DC policy insiders, the most important of 
which was a small group of powerful members of the Foreign Policy Association (FPA) 
which had taken an early interest in drug control during the 1920s and 30s, likely as a means 
to encourage US cooperation with the League of Nations, and developed strong links with the 
global drug policy community.8  
 
The existence and continuity of these groups highlight that Anslinger steered what was a 
broader US vision of drug policy dating at least back to the turn of the twentieth century. 
However, his role in shaping domestic and international narratives and navigating the 
complicated national and international politics cannot be underestimated, as this thesis will 
demonstrate. Meanwhile, the UK, as we will see, had a far less important domestic drug 
control lobby with no clear indication that domestic opinion had a major impact on its 
national policies. Instead its policies were driven by technocratic impulses; intra-bureaucratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See for example: John C. McWilliams, The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 1930-1962 (University of Delaware Press, 1990), 86–7. 
8 Ultimately, although a number of existing works point to the importance of domestic interests in 
supporting Anslinger, a more systematic appraisal based on deep archival research of these groups 
and their interaction with national and international institutions is required. Nevertheless, the strong 
impact of these groups on national and international policy processes is clear at certain key junctures, 
as this thesis will highlight. 
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battles; national pharmaceutical and the medical interests which pushed back against invasive 
international regulations; concerns over international prestige; and desires for international 
cooperation. 
 
Where the US and British approaches overlapped, around the creation of an international 
regulatory approach undergirded by certain prohibitions, forward political progress was 
possible. Where the two diverged, around the US relentless drive to shrink the global  market, 
with little concern for manufacturer or consumer concerns, or the early British desire to 
accommodate opiate consumption in their colonies via ‘quasi-medical’ maintenance, 
momentum stalled. Further Britain favoured a less invasive free and open market with 
relatively minimal international oversight. Part of this derived from domestic economic 
concerns. For example, for the UK any increase in drug costs would be borne by the new 
National Health Service (NHS), created in 1946 and implemented in 1948, and could weaken 
the competitiveness of their pharmaceutical exports relative to new synthetic narcotics and 
those derived from new manufacturing processes on the continent of Europe.  
 
The US favoured a closed economic system tending towards shrinking supplies and strong 
UN oversight of national policies and implementation. For the US the economic downside to 
stricter regulation were lower and could be borne by its established pharmaceutical sector, 
evidenced by the sector’s continued support for the US’ international policy positions. The 
goal was therefore to drastically raise regulatory standards around the globe and export strong 
a strong prohibitionist framework. Thereby, under this vision, they could minimise the impact 
of unregulated and illicit supplies on its domestic market while simultaneously ridding the 
world of the ‘slavery’ of ‘addiction’. 
 
Throughout this story the US remained at the vanguard of control efforts, a number of times 
falling out entirely with the system when moderate states refused to go along with its designs. 
At the opposing end was a heterogeneous mix of recalcitrant states, centred largely around 
drug-producing countries which sought to avoid troublesome and invasive international 
regulations. Britain traditionally served as a middle-ground manufacturing state. During the 
inter-war years, however, Britain’s control of a number of key producing states (Burma and 
India for example) meant it frequently served as a recalcitrant to the US vision. After World 
War II, however, an ostensible end to the opium monopolies and decolonisation processes, 
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meant that Britain worked to carve out its middle-ground role as the head of a moderate 
coalition of producers, manufacturers and consumers. These had various economic interests 
in the system and a desire to see some international framework but reticent to follow the US 
vision.  
 
The US and UK visions would continue to differ over whether the goal was to manage and 
contain the size of the global market (the UK vision) or to work to shrink the size of the 
market (the US vision). The US regulatory vision was ultimately prohibitionist around plant-
based opiates, but the UK ensured the US failed to enshrine mechanisms to enforce this 
within the drug conventions’ regulatory framework. Supplementing this core regulated 
market were prohibitionist aspects, aimed at suppressing non-medical and non-scientific 
consumption. However, the implementation of these prohibitionist aspects were left 
purposely vague and ill-defined, seeking on the one hand to incorporate the US normative 
framework of repressive prohibitionism while preventing the imposition of concrete 
obligations on states, such as the UK, which had no desire to accept them. 
 
The historiography of Anglo-American relations offers two concepts which are of use in 
analysing this field. David Reynolds’ concept of ‘competitive cooperation’.9  And Nigel 
Ashton's idea of the ‘irony of interdependence’.10 Both Britain and the US publicly 
proclaimed their desire for international drug cooperation and recognised the importance of 
one another for achieving their desired end. In certain respects their visions overlapped and 
allowed close cooperation and interdependence, but in others their visions differed sharply 
and ultimately resulted in them competing for different end points and prevented an alliance 
over the drug issue. Overall this resulted in a situation where international cooperation was 
most harmonious when the US and UK worked together but this was often prevented due to 
divergent visions and interests.  
 
Historiography 
International Control Historiography: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-
Operation.  
10 Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002). 
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The history of drug control diplomacy has received limited attention from historians. There 
been little discussion of its interaction with other fields of historiography, such as Anglo-
American relations. This is despite the fact that foreign policy practitioners have often 
regarded the field as one of fundamental importance. Former Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III once said of the illicit narcotics trade: “there is no foreign policy issue short of war 
or peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being of the American People.”11 There 
are a number of detailed histories examining specific issues and commodities within the 
international drug control paradigm.12 There are also broader social histories which provide 
important contextual understanding regarding the interaction between these commodities and 
societies.13 In terms of diplomatic history, the field is quite sparse. 
 
Perhaps the earliest historical account of the international system can be found in Bertil 
Renborg’s book on the League’s drug control apparatus.14 As a regime insider, his book can 
be read as an attempt to influence the outcomes of the post-war re-internationalisation of 
control and his pursuit of a job within the system. Arnold Taylor’s 1969 work provides the 
original historical account of the evolution of controls prior to World War II, describing it as 
an example of ‘humanitarian intervention’.15 Peter Lowes' 1966 account of the genesis of 
control is another useful book.16 However, the foundational text is the book by Bruun et al.17 
As William O. Walker III suggests, it is ‘less satisfactory as a broad, comprehensive study 
but of considerable value as an interpretive administrative history’.18 The narratives are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Quoted in Raphael F. Perl, ed., Drugs and Foreign Policy: A Critical Review (Westview Press, 
1994). 
12 James H. Mills, Cannabis Nation: Control and Consumption in Britain, 1928-2008 (OUP Oxford, 
2012); James H. Mills, Cannabis Britannica  : Empire, Trade, and Prohibition 1800-1928: Empire, 
Trade, and Prohibition 1800-1928 (OUP Oxford, 2003); Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The 
Making of a Global Drug: The Making of a Global Drug (University of North Carolina Press, 2009); 
Joseph F. Spillane, Cocaine: From Medical Marvel to Modern Menace in the United States, 1884-
1920 (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).  
13 Virginia Berridge, Opium and the People: Opiate Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and 
Early Twentieth Century England (London: Free Association Books, 1999); David T. Courtwright, 
Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World (Harvard University Press, 2002). 
14 Bertil A. Renborg, International Drug Control: A Study of International Administration by and 
Through the League of Nations (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1947). 
15 Arnold H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 1900-1939: A Study in 
International Humanitarian Reform (Duke University Press, 1969). 
16 Peter D. Lowes, The Genesis of International Narcotics Control (Arno Press, 1966). 
17 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol. 
18 William O. Walker III, “Bibliographic Essay,” in Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, ed. William O. Walker III (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 
170. 
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derived from widely available published sources; oral history and an intimate (insider) 
knowledge of the system. One of the main problems with this book is its lack of coherence19 
and weak archival base.20  
 
The core text, particularly for discussions of international opium regulation, remains William 
McAllister’s Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century.21 It provides an extremely broad, 
nuanced and synthetic account of the international system. While serving the starting point 
for diplomatic histories it is ultimately an institutional history of the international control 
system and leaves significant scope for developing work examining the role of interstate 
relations outside League of Nations and United Nations forums. Further, it weakened by its 
lack of unifying explanatory frameworks. It does not fully break out of the ‘prohibition 
regime’ framework (see below) of explanation to develop its own. It is possible to derive 
from McAllister an array of explanatory frameworks, without a clear sense the author has 
chosen one. It is a work of great historical complexity and nuance but also very wide 
explanatory brush strokes - for example explaining the policy shift around the opium 
monopolies.22   This thesis aims to expand on McAllister’s work by providing a deeper 
evaluation of inter-state relations at a specific time period, more detailed reconstructions of 
specific key turning points within the system to develop new explanatory frameworks, and 
attempt to develop a new overarching frame of analysis which moves beyond the framing of 
international drug control as a teleological outcome of a US-led ‘global prohibition regime’. 
 
David R. Bewley-Taylor is the main proponent of the ‘global prohibition regime’ 
historiography. This approach has its origins in Ethan Nadelmann’s ground-breaking article 
on ‘Global Prohibition Regimes’.23 Bewley-Taylor developed this school in his first book, the 
United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997, by attempting to tell the history of 
US engagement with the international drug control system through a hybrid of international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is a criticism William McAllister also makes. William B. McAllister, “Conflicts of Itnerest in 
the International Drug Control System,” in Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective, ed. William O. Walker III (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 
163. 
20 There was no archival material available when the book was written. 
21 William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History 
(Routledge, 2000). 
22 Ibid., 151–2. 
23 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International 
Society,” International Organization 44, no. 4 (October 1, 1990): 479–526. 
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relations theory and international history.24 The core historical narrative is heavily drawn 
from Bruun et al.’s book The Gentlemen’s Club.25 Bewley-Taylor extends this narrative 
through a central thesis that the US created a ‘global prohibition regime’ via ‘hegemonic 
stability’ and other forces.26 Although the work develops a useful conceptual framework its 
historical coverage is weak and undermined by the fundamental lack of primary research, 
which results in a frequently inaccurate historical narrative being derived from the outcomes, 
rather than a reconstruction of processes.  
 
Bewley-Taylor’s core argument has been strongly undermined by subsequent historical 
research, particularly that of William McAllister but also a recent historiographical trend 
highlighting the emergence of prohibition in the global peripheries of Asia and Latin 
America, rather than just the core of the US and Europe. Two good examples of this are Isaac 
Campos’ work on Mexico and James Windle’s ‘How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition’. 
Campos writes in his 2012 book: ‘the problem is that historians simply have not looked 
deeply at the origins of drug prohibition in Latin America’.27 Meanwhile Windle writes that 
the ‘concept of prohibition being a distinctly American construct is…flawed’.28 This thesis 
finds significant justification for these viewpoints, with a number of examples of seemingly 
spontaneous national efforts, in Iran and Peru in particular, to bring prohibitionist controls 
into their countries. Further there are visible efforts by indigenous elites in Asia, Latin 
America and the Middle East to demonstrate their nationalist and modernizing credentials 
through drug suppression efforts.  
 
Bewley-Taylor, nevertheless, develops this US-created ‘global prohibition regime’ thesis in 
his later work, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured, drawing on new secondary 
diplomatic historical material to argue that the consensus around the ‘core prohibitive norm’ 
of control ‘regime’ is ‘cracked’ and may break apart.29 He uses contemporary international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997; Mandy Bentham’s 
book, is one of a number of other books that approaches the subject from the international relations 
discipline: Mandy Bentham, The Politics of Drug Control (Macmillan, 1998). 
25 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol. 
26 Bewley-Taylor, The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997, 210. 
27 Issaac Campos, Home Grown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico’s War on Drugs (University of 
North Carolina Press, 2012), 4. 
28 James Windle, “How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition,” The International History Review, 
August 2013, 1. 
29 David R. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012). 
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relations theories around ‘regime defection’ to elaborate his claims.30 Earlier examples of 
‘regime defection’ theories being applied to the field of drugs can be found in H. Richard 
Friman’s NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs.31  Ultimately my thesis differs 
from Bewley-Taylor’s and other analyses that the core ‘norm’ of the system is prohibition. 
Instead I highlight that it is a system of commodity regulations underwritten (as all regulatory 
frameworks are) by prohibitionist aspects. Further it contests the notion that the US was the 
key driver of the system’s outcomes, but instead argues a more nuanced picture of interstate 
cooperation, beginning with Anglo-American relations, is required.  
 
A further revisionist trend is emerging, led by James H. Mills, to re-examine Britain’s role in 
the genesis of international control efforts, by looking at the 1912 Hague Opium Conference 
from the perspective of cocaine.  He suggests that Britain had a far more activist role in 
negotiations around cocaine, rather than taking the reluctant approach that William 
McAllister suggested previously. There is, he writes, an ‘importance of returning to the 
details of British participation in the emergence of the international drugs regulatory 
system…to get a clearer and more nuanced picture of what they sought to achieve and 
why’.32  
 
My thesis draws overwhelmingly on archival sources and uses these to reconstruct the 
processes driving the evolution of international drug control. Rather than a legalistic 
interpretative focus on the international drug control treaties,33 it instead looks to the 
historical processes, goals and ideas that shaped them. It deviates from the practitioner-
academic historiography of current policy discourse which utilises the conventions as a 
baseline for understanding state action and control efforts.34 My work eschews the 
teleological historical narratives these approaches tend to produce, one which writes history 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, The Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs and Alcohol. 
31 H. Richard Friman, NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs (Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
32 James H. Mills, “Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium 
Conference, 1911–12,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 42, no. 3 (2014): 400–
419. 
33 Syamal Kumar Chatterjee, Legal Aspects of International Drug Control (Nijhoff, 1981). 
34 Martin Jelsma and David R. Bewley-Taylor, The UN Drug Control Conventions: The Limits of 
Latitude, Series on Legislative Reform of Drug Policies (Transnational Institute and International 
Drug Policy Consortium, March 2012), 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/dlr18.pdf. Bewley-Taylor, International Drug 
Control: Consensus Fractured. 
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backwards from its outcomes. McAllister’s research highlights the problems with this 
approach but it is a conclusion he does not seem to pursue with any determination and he 
uses of the term ‘regime’ in the singular throughout, suggesting a relatively uniform 
international framework and one based on ‘prohibition’. Other historians have used 
regulatory terminology. For example James Mills refers to the control system as the 
‘international drugs regulatory system’.35 This thesis points to what William McAllister has 
termed the policy ‘trajectories’ which surrounded the treaties and drove their development, 
interpretation and implementation.36 In so doing it aims to highlight the contingencies, 
evolutions, uncertainties and accommodations in the understanding and development of these 
documents and the system.  
 
This thesis provides greater conceptual understanding of the forces that shaped international 
control. It does so by drawing out more extensively issues discussed in passing or at times 
overlooked by McAllister and others, for example the British decision-making process 
surrounding the ending of the opium monopolies in 1943; the role of the Judd Resolution in 
US post-war policy formulation; or the struggles to create a unified national narcotics control 
in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Japan. All of these receive only passing examination in 
existing historical accounts. Further the thesis draws out, far more extensively, the political 
economy of the 1953 Opium Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention. It does this via a 
more thorough examination of the reasons given by states for their support or rejection of 
certain provisions. It thus brings discussion in many cases down from large historical brush 
strokes to a detailed appraisal of specific state actions at specific times and highlights the ad-
hoc evolution of policy via sequential decision processes.  
 
By beginning its narrative in 1939 this represents a new historical perspective on the role of 
the World War II era in reshaping the trajectories of international control efforts. McAllister’s 
work is the only one at the time of writing to cover this era in depth and tells the story as one 
of strong continuity between the League of Nations and the United Nations. The analysis that 
emerges here highlights continuities with the pre-war system but also the existence of 
multiple competing conceptions and possible counterfactuals during 1944-6.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Mills, “Cocaine and the British Empire: The Drug and the Diplomats at the Hague Opium 
Conference, 1911–12.” 
36 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 3. 
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This thesis focuses strongly on the creation of international production regulations which had 
completely stalled in 1939. After the war, constant reinvigoration efforts eventually came to 
fruition with the 1961 Single Convention coming into force. These were based strongly on 
the manufacturing regulations designed for the 1931 Convention. Other key questions 
intersect with this thesis – prohibitions around quasi-medical use; opium smoking; and 
defining medical-scientific consumption. Questions of cannabis and coca leaf are also 
touched on, but this thesis is first and foremost about production limitation of opium as this 
was the key issue over the period. 
 
Anglo-American and Cold War Historiography: 
The British-American wartime alliance and post-war alliance has been characterised as a 
‘special relationship’.37 Mark Stoler argues that during World War II: ‘never before had two 
nations fused their military...forces to such an extent...or so collaborated in economic 
mobilization [and] the sharing of intelligence secrets...Nor had two heads of government ever 
before created such [a]...strong personal friendship, a friendship duplicated by many of their 
subordinates and citizens’.38 This relationship was built on complex layers of cooperation, 
some the result of geopolitical necessity, some created by personal relationships as well as a 
sense of shared history and culture.39 This is particularly relevant for a discussion of narcotics 
control, where individual diplomats played a significant (at times pivotal) role in determining 
the success of diplomatic efforts. Further, the relationship was underpinned by systemic 
conditions of declining British power and rising US power.40 The Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’ has, nonetheless, proved a durable and recurring feature of the international 
post-war system.41  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For an overview of the “special relationship” historiography see David Reynolds, “Rethinking 
Anglo-American Relations,” International Affairs 65, no. 1 (1988); Alex Danchev, On Specialness: 
Essays in Anglo-American Relations (Macmillan, 1998). 
38 Mark A. Stoler, Allies in War: Britain and America Against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945 (A Hodder 
Arnold Publication, 2007), 230.  
39 Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72, no. 4 (1996): 739.; For a systemic 
argument for the wartime alliance see Warren F. Kimball, “Wheel Within a Wheel: Churchill, 
Roosevelt and the Special Relationship,” in Churchill, ed. Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 291–308.  
40 Donald C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 
41 John Baylis and Steve Marsh, “The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: The Lazarus of 
International Relations,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 17, no. 1 (2006). 
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Arguably the dominant analytic paradigm for the relationship is the ‘functionalist’ tradition. 
It suggests that the ‘special relationship’ arose from mutual utility where each power derived 
some benefit from cooperation with the other. An implication of this was that the relationship 
was not inevitable but was dependent on nurturing and negotiation to produce cooperation.42 
This thesis subscribes to this tradition. The US and UK had areas of overlapping interests in 
drug control during, but particularly after, World War II. However, in the 1950s ultimately 
they failed to cooperate. It was the result of diverging policy goals and interests but was 
heavily worsened by personal diplomacy. For the latter, Harry Anslinger lost of control of US 
drug diplomacy in the 1950s and a splintering of the policy process in the Federal 
Government strongly undermined the US’ ability to pursue a coherent agenda.  
 
The extensive Anglo-American historiography has a significant blind spot surrounding 
narcotics control. None of tomes associated with the mainstream historiography give any 
significant coverage to the role of the narcotics trade, despite the often-potent interaction of 
drug policy and diplomacy with Anglo-American relations more broadly, for example in the 
interaction with Anglo-US-Iranian relations as this thesis highlights.43 Overall, this study 
aims to help correct this historiographical oversight. 
 
Regional Historiography: 
The Korean peninsula, Indochina, Burma and Middle East were regions of periodic tensions 
in the Anglo-American post-war relationship.44 However, Cold War Historiography has 
largely overlooked the role of narcotics control in various regional and national politics.45 
This thesis helps overcome this deficiency. Christopher Thorne has argued that the wartime 
relationship in Asia was that of ‘allies of kind.’46 His characterisation is part of a broader 
Anglo-American historiographical trend that highlights the continuation of a power rivalry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For a discussion of the Functionalist tradition within Anglo-American historiography see Danchev, 
“On Specialness,” 739. 
43 The Tobacco industry does earn a mention in David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean 
Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Random House, 
1988), 42. 
44 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After 
(Macmillan, 2001), 51. 
45 Numerous broad historical tomes were consulted and found to have absolutely no reference to 
drugs. 
46 Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War against Japan, 
1941-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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between a declining Britain and a rising America.47 The issue of narcotics control holds 
particular relevance for relations over Asia. The narcotics trade was inextricable from much 
of Asia’s economic, social and political fabric.48 
 
In the interests of parsimony, one region to receive less attention is Latin America. Apart 
from aggressive British efforts to soak up pharmaceutical export market share in the region, 
Britain largely deferred to American interests and influence. Meanwhile, much of the Latin 
American discussions centred on coca, meaning it remained below the radar of the 
international system which focused primarily on opiates prior to the 1960s.49  
 
William O. Walker III produced a seminal study of British and American policy towards 
opium in Asia between 1912 and 1954.50 It represented a continuation from his earlier studies 
on drug diplomacy in Latin America.51 His conception of relations is one that highlights the 
functionalist underpinnings of the relationship where competition predominates over 
cooperation and leaves relations in significant ‘disrepair’ by the mid 1950s.52  There is a 
stronger emphasis on the interwar than post-war period, and little emphasis given to wartime 
changes. This thesis will provide far greater depth on episodes, such as the colonial issue and 
Anglo-American disagreement over Burma in 1946, which Walker discusses only in passing. 
 
The modern relationship between war, political instability and the global illicit narcotics trade 
emerged during World War II. Peter Dale Scott argues that (although officially being 
supplied by India) the reliance on cheap, smuggled, Shan opium by the Siamese opium 
monopoly helps explain the Thai Northern Army’s invasion of the Shan States in 1942.53 
Jonathan Marshall traces the origins of the American ‘government-gang symbiosis’ in Asia to 
World War II when the US sourced the important strategic material Tungsten through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Reynolds, “Rethinking Anglo-American Relations,” 91. 
48 There exists some strong work examining the role of opium in Asia. See for example: “Appendix 1: 
The Literature of the Opium Trade” in Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political 
Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750-1950 (Routledge, 1999), 174–8.  
49 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 199. 
50 William O. Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 
1912-1954 (University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
51 William O. Walker III, Drug Control in the Americas (University of New Mexico Press, 1989). 
52 Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954, 
269; 217. 
53 Peter Dale Scott, American War Machine: Deep Politics, the CIA Global Drug Connection, and the 
Road to Afghanistan (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 68–9. 
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Chinese criminal gangs, and paid for it with opium.54 So began a set of relationships as well 
as a set of US covert practices that would continue on into the Cold War and beyond. My two 
chapters looking at the World War II era draw out some of these relationships, and other 
unexplored linkages between opium and broader wartime regional political concerns and 
post-war planning discussions. 
 
The role of the opium trade in colonial and Cold War politics is explored in the seminal work 
of Alfred McCoy.55 He charts the continued role of the trade in enabling colonisers to 
establish client groups within Asian and Middle Eastern states.56 It has since been expanded 
upon twice and in his ‘third and final edition’ he asserts closure on the ‘book’s controversial 
thesis about CIA complicity in the drug trade [which] has been corroborated by the agency’s 
own sources and, more importantly, by history itself’.57 
 
Meyer and Parssinen provide an original account of the evolution of the international opium 
trade in Asia from 1907-1954. It is a work based heavily on primary research and serves as a 
conscious effort to explode the nationalist myths and cultural conspiracies that have 
accompanied the trade. Meyer and Parssinen show, as best they can for an under-documented 
trade, opium as an evolving international business structure that grew in symbiosis with local 
legal-political systems.58 
 
They also highlight that the torch of international control was shuffled back and forth 
between the US and Britain in their period of study. British bureaucrat, Sir Malcolm 
Delevingne, an Undersecretary of State, led supply control efforts while representing Britain 
on the League’s Opium Committee until 1931. His believed smugglers would not be able to 
reverse-integrate complicated manufacturing processes, and once a controlled supply chain 
was created, the illicit market would shrink, potentially to the point of extinction.59 After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Jonathan Marshall, “Opium, Tungsten, and the Search for National Security, 1940-52,” in Drug 
Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective, ed. William O. Walker III 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 89–90. 
55 Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade, Afghanistan, 
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Delevingne’s retirement the torch was passed to the US’ top drug diplomat Harry Anslinger 
who would look to extend and tighten Delevingne’s conception but also export the US 
prohibitionist model of eradicating all non-medical supply and demand through the global 
diffusion of police enforcement efforts.  
 
Meyer and Parssinen also highlight the anti-opium drives in China as an expression of 
nascent nationalism and anti-imperialism that was appropriated by virtually all political 
movements following the Opium Wars. All political movements were nonetheless forced to 
engage with the trade (Mao’s communists included) to fund political and military activities.60 
Once in power, the communists instituted one of the most effective anti-narcotics campaigns 
in world history.61 Overall, every side in China before, during and after World War II, as well 
as external actors such as the US, sought to co-opt the opium narrative for broader political 
ends, as this thesis will highlight. 
 
A number of works have attempted to unpick the interaction between US drug diplomacy and 
broader relations with the Middle East. For example, in the case of Iran, Bradley Porter’s 
‘Learning to Tax’ highlights US involvement in establishment of the Government Opium 
Monopoly during the inter-war period. However the work is fundamentally one of economic 
history and engaged in minimal diplomatic archival research.62 Some more recent 
historiography has elaborated on the role of drugs in Middle Eastern politics and their impact 
on interstate relations.63 Nevertheless this field remains extremely underdeveloped. This 
thesis aims to expand on the interaction between drugs and diplomacy in the Middle East and 
Asia via their interaction with Anglo-American diplomacy. This is particularly important 
given the role Britain and the US played in determining and driving drug policy in the 
regions. 
 
Japan and Germany provide particularly interesting case studies. Japan has traditionally been 
viewed as committing narcotics war crimes against China during the 1930s and became a test 
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case for US drug policies after World War II. Germany provides an illuminating case under 
Allied occupation after World War II and given its lynchpin status in Cold War politics. Both 
receive significant attention in this thesis. H. Richard Friman’s examination of Washington’s 
efforts to export its prohibitionist framework to Germany and Japan is the only significant 
account thus far.64 It is based on archival research in both countries.65 Ultimately the archival 
base is relatively shallow, and many assertions are based on politicised reports of the Foreign 
Policy Association about Germany and Japan which, as we shall see in this thesis, sought to 
support the domestic position of Harry Anslinger and the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN). This thesis provides the first archive-based historical account of Anglo-American 
drug control in Germany after World War II and the first extensive account of US drug 
control reconstruction efforts in Japan post-World War II. 
 
The US and UK Domestic Contexts: 
Virginia Berridge has stated that: ‘large areas of policy history, at both the national and 
international levels, remain untouched.’66 Some valuable primary research has been 
conducted on the evolution of British67 and (more extensively) American68 domestic control 
policies during the nineteenth and twentieth century. However, Virginia Berridge states that 
‘little primary historical research’ has covered the period after 1926 in Britain in depth.69 
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Some more recent histories have attempted to discuss early drug policy history from a 
Foucauldian theoretical framework.70 
  
Britain and America are widely held to have taken substantially different approaches to the 
treatment of addiction prior to the early-to-mid 1960s. The approach of the ‘British System’ 
was seen as treating addiction via the prescription of opiates, thereby avoiding criminality 
and suffering inherent in the US repressive approach.71 In many ways it served as a useful foil 
for academics critical of the US’ repressive model.72 The philosophical basis has been traced 
to the 1926 report of the Rolleston Committee.73 The term continues to arouse controversy. 
Berridge argues that ‘there was in fact no ‘British System’ in the way this term is often used, 
rather…a system of masterly inactivity in the face of a non-existent problem.’74 My thesis 
tends to confirm this view by highlighting that UK Home Office officials, particularly in the 
1950s, had no desire to accept new international obligations around a perceived non-existent 
domestic problem. Further Home Office officials had no desire to advocate for the ‘British 
System’ at the international level, merely to avoid a situation where they could be criticized 
at CND for domestic policies. 
 
More recent writings have characterised it as based on fluidity and pragmatism. As two of the 
leading commentators put it: ‘the quintessential characteristic...[is] its lack of rigid form and 
hence its potentially greater capacity to be intuitively reactive to changed circumstances.’75 
This thesis will highlight that this characterisation applies to Britain’s approach to 
international controls, particularly their strong desire to keep commitments minimal and 
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adaptive. This thesis highlights the unwillingness, particularly after World War II, of Britain 
to challenge domestic medical interests or assume costly new obligations for their National 
Health Service, founded in 1948, out of a deference to US control efforts.  
 
The period 1920 to 1965 has been characterised as the ‘Classic Era’ of US narcotics control 
when ‘policy was unprecedentedly strict and punitive’.76 A number of scholars have 
highlighted that the encroachment of US federal power into the field of narcotics control 
interacted with diplomatic motives, special interest pressures, constitutional issues around 
state-federal relations, and ‘ulterior political motives of disingenuous individuals, notably Dr. 
Hamilton Wright’.77 Wright was a moral crusader and one of the original US drug diplomats. 
He was instrumental in shaping the international control system during the genesis period 
around the Hague Opium Conference of 1911-12 and the passage of subsequent national 
control laws. His wife, Elizabeth Washburn Wright continued advocating his vision after his 
death. Her ham-fisted diplomatic forays feature occasionally in this thesis. She represented an 
at times important Washington DC insider component of ‘Anslinger’s Army’ - well 
connected to Executive, Congressional and news outlets. 
 
During the 1960s, when this study ends, a convergence with Britain occurred. America began 
to institute methadone maintenance policies and Britain began to re-evaluate its own system 
in light of a growing drug consuming population.78  
 
Outline: 
This thesis begins below with an overview of the creation of international drug control during 
the first half of the twentieth century, told through the lens of Anglo-American relations. 
Chapter One opens in 1939 with the onset of World War II and the efforts to salvage the 
technical aspects of the League of Nations system. It proceeds in a chronological manner. 
The first two chapters focus most heavily on the ‘era of bilateralism’ as the League Opium 
Advisory Committee (OAC) effectively collapsed. The following two chapters are focused on 
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the re-multilateralisation of control. Chapter Three focuses on the re-creation of control under 
the UN system while Chapter Four focuses on the recreation of control in war torn areas and 
the efforts to ensure adherence to the international system. Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
focus on the creation of new international drug controls and the march towards a production 
limitation agreement, first the 1953 Opium Protocol and ultimately the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Let us now turn to the origins of the system around 1900. 
 
A Long Prelude: Interests, Ideals and Precedents 1900-1939:  
The American International Drug Paradigm and the Birth of International Controls: 
The American paradigm for international drug control solidified around the turn of the 
twentieth century. It encapsulated both domestic concerns and economic interests. Regarding 
domestic concerns, there were two main strands. Firstly, it was fuelled by a changing 
perception of drug user ethnicity and demographics by the white protestant population.79 This 
was magnified by a nativist fear of immigrants, alien substances and cultural practices.80 
Secondly, it was built on a latent progressivism that sought to use the state to remove social 
evils, particularly those believed bred by intoxicants. This progressivism was to develop a 
strong international footing under the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.81 
 
In the economic sphere the US sought to build relations with a Chinese population and state 
apparatus that saw opium as embodying all they detested about the European colonial 
powers. China was the epicentre of the world opium problem and the drug had come to 
represent a potent symbol of national disgrace inflicted during and after the Opium Wars.82 
The US sought to utilise these sentiments to ameliorate their own (largely immigration 
related) tensions with the Chinese business community and help open the market to American 
commercial interests.83 
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The interaction between these idiosyncratic strands of American domestic and foreign 
relations drove US efforts to export drug control.84 The first tangible manifestation occurred 
in the Philippines after the Spanish-American war. Washington ended the opium monopoly, 
begun by the Spanish administrators half a century earlier, and instituted a policy of strict 
prohibition, except for medical purposes.85 This was to serve as the American test case for 
prohibition and eventually the model it forcefully advocated for the European colonial 
powers. 
 
The first US efforts to internationalise prohibition came with its calling the Shanghai Opium 
Commission in 1909. Delegates had no plenipotentiary powers, yet immediately clashed. The 
US and China pushed a strong prohibitionist agenda and the colonial powers dismissed it, 
defending ‘quasi-medical’ opium eating and smoking in their colonies. Meanwhile, drug-
producing states argued that manufacturing states were being hypocritical by seeking to 
restrict opium production while leaving their own pharmaceuticals unhindered. These 
divisions represented the core battles over international drug control through World War II 
and beyond. The Shanghai Commission produced weak recommendations that were largely 
ignored. Britain, in the midst of a Ten Year Agreement for phasing out opium exports from 
India to China, signed in 1907, desired to be left alone to administer its own colonies as it 
saw fit.86 
 
Undeterred, the US threw their weight behind a plenipotentiary Convention.87 The resultant 
Hague Convention of 1912 was a relatively weak document that required universal 
ratification. The outbreak of World War I placed this treaty on hold until 1919 when its 
ratification was included in the Paris peace treaties at the behest of both Britain and the US. 
The accession of Sir Malcolm Delevingne as Under-Secretary for the drug issue at the Home 
Office in 1913 proved pivotal in bringing British policies closer into line with US policies. 
Taking a strong supply control stance he helped overcome Foreign Office reluctance to 
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engage with the issue.88 This forced Germany and Turkey to accede and the Treaty eventually 
came into force.89  
 
The 1912 Convention was a compromise document, with broad aspirations and no 
implementation mechanisms. It became the normative foundation for the international system 
and control efforts over the coming century. Its preamble stated that the international 
community was ‘determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the abuse of opium, 
morphine and cocaine’ and their derivatives.90 What remained was to agree the means to 
achieve this goal. This was rendered more difficult by the fact that the US was ostensibly 
ignoring the effective guardian of the system – the League of Nations. Further, anti-drug 
zealots in the US would sooner see negotiations fail than the US weaken its stance of 
complete prohibition save for ‘medical and scientific needs’.91 Eventually, however, the 
ground was set for two new plenipotentiary conferences to be held in 1924-5. 
 
The British International Drug Paradigm: 
Alfred McCoy views 1773 as the beginning of Opium’s modern era, when the British East 
India Company imposed a monopoly over the sale and production of opium in northeast 
India.92 British policy represented an evolving mix of normative desires and practical 
concerns. In the end it was the practicalities that usually carried the day. Opium smoking was 
permitted within a number of British far eastern territories, and its sale through government 
monopolies provided substantial revenues. The result was a situation whereby Britain’s 
colonies continued a practice that London officially condemned.93  
 
Efforts by Malcolm Delevingne to win the abolition of ‘quasi-medical’ opium use in 
anticipation of the 1924 Conferences led to a nasty bureaucratic fight. This eventually pitted 
the Home Office and Foreign Office on the one side versus the Colonial Office and India 
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Office on the other.94 Delevingne argued London ‘was being continually pressed by public 
opinion in the United States, which has the support of the American Government.’ He was 
supported by the Foreign Office, which was uncomfortable with maintaining an apparent 
hypocrisy on the international stage.95  
 
The Colonial Office was concerned with practical problems around prohibition. China would 
likely serve as a hub for a reinvigorated illicit trade, one that would be politically 
destabilising for British colonies. Further, there would be fiscal ramifications. Between 1858 
and 1947 about one seventh of the revenue of British authorities in India came from taxes 
levied on the production and export of opium, although this remained in steady decline since 
1906.96 Finally, they worried opium consumers being pushed towards heroin, cocaine and 
other substitutes.97 Eventually the Cabinet sided with the Colonial Office, with the Prime 
Minister deciding, ‘Although we wish to see an end to the [opium] traffic, we cannot ignore 
practical difficulties which Americans, in particular, must be made to understand’.98 
 
They chose a policy of gradual suppression over a fifteen-year period (on course to coincide 
with the outbreak of the next world war). A wide loophole, however, made full prohibition 
contingent on effective suppression in China.99 The policy challenged America’s 
uncompromising stance. Meanwhile, the two 1924 Conferences met. The first focused on 
Asia (and to which the US was not invited) and almost immediately became deadlocked. The 
second began in November 1924 and saw the US launch a hard line offensive, throwing 
proceedings into near disarray. Beneath the tempest the subcommittees successfully pulled 
together a number of bureaucratic proposals. Most notable was a system for states to estimate 
their drug requirements, and a means for reporting these statistics to a new (semi-
autonomous) administrative body - the Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB; or ‘the 
Board’).100  
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The first conference concluded in early February 1925, but achieved little owing to the 
instability in China. One week later the second conference wrapped up. The US delegation, 
unwilling to make concessions, had walked out of proceedings and refused to sign. The 
resulting 1925 Convention instituted the first significant bureaucratic mechanisms to 
implement the normative goals outlined in the 1912 Convention. It also brought other drugs 
like coca and marijuana (at Egypt’s request) into the control framework. It did not, however, 
restrict supply and states were free to continue producing and consuming whatever quantities 
they desired, provided they reported statistics to the PCOB.101 Meanwhile, the US had been 
completely alienated from the drug apparatus and would remain so for the next half-decade. 
 
Harry J. Anslinger: 
Harry Anslinger was appointed as head of the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN) in 1930. He would remain Commissioner of the FBN (a branch of the Treasury 
Department) in September 1930 where he would stay until his retirement in 1962 (although 
remaining on as US international drug representative until 1970). Anslinger was a committed 
alcohol prohibitionist and was determined not to repeat the failures of the Volstead act in the 
field of drugs. One of these failures, as he saw it, was an unwillingness to institute harsh 
penalties for individual consumption. As late as 1928 he submitted a plan to a national 
competition offering his ‘better ideas’ on how to administer alcohol prohibition more 
effectively. Anslinger’s feelings for Britain were, at best, ambivalent. He had cut his 
diplomatic teeth with the State Department negotiating the ‘Anslinger Accord’ with British 
officials administering the Bahamas in the 1920s. It established a certificate system for 
shipping, to counteract the overt alcohol bootlegging into the United States from the port of 
Nassau. This success led to his being poached by the Treasury department.102 
 
Anslinger would dominate American (and international) drug control efforts for the next four 
decades. A young and extremely capable bureaucrat, he had a shrewd political instinct, a 
willingness to massage and fabricate data, and an ability to cultivate the media and loyal 
domestic constituencies (‘Anslinger’s Army’) and leverage them to forward his control 
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agenda.103 More pragmatic than his legion domestic detractors gave him credit for his 
overarching priority remained to build and maintain the FBN as the US’ lead drug agency. 
His single-mindedness on the drug issue betrayed a certain moral zealotry, but this was 
usually outweighed by a desire to protect the FBN and his suzerainty over it. He was in this 
sense more of a bureaucratic entrepreneur than a moral entrepreneur.104 
 
Prelude to the War: 
By 1930 conditions in America had sufficiently changed to allow a re-engagement with the 
nascent drug control system. An internationalist constituency argued for engagement with the 
League on this issue as a means towards broader cooperation; the drug manufacturing 
industry feared an agreement imposing unfair conditions; and the State Department wished to 
cleanse the spectre of the 1925 Conference from its relations with the League.105 Moreover, 
the recently appointed Harry Anslinger together with his State Department ally Stuart Fuller 
(the two would remain a close and formidable team until Fuller’s retirement in 1941), quickly 
showed themselves determined to re-internationalise US drug control efforts.106 
 
Within the League, a sense of collective responsibility to vindicate international cooperation 
(particularly regarding arms control) led delegates to surmount the large obstacles to 
agreement.107 The result was a compromise treaty, but one that imbued the drug control 
system with a new coherence, and created a tangible distinction between the global licit and 
illicit traffic. It also added some oversight teeth to the work of the PCOB through the creation 
of the Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) to administer the ‘system of estimates’ (see below).108 
Meanwhile it served to further enshrine supply control as the underlying principle of the 
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international control framework, with little consideration given to demand issues or 
addiction.109 
 
The cooperation proved short lived. Soon afterwards, Malcolm Delevingne retired from the 
Home Office (albeit remaining active within the international control apparatus until 1948).110 
London quietly continued to work to square its colonial interests with its international 
commitments.111 Meanwhile, the US quickly wearied of compromise. Taking up the reins of 
supply control from Britain, Anslinger and Fuller forged ahead with an American vision for 
immediate prohibition of non-medical and non-scientific consumption in an uncompromising 
and divisive manner.112 
 
In 1931 the US had warned that: 
 
There is but one real method by which to suppress the evil of opium smoking in the 
Far East…is complete statutory prohibition of the importation, manufacture, sale, 
possession or use of prepared opium, coupled with active enforcement of such 
prohibition.113 
 
Britain and other European colonial powers agreed in principle but refused to prematurely 
commit. Meanwhile, a growing illicit market accompanied the implementation of the 1931 
Convention.114 States doubled down and looked to cross border anti-smuggling cooperation 
while broader security issues in Europe and Asia threatened to engulf the League. The last 
major act on the control front was the 1936 Illicit Trafficking Conference. During this, 
Anslinger and Fuller attempted, but failed to win criminalisation of all non-medical 
production and distribution. Unwilling to compromise they sought to walk out but were 
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prevented by a State Department anxious to avoid a repeat of 1925. Remaining on at the 
talks, the pair mocked the proceedings and eventually refused to sign the 1936 Convention. 
The treaty did not come into force until October 1939 by which stage war had intervened.115  
 
As the decade drew to a close the League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) became 
consumed with the goal of designing a production limitation treaty. A conference was 
tentatively scheduled for 1940, by which time war resulted in indefinite postponement. In the 
meantime Britain had ignored American efforts to impose a specific timeline for eliminating 
both its opium monopolies and the practice of opium smoking in its colonies.116 Seeing this as 
a major domino in ending the colonial trade, Anslinger would look to the confusion of 
wartime as a means to secure his desired end. This issue, so symbolic of the divide between 
the prohibitionist United States and the old colonial regulatory system, was soon to come to a 
head. 
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Chapter 1: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond – Part I, 1939-43: 
 
Introduction: 
At the outbreak of War in 1939 the drug control system stood as a mixture of contradictions 
and uncertainty. On the one side were the strict control advocates, led by the United States.117 
Having exploited League insecurities to push their hard-line conception of control, they 
struggled to encourage compliance with and widespread acceptance of their approach. On the 
other side were producing states, agrarian countries whose economic, cultural and political 
systems were entwined with - and often in some ways dependent upon - the very drugs the 
system sought to limit. Success for control advocates was often a function of how much 
leverage could be brought to bear on these producer states. In the middle were the old 
colonial powers, of which Britain was the most prominent example. Britain recognised the 
role that addiction and the opium economy played within many of its colonies. It sought to 
balance its desire for international cooperation (which required US interest in this issue to be 
encouraged) with the realities of imperial governance and commercial interests. 
  
The outbreak of war would fundamentally reshape international drug control and set the basis 
for the system that was to be enshrined in the 1961 Single Convention and which endures to 
this day. For the first and only time in its history the evolution of the system would be 
determined by specifically bilateral efforts rather than multilateral efforts. Moreover, it was 
US-led bilateral efforts, driven by its wartime leverage, while other states were confined to a 
rear-guard defensive action. The US was to emerge after the war as the dominant world 
power and the lead nation in international drug control efforts. Instead of recreating the 
previous ambiguous association with the League drug apparatus, the US would take centre 
stage in the new United Nations (UN) control system. None of this was predetermined. The 
rising US geopolitical star facilitated it, but the reshaping control efforts during wartime and 
the emergence of a new post-war system was in many ways the result of aggressive wartime 
diplomatic manoeuvring on the part of the US FBN Chief Harry Anslinger and key members 
of the Washington drug control lobby.  
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In many ways this group fundamentally altered the set of interests underpinning the system 
and changed the arithmetic for post-war control. In so doing they helped set the international 
community on the path towards the 1961 Single Convention. The most radical departure 
occurred in 1943 when Britain and Holland promised to adopt a policy of total prohibition of 
opium smoking and monopolies in their Far Eastern Territories upon repossession. This shift 
was the direct outcome of an aggressive and risky strategy of bluff by Anslinger and his 
allies. Neither country believed their colonial interests were best served by immediate 
prohibition. Nevertheless, owing directly to US pressure both Britain and the Netherlands 
eventually caved in. Their acquiescence helped ensure the post-war control system would not 
revert to the deadlock of the interwar years. Instead it could witness the emergence of a 
reinvigorated supply control framework underwritten by traditional hard line advocates and 
newly supply focused colonial powers. It would also ensure that America could bring new 
pressure to bear on the traditional system recalcitrants such as Iran and Afghanistan, which 
had traditionally rejected new international obligations around opium control, and set the 
stage for a post-war production limitation treaty. 
 
Part 1: The Early War – September 1939 – 1943: 
Salvaging the Apparatus: America Steps up:118 
The international control framework was underpinned by a number of multilateral treaties, 
implemented via national legislation. The League Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) was 
established by a General Assembly resolution and acted as the policy organ of the control 
system. The PCOB and DSB had independent treaty bases – although depended on the 
League Secretariat for administrative functions. The PCOB was empowered by the 1925 and 
1931 Conventions with supervising and reporting upon the movement of opium, coca leaves 
and other narcotic drugs throughout the world, and to ‘sound the alarm’ when excesses 
accumulated in any territory. The DSB was the product of the 1931 Convention and oversaw 
‘system of estimates’ for Governments’ ‘medical and scientific needs’ and to determine what 
quantities each country could manufacture, import and export. The 1931 Convention had 
achieved almost universal adherence by 1933 and applied to 177 territories. Most complied, 
and the PCOB retained the power to request States Parties to impose an embargo on further 
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exports to those that did not.119 In practice this option was avoided and quiet diplomatic 
pressure was preferred. For those states that did not, or could not, supply statistics (including 
those that had not ratified the 1931 Convention), the DSB was empowered to establish 
estimates on their behalf, which were legally binding on States Parties.120 
 
The US maintained official relations with the PCOB and DSB but not the League OAC. The 
US and its control advocate allies such as Canada and China believed the encroachment of 
national economic interests into the OAC and the League drug secretariat had fatally 
weakened the interwar system. The PCOB and DSB were perceived as having remained aloof 
of the politicisation of the OAC.121  When war broke out, the League drug apparatus hoped to 
remain aloof. The PCOB requested all governments to continue sending statistics and the vast 
majority complied.122 Britain remained strongly supportive of maintaining the entire League 
system.123 The US focused on saving the DSB and PCOB. In October 1939 the State 
Department publicly affirmed that: 
 
It is upon the operation of these two boards...supplementing and coordinating the 
efforts of independent nations, that the entire fabric of international drug control 
ultimately rests and the American Government regards it of the highest 
importance...to the entire world, that they should be enabled to function adequately, 
effectively and without interruption and should enjoy the cooperation of all nations.124 
 
By the close of the OAC meeting in Geneva in May 1940 the Netherlands had surrendered to 
Germany and soon France would sign an armistice. Thereafter the pretence of normalcy 
ended, and attention shifted to a salvage operation.125 As Harry Anslinger described it: staff 
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suddenly began ‘jumping around in Geneva like chickens before a hurricane’.126 Evacuation 
of the PCOB and DSB to the US soon appeared to offer the best hope for the system’s 
survival. This PCOB and DSB were perceived as independent of the League and oversaw the 
technical aspects of the system, while avoiding the political issues which could jeopardise its 
continued functioning. 
 
In 1940, President Roosevelt had approved the transfer of ‘non-political’ League services to 
the Institute of International Study at Princeton. The goal was to preserve the League’s 
technical apparatus and gain intelligence about Germany’s economic situation.127 The PCOB 
and DSB were not invited because the distinction between their work and the League 
Secretariat was not grasped in the State Department.128 Nevertheless, Anslinger and other 
system advocates like Helen Howell Moorhead and Herbert May for the Foreign Policy 
Association (FPA), conducted a quiet campaign to overcome State Department opposition - 
the most determined coming from Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long.129 
 
Britain evolved a general wartime policy of ‘keeping alive the organs of the League which 
are able to do useful work.’  In 1940 they were already ‘strongly in favour of the transfer of 
as many officials as possible concerned with narcotics to the US’.130 At the same time, 
wartime conditions fostered the emergence of a new London-based relationship between top 
League drug system personnel stationed in Britain, the Foreign Office and the Home Office. 
The Chairman of the PCOB (and India Office official) Sir Atul Chatterjee had, in July 1940, 
opened a four-way correspondence with Roger Makins, Deputy Head of the Foreign Office 
Central Europe Department, Sydney Harris, Under Secretary of State at the Home Office and 
DSB Chairman Sir Malcolm Delevingne. Hereafter the group is referred to as ‘the London 
Four’. Chatterjee’s initial motive was to gauge State Department opposition to the transfer.131 
 
The four-way correspondence quickly blossomed into a relationship of strong mutual utility. 
The PCOB and DSB officials provided timely expertise to the British government who were 
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both bewildered by the issue's wartime potency and struggling to prevent it poisoning other 
areas of Anglo-American relations. In return, the British Government provided these officials 
with valuable access to the now Washington-based League apparatus. Both functions became 
increasingly important as US influence and internal machinations became more apparent. By 
1943 the DSB Chairman Sir Malcolm Delevingne was acting as the main Foreign Office 
advisor on the opium issue.  
 
In 1940 the State Department appeared likely to refuse the PCOB and DSB move to 
Washington. They suggested League officials look to Portugal, Cuba or South America as 
alternatives. Chatterjee, trying to mollify State Department concerns, promised a minimalist 
role –'reception, collection and publication of statistics’. His sense of urgency increased as his 
correspondence with League headquarters in Switzerland was cut off. A quiet Washington 
lobbying campaign for allowing the PCOB and DSB to move to the US continued under the 
leadership of Herbert May and the Foreign Policy Association (FPA).  
 
May was Vice President of the PCOB; the Acting Chairman of the DSB; and Board member 
of the FPA. He represented a core member of Anslinger’s wartime ‘inner circle’ of control 
advocates but also a true old hand of the system, with broad international respect and 
admiration. May had served on the PCOB since its founding in 1928 and served on both the 
PCOB and DSB before, during and after the war. Since the early League days the FPA had 
served as a surrogate for the US government on the opium issue. It undertook public relations 
work; lobbied US elites; and became an incubator for policy ideas. It was a central plank of 
the wartime ‘inner circle’. It had three main actors one of whom was Herbert May. Helen 
Howell Moorhead chaired the FPA Opium Research Committee and was perhaps the most 
important non-state actor in the formation of international drug control. As William 
McAllister describes, for over a quarter of a century ‘she provided social lubrication, acted as 
a go-between among governmental representatives, floated policy options, and served as a 
backchannel communications conduit’.132 Joseph P. Chamberlain served as President of the 
FPA and law professor at Columbia University. He took a less activist role in the day-to-day 
workings of the ‘inner circle’ initiatives, but served as an extremely effective figurehead for 
FPA activities particularly by utilising his high profile international contacts to engage 
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governments in opium control discussions during the war. All three frequently acted in a 
personal capacity, as the charter of the FPA prohibited policy advocacy.133  
 
The 'inner circle', a term originated by William McAllister, was a group based around Harry 
Anslinger and Washington DC-based control advocates and lobbyists during the war. It 
played an instrumental role in securing the survival of the system, worked to circumvent 
more conservative elements of the old League system, advocated an end to the opium 
monopolies and drove discussions around the post-war drug control system. It included the 
FPA team as a core component. Further it included a number of Anslinger’s chief 
international allies. Most important was Col. Clem Sharman of Canada (see below). At times 
it included Dr. Victor Hoo, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1942-5. Hoo had 
served as China’s lead representative to the League of Nations from 1931 until 1942 when 
the opium issue was a chief foreign policy and domestic concern. He worked closely with the 
US to drive this issue in international discussions, as we shall see.134  
 
George Morlock from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs was Anslinger’s chief ally and 
counterpart at the US State Department. Morlock and Anslinger worked closely although 
Morlock had less determination on this issue and was more deferential to broader State 
Department concerns than his predecessor Stuart Fuller with whom Anslinger had formed an 
extremely tight bureaucratic alliance during the 1930s until his death in 1941.135 The ‘inner 
circle’ also came to include Arthur Elliott Felkin the diligent and earnest PCOB Secretary and 
former British bureaucrat. While in Washington Felkin, came strongly under Anslinger’s 
influence and became highly disillusioned with old League Secretariat members who he 
worked with Anslinger and other ‘inner circle’ members to circumvent. Further it included 
Leon Steinig an exiled Jewish Austrian who had escaped Nazi occupation to the US, 
eventually becoming a US citizen. He had served a key role in drafting the international drug 
treaties during the 1930s and was the main secretariat figure in the DSB.136   
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Eventually Herbert May secured State Department consent for the PCOB and DSB move.137 
Opposition folded when it became apparent that Secretary of State Cordell Hull held a ‘strong 
interest’ in the drug issue. Logistical barriers remained. For example, the Spanish 
Government initially refused a travel visa for Arthur Elliott Felkin. Anslinger eventually 
extorted one by threatening to withhold future narcotic supplies from Spain.138 It was an early 
example of the powerful leverage his opium stockpile afforded him (see below).   
 
Political and logistical constraints ensured minimalist functioning of the PCOB and DSB. 
Reports were reduced to bare bones statistics, removing all commentary not mandated by the 
conventions. They were officially ‘branch offices’ of Geneva Headquarters. With increased 
US patronage came increased US influence. The PCOB and DSB were dependent on the 
goodwill of their hosts and the assistance of Anslinger. As Herbert May described it when 
Anslinger helped solve a complicated issue regarding their office lease: ‘Good old Harry, 
always to the rescue!’ Reciprocating, members of the apparatus provided statistics and 
political intelligence to Anslinger and became a core part of the ‘Inner Circle’.139  
 
Anslinger also used the situation to inculcate the American approach to addiction ‘treatment’ 
to the officials stationed in the US. This involved arranging extensive tours of prisons, federal 
narcotics farms (detoxification hospitals) and various regional FBN bureaus.140 As PCOB 
Secretary Elliott Felkin described one visit to a New York penitentiary to Anslinger: ‘As you 
know, I am a child in these matters, but I want to tell you how strong a general impression of 
keenness and efficiency I got.’141 
 
By 1943 Anslinger commented that it was ‘gratifying to know that the structure we have 
helped to erect over the past years has not toppled’.142 Herbert May later recollected ‘that the 
[PCOB] and the [DSB] w[ere] among the very few international institutions which continued 
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to operate fully all through the war...nearly all League activities had stopped too and the 
Opium Advisory Committee...was not able to operate’.143 Although May overstated their 
functioning it was, nonetheless, a good example of continuity between the League and the 
UN. In 1941 88 per cent of the 177 states and territories covered by the 1931 Convention 
submitted statistics.144 Further, officials, expertise and technical frameworks would be 
available for re-institutionalisation after the war. Other organisations collapsed or became 
tainted by their presence in occupied territories. The International Health Organisation was 
viewed as coming under ‘German and Vichy influence’ and would need a complete 
remoulding after the war.145 
 
With the technical apparatus saved, but the OAC and the League drug secretariat placed into 
limbo the system’s political momentum ground to a halt. Anslinger and his allies continued 
vital behind the scenes efforts to circumvent and make redundant these latter aspects of the 
League system they so hated. Political evolution had shifted to bilateral interactions, largely 
independent of the multilateral framework. America would take the lead on these efforts, 
thoroughly exploiting its wartime position, whilst the old colonial powers fought a stumbling 
rear-guard action. The war would completely reshape the international control system, but 
traditional stumbling blocks continued, particularly between the UK and US. It is towards 
some of these issues that we now turn. 
  
The US and Recurrent Wartime Narcotic Concerns: 
Wartime conditions caused widespread disruption to the licit and illicit markets. Conflict 
increased the demand for painkillers and other medicines. This fuelled expanded production – 
eventually leaving new excesses that could leak into the illicit market, particularly when the 
war ended.146 Narcotics were also indispensible to each nation’s war efforts. A tenet of 
economic warfare became preventing enemy access to drugs or their precursor raw materials. 
For example, throughout hostilities states engaged in practices of ‘preclusive buying’ while 
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seeking to destroy the drug manufacturing capacities of their opponents through bombing of 
factories.147  
 
Opium was also viewed as a direct weapon of war, particularly in the US. After Pearl Harbor, 
Anslinger seized the opportunity to further link the drug issue with national security 
concerns. Japan was already believed to be conducting a ‘narcotization’ campaign against 
China’s population - a charge levelled at many Japanese officials during the Tokyo War 
Crimes Trials.148 Meyer and Parssinen argue that the ‘narcotization’ charge was part of a 
broader ‘myth of conspiracy’ surrounding the drug issue. Regarding Japan and China they 
argue that ‘what looked like genocide and conspiracy at the highest levels…in fact was 
political compromise in pursuit of larger goals’.149 Nevertheless, soon after war broke out 
Treasury Secretary Morgenthau publicly claimed that ‘Japan’s war on Western Civilization 
started ten years ago, an offensive in which the weapons were narcotic drugs’. Anslinger 
claimed that America ‘experienced Pearl Harbors many times in the past in the nature of 
dangerous drugs from Japan which were meant to poison the blood of the American 
people’.150 
 
Another pervasive fear, particularly for the US, was that wartime conditions bred addiction 
among soldiers. They could then bring their habit back home to infect the general population. 
It was a recurring US wartime fear stretching back to the Civil War when morphine addiction 
earned the name the ‘army disease’. It had been particularly potent during and after World 
War I. In Britain WWI press hysteria contributed to the passage of the Dangerous Drugs Act 
in 1920. The historiography of wartime addiction epidemics suggests that they were more 
imagined than real, but proved an enduring public perception of the dangers of war.151 
Anslinger carefully monitored all reports of addiction among US soldiers and their 
interactions with local drug trades. He received a stream of reports from commanders on the 
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ground and his own sources within the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Many were 
forwarded to the War Department for remedial action.152 Britain was acutely aware of US 
fears around proximity for their troops to the opium monopolies during joint operations in 
Asia, as we shall see later.153 
 
Anslinger also grasped opium’s potential as a weapon of economic warfare. He had spent the 
late 1930s building up America’s reserves and by 1940 was sitting on roughly six hundred 
thousand pounds of opium - a four-year supply. This afforded him tremendous strategic 
leverage and apotheosized him to a ‘de facto global drug czar’.154 For example, in August 
1940 the Netherlands East Indies sought emergency supplies of manufactured drugs 
equivalent to one ton of opium. Anslinger insisted that they provide one ton of raw opium 
they were holding ready to be processed into smoking opium.155 Only Britain, meanwhile, 
with its large pharmaceutical industry, remained in a position to challenge US drug 
hegemony.156 
 
Britain Alone – Ensuring Supplies: 
For Britain war raised immediate practical concerns. Unlike the US, Britain had no stockpile 
and had to battle to ensure adequate supplies for its factories, colonies, and pre-existing 
export markets (Canada being one of the largest). This was all before additional wartime 
demands. This required a delicate balancing act: meeting wartime needs; protecting pre-
existing export markets; preventing currency outflows; and making inroads into the 
traditionally German and American dominated pharmaceutical export markets of Latin 
America.157 
 
Britain’s concerns for its colonies centred on ensuring supplies for their monopolies. Absent 
these they faced growing black markets; collapses in government revenues and consuming 
populations suddenly deprived of legitimate supplies, all at a time when they could least 
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afford civil unrest. By 1940 London was sufficiently worried about its international 
bargaining position vis-à-vis producer countries such as Iran that it considered joining forces 
with France, and possibly the Netherlands. Teheran’s Monopoly appeared to be reneging on 
part of a 1939 contract for one thousand chests of opium (each chest weighed roughly 72 
kilograms).158 Fears about their reliability only increased as the Monopoly talked of price 
hikes and began demanding payment in dollars - something the Treasury flatly refused.159 
 
The Colonial Office soon became alarmed over the Straits Settlements’ dwindling stockpiles. 
Meanwhile the Hong Kong monopoly pushed for permission to source alternative supplies 
through a disreputable private firm trading operating under the family name Nemazi. The 
firm had been blacklisted after causing a minor opium scandal for British shipping interests in 
Hong Kong in 1927.160 The Colonial Office was told to sit tight and an arrangement was 
sought for a purchase that would cover both colonies.  
 
After some further false starts with negotiations, the situation in Malaya and Hong Kong 
grew urgent and the Colonial Office began looking to Turkey and Afghanistan as potential 
substitutes.161 The Foreign Office offered no objections, and instead noted that Kabul was 
anxious to sell for fiscal reasons and that Indian was anxious to help them sell. Some in the 
Foreign Office suggested purchases from Turkey would help the Turkish pay for tin and 
rubber and so recycle some of the money back to UK colonies .162  
 
As 1940 drew to a close both Afghanistan and Turkey were prepared to offer supplies of 
opium, in exchange for sterling and on relatively favourable terms.163 Meanwhile the drawn-
out affair surrounding the non-completion of Iran’s contract had reached all the way to the 
desk of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who was marked to receive a full report in 
early 1941.164 This early wartime experience as a hostage consumer nation left an indelible 
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mark on Britain. As we shall see in later chapters, London would vigorously oppose US 
attempts to restrict the global supply prerogative to a ‘closed list’ group of nations.  
The US-Canadian Special Narcotic Relationship: 
Canada was perhaps Britain’s largest pre-war export market for manufactured drugs. Canada 
was also United States’ closest drug diplomacy ally. Canada’s top drug official, Colonel 
Clem Sharman began representing Canada at the League’s OAC in 1934. From then until his 
final retirement from the control system in 1958 he and Anslinger were virtual alter egos on 
the international stage. The two engaged in a prolific correspondence. Both firmly believed in 
controlling supply at the source as well as the pursuit of strict criminal penalties (Britain 
would later characterise Sharman as ‘obsessed with the purely police aspect of the [narcotics] 
problem’). Both also shared a latent disdain for the colonial opium policies of Britain, the 
Netherlands, France and others.165 Sharman’s wartime position was reinforced by the fact that 
the Prime Minister had previously served on the Canadian Delegation to the first international 
opium conference and retained a strong interest in the issue.166 Overall the hard-line position 
Canada took in drug diplomacy arose from Sharman’s strong domestic suzerainty over the 
issue and his skill at manipulating international forums without risking Canadian prestige. As 
we shall see, the Canadian position moderated sharply once Sharman retired from 
government service in 1954. 
 
The personal relationship resulted in a de facto regional framework and strategy for control. 
For example, the two occasionally cooperated to secure cross-border market access for their 
best behaving drug-manufacturing firms. This then strengthened their domestic positions as 
gatekeepers of the industry. They could then use these non-statutory powers to dole out 
benefits and punishments to firms depending on how tightly they controlled supplies.167 No 
similar agreement was reached with the UK throughout the war. Sharman’s relationship with 
London was largely fraught and interactions centred on supply.  
 
Early on in the war Canada took quick action to curtail domestic consumption with the 1939 
War Measures Act. Under this all non-prescribed opiate use was banned. With the fall of 
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Holland and Belgium in mid-1940 Canada lost half its supply of Codeine (its main opiate) 
and a significant portion of its supplies of Morphine and Heroin. They were now completely 
dependent on Britain at a time when the Atlantic was an increasingly perilous supply line and 
Britain’s own survival was in doubt. Canada’s supply situation was a source of concern but 
never became acute. Ottawa had, with Anslinger’s assistance, secured a US promise to act as 
its supplier of last resort.168  
 
North American Ambivalence to Britain: 
Aside from economic competition Anslinger quickly became critical of perceived British 
inaction over wartime smuggling. He had begun the war on reasonable terms with the British 
drug apparatus. He and the Chief Inspector of the Home Office Drug Branch, Major William 
H. Coles, enjoyed a mutual respect at the League OAC. When war broke out Coles was 
reassigned and his role fell to Deputy Chief Inspector Francis Thornton. Anslinger’s overt 
response was concern. He expressed hope that Coles had not severed his connection with the 
issue.169 This initial response set the tone for the relationship until Coles’ return in 1945, 
during which time Thornton would inspire a lack of faith in Anslinger (and Sharman) that 
would eventually become disdain. 
 
In 1940 Anslinger praised signs that the UK was toughening its police response to domestic 
drug use. He was particularly glad to see addicted members of the medical profession being 
prosecuted. In early 1941, however, Liverpool began drawing press attention as a trans-
shipment port for the illicit traffic into North America. Liverpool became an increasing 
annoyance as reports about it came to the State Department during 1942. His initial response 
was to quietly reach out to Thornton and the Home Office ‘to work out something’.170 
Anslinger remained relatively muted on the issue until after 1943, when he came back to it 
aggressively.  
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Another source of Anglo-North American wartime tension was Britain’s interactions with 
Latin America, as we shall see in Chapter Two. These Anglo-American drug disagreements 
strengthened Anslinger’s resolve to use wartime confusions to secure an end to the British 
opium monopolies in the Far East. 
 
Part 2: Drug Control in Asia 
Article 6 of the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 committed states parties to the gradual 
‘suppression of the manufacture, the internal traffic in and the use of prepared opium in so far 
as the difference conditions peculiar to each nation shall allow’. The United States continued 
to push for immediate suppression similar to that enacted in the Philippines. The European 
colonial powers’ response was to establish government monopolies and gradual measures to 
suppress prepared opium use. Many argued consumption was diminishing as a direct result of 
the monopoly system. Further they claimed it was an effective mechanism to prevent the 
illicit traffic ‘which stimulates consumption’.171 
 
At the outbreak of war opium smoking, under proscribed conditions, was legal in the 
Netherlands Indies, British Malaya, the Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak, Burma, 
India, Ceylon, British North Borneo, Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Thailand. States 
with monopolies maintained that they were in line with the 1912 Convention and were 
preferable to total prohibition. The US and China demanded that large and mandatory annual 
reductions in these supplies be included in any production limitation agreement. The British 
and Dutch maintained that a production limitation agreement was first needed to reduce the 
leakages into the illicit market from China and Persia and then abolition of opium smoking 
and eating might be possible, ‘provided that a reasonable transitional period is allowed’.172 
 
For the US, China and to a lesser degree Canada, the causality was reversed: the monopoly 
system sustained the illicit market, addiction and non medical-scientific usage while stalling 
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production limitation. By solving this question, forward momentum on a production 
limitation convention could thus be enabled.173  
 
China: 
During the 1920s and 30s China disintegrated into warlordism, civil war and then war with 
Japan. Political and economic fuelled a process whereby local politics and the black market 
grew in symbiosis, as all sides used the illicit trade to finance military operations.174 By the 
beginning of the 1930s China remained the epicentre of the global trade and the key to 
control in the region. Meanwhile, a League Commission of Enquiry reported in 1930: 
‘Contact with Chinese Immigrants has in other Far-Eastern territories usually been the cause 
of the indigenous population acquiring the opium-smoking habit’.175  
 
In 1935 the nationalists began the most vigorous anti-opium campaign they would ever 
undertake. This Six-Year Opium Prohibition Plan aimed for total suppression by 1940 but 
was largely unsuccessful.176 Nevertheless the Government began declaring victory in areas it 
controlled, while claiming areas under Japanese control were getting worse and that China’s 
successes were being undermined by ‘places where opium is openly sold by the local 
governments’.177 
 
The situation in China caused a division between Britain and the US. Britain was deeply 
sceptical of Chiang’s claims while the US privately recognised that facts on the ground were 
more complex and that Generals and local politicians loyal to Chiang were likely complicit in 
the trade. Nevertheless, US public statements remained effusive in their support of Chiang.178 
For the US, the narrative served a useful tool to bludgeon the Japanese, while also building 
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Chinese goodwill. Such statements became harder to sustain as the war went on (see Chapter 
Two).  
 
Ending the Colonial Issue: 
By 1942 the ‘inner circle’, led by Helen Moorhead and Herbert May, were examining 
principles for post-war control (see Chapter Three) and the ending of colonial opium 
monopolies. On the other side were, what Sharman described as, the ‘“wait and see” army’ 
led by Malcolm Delevingne and Bertil Renborg of the League Secretariat. They suggested 
first examining the ideas of consolidating the existing conventions into ‘a single instrument’. 
Second, to evaluate the efficacy of specific convention provisions. Third, to plan re-
establishing international controls when hostilities ceased. Both Sharman and Anslinger 
despised Renborg, viewing him as emblematic of the old League of Nations apparatus which 
they wanted to kill off, and had no intention of engaging with him. George Morlock, 
Anslinger’s counterpart in the State Department, also agreed that the US should not become 
embroiled until US broader post-war policies were clear.179 
 
Anslinger viewed ‘Sir Malcolm’s ideas’ as ‘typical of British Imperial policy’ and suggested 
to Sharman that the US and Canadian governments ‘march along together on a concrete plan 
involving the abolition of smoking opium after the war and limitation of production’. He 
went on, ‘if we do not get agreement with the British Government before the war is over, we 
might as well give up the idea of progress as they will fall back to the pre-war tempo’. 
Sharman agreed but argued that mid-1942 was ‘the worst possible time to take the initiative’ 
as ‘the dice would be loaded more heavily’ against them. He suggested bringing Russia on 
board as he and Anslinger meet to chart a path forward.180 Anslinger let the matter stall, but in 
September 1942 developed a plan. As he wrote to Sharman: 
 
I have been asked to instruct naval officers who are being trained to take over 
administration in occupied territories in the South Pacific, on narcotic 
administration. The thought occurred to me that it would be a good thing to 
indoctrinate them well with the idea of abolishing the monopolies immediately after 
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they take over. Victor Hoo called the same day with the same idea, stating that the 
Chinese intended to take similar action and that if we also took this action and the 
monopolies were out during the armistice period, one, two, or three years, the British 
could hardly re-establish these institutions if, as, and when they regain possession.181 
Sharman quickly agreed ‘whole-heartedly’. However, Anslinger’s strategy involved a great 
deal of bluff. The US would have the right to establish any form of government in areas of 
which they had unilateral control. In areas of joint control, the US could not act unilaterally. 
Morlock was dissuaded from further pursuit of the issue within the State Department, but 
privately suggested that Anslinger pursue it with the War and Navy Departments by 
suggesting that closing opium dens was a US legal obligation.182  
 
The League Old Guard: 
In the meantime Bertil Renborg had drafted two memos outlining post-war planning options. 
These arose from meetings of the PCOB and DSB in London during 1942, which the ‘inner 
circle’ had largely boycotted. Renborg sought to circumvent the ‘inner circle’ by gaining the 
support of the Acting Secretary General of the League, Sean Lester. The latter had expressed 
an interest but intended to reserve his decision until he received the final plans. Renborg set 
to work consolidating them and finally forwarded them on to Anslinger and Sharman on 
December 28th, two full months after the London meeting. By this stage Anslinger and the 
‘inner circle’ had their own plans in motion and had little intention of supporting Renborg.183 
 
Renborg’s vision focused on consolidating the treaties, continuity of function of the system of 
estimates, and the wholesale transfer of the League apparatus. Regarding the monopolies and 
quasi-medical consumption, he dismissed radical action, suggesting ‘prohibition could not be 
expected by itself to bring about the desired result’ and suggesting further study.184 Upon 
receipt of the documents Anslinger wrote back angrily: 
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the two most important subjects in a post-war world, namely, limitation of opium 
production and abolition of smoking opium monopolies, were given the same 
treatment which they have had in the past—the old political run around. It is my 
opinion that if any progress is to be made…the approach will have to be entirely 
different from that set forth in the vague program.185 
 
Sharman responded with similar criticisms. Renborg moved quickly to assuage doubts 
claiming that the informal ‘consensus’ was that opium smoking would be abolished and that 
effective measures would be included in any peace settlement. Sharman and Anslinger 
remained unimpressed.186 
 
Towards an ‘Inner Circle’ Strategy:187 
Over a series of three meetings, between December 1942 and March 1943 Anslinger and the 
‘inner circle’ pushed ahead. The meetings were held unofficially, under the independent and 
unthreatening banner of the FPA, but choreographed to suggest US government backing – for 
example being held in Anslinger’s office, ostensibly because FPA conditions were too 
cramped. In December 1942, Anslinger (FBN), Helen Moorhead (FPA); Professor 
Chamberlain (FPA); Herbert May (PCOB; DSB; FPA); Dr. Victor Hoo (China); Dr. Liu 
Chieh, Minister Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy; and George Morlock (US State 
Department) met to strategize.  
 
All meetings would need to remain unofficial since the US government had not reached 
consensus policies on post war planning, let alone the drug issue. The FPA could convene 
them and eventually work to offer ‘independent’ recommendations to the State Department 
and thereby drive US policy. Given the proximity of the expected allied drive on Burma it 
was agreed that this should represent the focus of discussions. Dr. Hoo suggested that, 
although the British would argue it was a civilian health issue, it was arguably ‘a military 
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necessity for the safety and welfare of troops’. This became the core of the argument for both 
the US and China. It was agreed to hold another meeting in early January 1943.  
 
The ‘inner circle’ then worked to develop a Pacific consensus and thereby isolate the British 
and the Dutch. Sharman, given the political complication and afraid to step too far ahead of 
Canadian government policy, sat out the second meeting. The FPA secured the involvement 
of the ‘obviously unaware’ Australia and New Zealand. At the meeting Anslinger and 
Morlock sounded-out the two governments and suggested the US government was merely 
deciding how to approach relevant governments. With little substantive progress it was 
agreed to convene another meeting on March 17th and include representatives from Britain, 
the Netherlands, China, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.188 
 
The Dutch quickly agreed to send an ‘observer’ from their Washington Embassy to the third 
meeting.189 On receipt of the invitation, the UK Foreign Office solicited the Home Office’s 
thoughts in a somewhat routine manner.190 The London four relationship (see above), 
between Harris (HO), Chatterjee (PCOB), Delevingne (DSB) and now a Mr M. S. Williams 
(FO), came into its own as a counterweight to the ‘inner circle’. Delevingne, by this stage the 
Foreign Office’s main opium advisor, immediately rang alarm bells. He read it as a 
bureaucratic flanking manoeuver intended to bypass the old League structures and warned it 
was ‘certain’ that opium smoking would be raised. He pointed out that the Government of 
Burma was already looking at this question, and Malaya and Hong Kong would have to 
examine it closely before Britain could formulate a coherent position, let alone have a lay 
Washington Embassy official discuss it.191  
 
Consequently, London refused to be represented but gave the Ambassador discretion to send 
‘an observer’. The Foreign Office expressed curiosity as to the official attitude of the US 
Government to the unofficial meeting and quickly opened what was to prove a long and 
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vigorous inter-departmental discussion by soliciting the Colonial Office’s views.192 The latter 
called the question ‘premature’ given wartime uncertainties. They expected Japan was 
‘fostering’ opium smoking and preferred a regional solution, based on a convention with 
surrounding territories.193 
 
Lord Halifax, anxious to oblige the request and unaware he was wading into a flammable 
area of the US-UK relationship, opted to send an observer. It was a decision he came to 
regret. In reporting back to London he sent a stern pre-emptive defence of his decision, citing 
the Washington culture of ‘unofficial’ and ‘exploratory’ conferences at a time of ‘great and 
growing importance of the United States in International Affairs’. He also requested a full 
statement of policy for his future reference.194  
 
His representative had been blindsided at a meeting that was clearly choreographed to force 
the colonial issue.195 Choosing his words carefully, Anslinger said that ‘one cannot have the 
Four Freedoms and still sell opium’. He then attacked past British colonial opium policies 
while Herbert May suggested Britain had the worst international reputation regarding opium. 
Moreover, they warned that the US press was snooping around the issue and viewed it as 
linked with other international problems.  
 
Anslinger pointed to China’s supposedly enormous successes and claimed that in the event of 
an occupation of Burma, China would enact strict prohibition on its sale. Sharman and 
Chamberlain, closed ranks also praising China’s domestic control efforts. Sharman, however, 
was careful to make explicit that the views expressed were his own and that a formal 
Canadian policy had not yet been discussed. Anslinger then argued that China’s policy could 
lead to a clash with the British. Vouching his own opinion he said the American forces would 
follow a similar policy of immediate suppression in the areas that they occupied.196 
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Anslinger was bluffing. The State, Treasury, War and Navy Departments had not yet 
expressed a specific policy, let alone suggested that they would override their uniform 
occupation policies (already agreed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff). Initial official 
responses had suggested strong caution. The US government would try to ‘persuade’ their 
allies to follow US policy but unilateral measures were not envisaged.197 Further, a precedent 
had already been set in North Africa where the French had reopened their hashish monopoly, 
while the US could merely forbid its occupation forces from using its shops.198 In a broader 
sense, the Roosevelt administration, and Secretary Hull in particular, were careful to avoid 
airing alliance politics publicly at this time.199 George Morlock sat in silence at the meeting as 
Anslinger set the US up for a potentially embarrassing climb down should the colonial 
powers refuse to fold. His silence, however, helped create a perception within the Foreign 
Office that Anslinger spoke for a unified US Government.200 
 
Anslinger’s portrayal of China was labelled the work of ‘foreign and Chinese propagandists’ 
back in London. They maintained the main obstacle to total prohibition in colonies adjacent 
to China remained ‘smuggling by and on behalf of the Chinese communities resident therein’. 
London saw itself as at least being honest in refusing to enact a policy it could not enforce. 
One Foreign Office official, unaware that the American drug apparatus was staffed with 
many unreconstructed alcohol prohibitionists and highlighting the Foreign Office’s lack of 
institutional knowledge around the politics of the drug issue, made the point that: ‘Americans' 
with their experience of prohibition should be the first to appreciate the importance of 
avoiding a situation where the law itself is brought into contempt.’ China, on the other hand, 
was seen as publicly enacting broad laws of suppression while privately allowing profitable 
monopolies to function under the name of an ‘Opium Suppression Bureau’, marketing the 
drug as ‘anti-opium medicine.’ 201 
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The Dutch Observer took a conciliatory attitude at the meeting but soon after requested the 
minutes be changed to express his defence for the monopoly system as the best means to 
prevent smuggling. Further he sent on an article by the former Dutch OAC member, DeKat 
Angelino, which justified the Dutch position. It claimed the results of prohibition in the 
Philippines were not ‘encouraging’, and criticised those arguing for immediate prohibition as 
misguided. It argued that the current Dutch policy prevented the growth of the illicit traffic, 
corruption and opium consumers from turning to cocaine and heroin.202 
 
Anslinger dismissed it as ‘the old opium bloc argument’. By June 1943 the ‘inner circle’ had 
no idea whether their strategy was a success. They were awaiting further communication 
from Victor Hoo; had no sense of official Australian or New Zealand policy, nor whether the 
official Canadian policy would echo the US; further British and Dutch reactions to the 
meeting suggested ‘a repetition of their former position’. Anticipating little progress they 
began to examine ‘further avenues’.203 
 
British Policy Shifts: 
Foreign policy goals quickly outweighed practical administrative concerns for the Foreign 
Office. Anthony Eden accepted the difficulties but hoped to avoid ‘unfriendly criticism’ by 
accommodating Sino-US goals. The Foreign Office recognised the political capital China 
would draw from British intransigence and ‘disproportionate importance’ placed on the issue 
in the US.204 Aware this was an issue that they ‘clearly are not very well informed on’ the 
Foreign Office solicited views from the Home, Colonial, Dominions, Burma and India 
Offices.205 Those involved in discussions soon decided more concrete measures were 
necessary. 
 
The Reasons for the Shift: 
A core reason for the shift in British policy was a change in costs and benefits around opium 
policies in the colonies. After the 1925 Conventions the colonial governments in Borneo and 
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Malaya had imposed a system of registration and rationing for smokers. Gradually rations 
were reduced, while efforts were made to improve social conditions. Registration for the 
Malayan monopoly was effectively closed in 1934 and the expectation was that the existing 
addiction would shrink while usage would not spread to a new generation.206 
 
Hong Kong was unable to adopt a similar course due to its proximity to Mainland China.207 
During the 1920s civil disorder in China caused an influx of black market opium. Rather than 
suppression, the goal of government policy became merely to coerce consumers into buying 
monopoly opium. Further, fiscal benefits of the monopoly militated against efforts to change 
the system.208 However, with these fiscal benefits and the concerns about administrative 
practicalities muted by Japanese occupation, the desire to appease American demands in 
1943 outweighed these former obstacles. This wartime logic applied across the various 
British territories occupied by Japan. 
 
The Dutch unilaterally decided to acquiesce to US demands in August 1943, but postponed 
an announcement to allow Britain to make a simultaneous announcement.209 This Dutch 
decision, the Secretary of State for India and Burma said later, made it ‘difficult to resist 
American proposals’.210 Britain was at risk of becoming a regional pariah on this issue. In 
September 1943 the Interdepartmental Opium Committee convened at the Home Office.211 A 
broad policy of suppression was agreed along with a draft public statement (after subsequent 
tweaking) that the UK:  
 
‘has decided to adopt the policy of total prohibition of opium smoking in the 
British and British protected territories in the Far East which are now in enemy 
occupation and, in accordance with this policy, the prepared opium monopolies 
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formerly in operation…will not be re-established on their reoccupation [emphasis 
added].’ 212 
 
London no longer felt in a position to say ‘no’ to the US on this question. They were acutely 
aware of the US public fears of opium and the US Government’s desire to protect their 
troops.213 Moreover, Britain feared a public relations disaster should the American public 
blame the opium monopolies for infecting their soldiers with addiction.214 Further, they 
expected public relations windfall in the US following the announcement, which could help 
alleviate broader colonial policy tensions. Simultaneously, the administrative costs of 
prohibition were viewed as significantly less than they had been in the decades prior, 
particularly as the Japanese occupation removed the administrative benefits. Finally, 
sacrificing the monopolies in British territories occupied by Japan would help appease 
American demands before they could be extended to cover the more problematic case of 
India.215 
 
The policy shift would not apply to India, where the traditional method of opium 
consumption was by eating not smoking. Mainland India was also not ‘in enemy 
occupation’.216 Burma proved the most complicated case and would drag on into the post-war 
era (see Chapter Two). Consequently, reiterating previous reservations, the 1943 statement 
explicitly warned that success would ‘depend on the steps taken to limit and control the 
production of opium in other countries’ (i.e. China).217  
 
Crossed Cables: 
Anslinger was uncertain of the outcomes of the FPA meetings and initiated a public relations 
offensive in the US, stoking fears of a resurgent heroin trade after the war if the monopoly 
system was re-established and was allowed to infect US troops. Congressman Carroll Reece 
gave a widely publicised speech in the House of Representatives mimicking Anslinger’s 
talking points about the monopoly system being incompatible with the ‘Four Freedoms’ and 
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highlighting the dangers of a resurgent trade. Anslinger also worked with his international 
allies, particularly Dr. Hoo to forge a Sino-US response to expected Anglo-Dutch 
intransigence. Simultaneously, Anslinger’s domestic allies exerted political pressure in both 
the US and UK. The FPA reached out to the British Council of Churches, fishing for 
intelligence on Whitehall inter-departmental discussions. Even if successful, Helen 
Moorhead, wanted a change in policy to seem ‘the result of British opinion, not American 
pressure,’ to help ‘save their face’. 218 Ultimately this overture seemed to go nowhere and 
there is no indication that British public opinion and domestic lobby groups played a 
significant role in determining government policy around opium. 
 
The Federal Government eventually formed a consensus policy that the US would do 
everything possible to effect suppression, but that it was not something that could technically 
be forced upon the colonial powers.219 Anslinger and his domestic allies focused only on the 
first part of the statement and declared victory. Helen Moorhead congratulated Anslinger that 
his actions had ‘proved sound and wise both in timing and strategy’ and that he had 
accomplished ‘steady forward movement’.220 The State Department issued a polite aide-
memoire to London, the Netherlands, China and Portugal restating US views and suggesting 
they limit opium use to strictly medical and scientific purposes. They also asked the British 
Government to consider ‘a common policy’ for forces under allied command, while reserving 
the right to take any independent measures ‘deemed necessary for the protection of the 
health’ of US forces.221 
 
The receipt of this document sparked confusion in London and mild panic in the Washington 
Embassy. The Embassy, (unaware of the policy shift already agreed in London) read it as a 
‘threat…which the Americans might easily put into effect, with the full support of their 
public opinion’. Furthermore, the Embassy feared it could  ‘compromise the position which is 
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being slowly built up, of leaving control of civil affairs in British territory to British 
authorities.’ The Embassy asked that it be ‘considered urgently’ warning that ‘the people 
interested here are fairly unscrupulous in their methods’ and ‘if there is what seems to them 
undue delay they may start some kind of propaganda campaign which might be damaging to 
us.’222  
 
The Embassy’s reaction must be read in the context of the aftermath of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations Conference which took place at Mont Tremblant in December 1942. Colonial 
issues emerged as a major point of contention and William Roger Louis argues ‘American 
anti-colonial sentiment reached its wartime peak’. Emerging from the hostility of this 
conference as a respected voice of British Colonial interests was Lord Hailey (a retired 
Governor of the Punjab and the United Provinces of India). He offered a stern but pragmatic 
defence of British policies. He went on a public relations offensive in the US during the 
winter of 1942-3, becoming one of the most effective propagandists for British Colonial 
policies.223 It seems his progress was part of the ‘position’ that the Embassy feared would be 
undone by the opium issue. Back in London, the reference to strict ‘medical and scientific’ 
usage was read by many as an escalation of US demands. Initially it sparked mild 
bureaucratic confusion. Departments worked to ensure that the public relations offensive 
would address the concerns highlighted, but on points of substance, it was eventually 
ignored.224 
 
The Embassy’s fears were the most alarmist expressed by British officials on paper. 
Moreover, the policy shift had already been decided upon and even with the misinterpretation 
of the aide-memoire, London was still not willing to restrict to ‘medical and scientific needs’. 
Given these points, it is hard to conclude that fears of losing control of colonial civil affairs 
drove British policy from the start.225 The concerns were likely present, and consciously 
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fanned by Anslinger (for example, his carefully chosen use of the ‘four freedoms’ phrase). 
However, this concern existed in a broader context of British weakness - given that it would 
be bargaining over territories currently out of its possession – and the existence of strong 
anti-colonial sentiments within the US. At no point (other than the later panic within the 
Washington embassy) did there appear an imminent fear that opium would be the trigger for 
America to thwart British repossession of its colonies. 
 
Overall, it was a decision largely based on a cost-benefit analysis. The British government 
had not been a long way from enacting some form of suppression prior to the 1924 
Conferences. At that time the administrative costs of prohibition outweighed the public 
relations benefits and the Colonial Office’s concerns held more weight than the Foreign 
Office's desire to win international credibility. By 1943 the equation had reversed. Negative 
publicity and the alienation of powerful figures in the US government could adversely affect 
broader foreign policy goals. This was at a time when none of the administrative benefits of 
the monopolies were being felt. Anslinger had pushed hard while the British were at a weak 
point, and their resistance quickly gave way. Had Anslinger not forced this issue, it seems 
unlikely that Britain would have embarked on such a broad and coherent policy shift upon 
retaking its possessions. The situation on the ground would more than likely have called for a 
recreation of the monopoly system and the pre-war status quo, in the short term at least. 
 
Announcements and Outcomes: 
London began choreographing its statement to obtain ‘the fullest possible publicity value, 
especially in the US.’226 The Colonial Office wanted to hold off informing the State 
Department in case it tried to pre-empt the British announcement and steal the public 
relations coup.227 The Foreign Office, professing little faith in the Colonial Office’s publicity 
skills, cautioned over the ‘inflammable nature of this question’. It feared that attempting to 
‘jump’ the State Department would lead to criticism of the announcement as inadequate, 
‘irritate them…and incidentally undo some of the patient work… [of] the last year and half at 
getting the Far Eastern Division of the State Department to consult and act with us whenever 
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we can.’228 In the end the Foreign Office decided to inform the State Department, but 
explicitly ask it not to pre-empt London’s announcement.229 
 
By 16 September, both Anslinger and Sharman were celebrating. As Sharman described it: 
 
This is the most happy solution to what might well have proved…a major conflict of 
policy between the United States and Great Britain at or before the Peace 
Conference…I am abundantly satisfied that your personal influence, as also your 
action in having the unofficial show down meeting in Washington last March, was by 
far the most influential factor.230 
 
Anslinger labelled it ‘the first concrete post-war agreement for which Treasury is 
responsible’.231 
 
On November 10 1943, in response to a prepared question in the House of Commons, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies recited a prepared statement two paragraphs in length. It 
was accompanied, on the same day, by the Netherlands’ announcement. The Acting Secretary 
of State noted the announcements ‘with satisfaction’ and gushed that: ‘the problem of 
smoking opium should now be susceptible of solution’.232 Drug control advocates went to 
work drawing press attention in the US. The story was initially overlooked; a fact that was 
decried as ‘outrageous’ by long-time system insider Elizabeth Washburn Wright. A month 
later the Washington Post concurred, writing in an editorial that it had not ‘received the 
attention it deserves’.233  
 
Chiang’s government responded to Britain’s poke at ‘other countries’ by publicly welcoming 
the announcements and painting China alongside the US as the ‘principal advocates’ for total 
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prohibition.234 Britain was infuriated at being placed ‘on the defensive’ and the Foreign 
Office privately cursed the Chinese as ‘hypocrites’ who ‘cleverly…conceal their 
hypocrisy!’235 Sir Malcolm Delevingne wrote an opinion piece in the Times of London 
claiming that it would ‘make a not unimportant contribution to the cause of Anglo-American 
cooperation particularly in the Far East’. Congressman Carroll Reece, in a speech on the 
House floor, described how Anslinger, through his informal negotiations, was ‘largely 
responsible for this diplomatic triumph’.236  
 
Behind the backslapping, voices of dissent surfaced in Britain. For example, Mr. Clifford 
Bellairs wrote in a letter to the Times of London: 
 
I have had some 30 years’ experience of the opium trade and this I can prophesy with 
certainty: if the Government merely prohibits the import and sale of smoking opium in 
the Far East the illicit traders, smugglers and dope peddlars will return en masse to 
make enormous profits to spread the vice, and it will not end the comparatively 
innocuous smoking of opium…but will open up further fields for the illicit 
consumption of morphine and cocaine, each a hundred times more deadly.237 
 
Another major domino would fall in 1945 when the French announced a policy of prohibition 
in their colonies.238 The paradigm for the post-war world was being shaped. Successful 
prohibition in one country depended on successful prohibition in all countries and Britain 
now had a vested interest in securing universal and effective supply controls throughout Asia. 
It seemed that much of the deadlock of the inter-war years could be headed for extinction.  
Having won this wartime coup, Anslinger had earned significant leverage both at home and 
abroad. He quickly turned his sights towards the Middle East and Iran in particular. 
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Part 3: Iran: 
Iran was one of the world’s major opium producers. Its support for international controls had 
traditionally been weak, drawing scorn from control circles, particularly the US. It had signed 
the original 1912 Convention with a major reservation, rejecting one of its central principles: 
that an exporting country was responsible for preventing the shipment of opium to countries 
that prohibited its entry (article 3(a)). Iran's motives appeared purely economic: this would 
close the lucrative Chinese market. Iran further refused to adopt an international 
import/export certificate system – as per the 1925 Convention - thereby undermining the 
efficacy of international control efforts.239 Shifting Iran’s international policies became a 
central plank of US wartime drug diplomacy. Britain, on the other hand, was unwilling to 
undermine relations with Iran out of deference to the drug issue.  
 
During the interwar years India had ceased opium exports to China. Iran quickly took up the 
slack. Its crop peaked in 1936 at forty per cent of the world’s morphine supply, and fifteen 
per cent of Iran’s foreign exchange earnings.240 By the outbreak of war it was also viewed as 
a main source for the global illicit market, particularly for Japanese forces in China in the 
midst of their wartime ‘narcotization’ campaign.241 The invasion of Iran by Britain and Russia 
in 1941 disrupted the Iranian-Japanese-Chinese trade. Britain ceased issuing navicerts 
allowing neutral ships to pass through wartime blockades. This cut off shipments to Japanese 
firms, and in so doing won plaudits from the US press and political establishment. The 
American Consul in Tehran noted that through ‘the British contraband control, Iran [was] cut 
off from its former profitable Far Eastern Market’. Around this time the new regime of 
Mohamed Reza Pahlavi expressed a desire to curtail opium production and consumption. 
Washington remained sceptical, particularly after an Iranian Treasury Official stated in 
December 1941 that their Monopoly would treat opium sales as a purely commercial 
transaction, regardless of the consequences for the countries it was selling to.242 In this, the 
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Americans heard a clear restatement of the original Iranian reservation to article 3(a) of the 
1912 Convention. 
 
 
 
 
An Iranian-American Drug Détente: 
In 1942 Anslinger was forced by the State Department to temporarily lift the ban on Iranian 
opium imports to improve relations.243 A drawn-out US-Iranian opium engagement ensued. 
The latter periodically promised adherence to the drug conventions, the former promised 
access to its domestic market after the war. Anslinger then tentatively welcomed an olive 
branch from the Chief of the New York-based Iranian Trade and Economic Commission, 
Allah Yar Saleh to try to regularise the US-Iranian opium trade. For Iran it was part of a 
broader trade rapprochement with the US in 1942-43. For Anslinger it was an opportunity to 
press Iran to improve domestic controls.244 
 
In 1942 the State Department began negotiating a free trade agreement with Allah Yar Saleh. 
It would cover sixty commodities - one of which was opium. Both Anslinger and George 
Morlock opposed opium’s inclusion, preferring deference to the drug conventions and 
warning the US could not legally buy Iranian opium after the war unless Tehran adhered to 
drug conventions. Further they suggested it would be a perverse reward given Iran’s record, 
and would ignore the good behaviour of convention adherents like Yugoslavia and Turkey.245 
 
Elizabeth Washburn Wright suggested tying the trade agreement to American drug control 
demands, thereby adding new pressure on the Iranian government to adhere to the drug 
conventions. It is not clear how Anslinger viewed her proposal but George Morlock was 
unequivocal that ‘the trade agreement was too important to be tied up with the small matter’ 
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of opium and the suggestion should be ‘thrown out’. He preferred instead a ‘voluntary’ 
exchange of notes between the two countries on the opium issue.246  
 
Britain Steers Clear: 
Bertil Renborg, the increasingly side-lined League drug Secretariat old hand, (see Chapter 3) 
viewed it as an opportunity to show the League Secretariat’s continued relevance and 
contacted the British Home Office. He asked Britain to use ‘its influence’ in Tehran to obtain 
some progress on control. The Foreign Office believed it was not a ‘specifically British 
interest’ and that they already had ‘enough more important matters’ on their hands. Further ‘a 
pipe of opium is one of the few consolations a Persian can enjoy in these days and any 
attempt by us to interfere would only add to our unpopularity’. 247 Their flat refusal 
highlighted the place of opium within the hierarchy of Britain’s foreign policy concerns at the 
time. 
 
Anslinger Bides his Time: 
Just as Renborg’s efforts were falling flat, the US and Iran concluded their 1943 Free Trade 
deal. It was the twenty-seventh deal America had signed under the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreement Act of 1934; the sixth since the outbreak of war; yet only the second with a 
country in the Near East (Turkey was the first). The 1934 act had been passed to provide 
Presidential authority to conclude agricultural trade agreements without congressional 
approval as a means towards alleviating the economic depression of the 1930s.  Iran received 
concessions on ninety-five per cent of products exported to the US as of 1939. Opium was 
still to be strictly controlled by the FBN and the change in the tariff rate was not expected to 
strongly impact the volume traded. It did however lessen Iran’s comparative disadvantage in 
morphine, given the relatively low morphine content of its opium vis-a-vis other suppliers 
(e.g. Afghanistan). In order to activate the trade concessions in opium, Iran first needed to 
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enact a system of import/export certification as per the 1925 Convention, and ensure 
domestic laws were sufficient to confine opium to legitimate channels.248 
 
By the end of the year it was apparent that Iran was making no progress towards stricter 
controls.249 Britain, having made a tangible contribution to control through shutting off 
Iranian exports to Japan for broader geopolitical reasons, had no desire to interfere in Iranian 
domestic politics regarding opium. The risks of rural destabilisation, corruption, public 
alienation and others such issues were too much of an immediate concern, while the returns 
from increased control, assuming it was even feasible, were too distant. Anslinger on the 
other hand, undeterred and flush with success after the Anglo-Dutch announcement of 
November 1943, entered 1944 ready to refight his battle with Iran. His position was 
considerably strengthened by a change in Afghan drug policy during 1943. 
 
Part 4: Afghanistan: 
The US had previously refused to supply Afghanistan with manufactured opiates due to its 
non-ratification of the 1912 Convention  (it had ratified the 1931 Convention). By 1941 
Kabul appealed to the State Department to reconsider. Initially they refused, claiming the 
Commissioner could not legally authorise supplies to non-adherents of the 1912 Convention. 
Afghanistan promised to take ‘any steps’ necessary ‘to comply with American laws’ and the 
State Department privately acknowledged that in 1912 Afghanistan’s foreign affairs were 
conducted by Britain. The Treasury Department agreed to issue export authorisations on a 
temporary basis. In October 1943, the US received word that Kabul had ratified the 1912 
Convention. Although this did not solve the Afghan drug problem, it did represent another 
feather in Anslinger’s wartime cap. It also augmented his credibility when pressing other 
recalcitrant states, not least Iran. The US, meanwhile, continued to press Kabul to tighten 
domestic controls throughout 1944 by politely threatening to cut off its market access when 
the war ended (see Chapter Two).250 
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Part 5: Egypt: 
Sir Thomas Russell Pasha was a colourful British bureaucrat who had served the British 
police apparatus in Egypt since 1902. Perhaps best described as the Anslinger of the Middle 
East he was the closest thing the region had to a drug czar. He served as the Commandant of 
the Cairo City Police and Chief of the Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau (CNIB) for the 
duration of the war.251 Like Anslinger, Russell Pasha was a remarkable bureaucrat, a shrewd 
media operator and occasionally an informal regional drug diplomat. Like Anslinger he was a 
strong advocate for control of narcotics at the source, and he ably stirred up local and 
international press coverage to further his strategic ends. In these pursuits, any loyalty to the 
British government often appeared secondary to his ‘drug habit’ and bureaucratic 
suzerainty.252 This latter attribute was perhaps his greatest similarity with Anslinger. For both 
men, their bureaucratic survival was synonymous with the survival of drug control efforts.  
 
The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 further drove Russell Pasha towards his US allies. With 
the fulfilment of its European Police Clause he expected that the drug issue would be handed 
over to an incapable, Egyptian-run, apparatus and his decades of work would be undone. He 
increasingly sought US patronage and cultivated a strong personal relationship with a number 
of the US drug control lobby particularly Mrs. Corinna Lindon Smith - an advisor on 
narcotics to the American General Federation of Women’s Clubs. Anslinger described her as 
one of Russell Pasha’s ‘very sincere friends and a great admirer’.253  
 
Wartime Drug Trends: 
With the outbreak of war the flow of ‘white drugs’ (namely Heroin) into Egypt dried up 
while ‘black drugs’ (namely Hashish) poured in from the surrounding Levant states. In 1941 
the Egyptian Mail attributed the drought to ‘war conditions and the strict supervision 
exercised on shipping in the Mediterranean by the British Fleet’. Russell Pasha described the 
war as ‘a golden opportunity which must not be missed’ before the ‘British police 
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disappear[ed]’ and CNIB became subsumed into the Ministry of Interior. He advocated a 
post-war Arab front against the illicit drug trade, one based on sustained Western support. In 
September 1941, he began a new diplomatic campaign against hashish cultivation in the 
Levant states. He wrote that anti-hashish efforts required ‘a certain ruthlessness for the 
feelings and pockets of the big landlords, notables and Ministers of Syria’, as well as 
‘efficient organisation of police, Gendarmerie, Law courts, etc.’. He argued that by getting 
the Syrian Administration to kill cultivation for a few years it was be far ‘harder for an 
independent Syria…to start…again’.254 
 
To Russell Pasha’s frustration, Britain was unwilling to intervene militarily in the drug trade 
in the Levant in 1941. He believed this encouraged a French ‘attitude of laisser-faire’ and 
gave ‘the impression that the British authorities were not interested in the matter’.255 As with 
the case of Iran in 1943, it was a correct impression to draw. British Military forces were far 
more absorbed with other matters in 1941 and had no desire to complicate relations with 
regional groups and generate new military entanglements in pursuit of long-term hashish 
control. 
 
This lack of British interest drove Russell Pasha further towards the US. In a bizarre moment 
of candour he wrote to Anslinger in March 1942 that ‘our American Colony here is growing 
greater daily!’ It was a statement that both Anslinger and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
Gaston described as ‘interesting’. In the meantime Egypt announced its intention to ratify the 
1912 Hague Convention. This promise, coupled with a request by George Morlock that Egypt 
be given ‘sympathetic consideration’, led the Treasury to approve shipments of US 
manufactured opiates to Egypt. Their speedy ratification - by June 1942 – was then happily 
touted by the US later that year when Iran questioned the feasibility of wartime 
ratifications.256 
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Despite their convention ratification, Russell Pasha quickly became impatient with the 
Egyptian Government. He complained to Anslinger that his ‘masters…have had a wonderful 
opportunity of inserting non-growing of hashish into the treaties they have been discussing 
with Independent Syria and Lebanon, but they’ve done nothing’. He also expressed dismay at 
the lack of a suitable Egyptian candidate to replace him as head of the CNIB, lamenting that 
‘no Egyptian has ever taken up the anti-drug traffic as a hobby’.257 
 
He warned that Egypt would ‘go down like a pack of cards before the narcotic attack that is 
coming’. Demand remained high and once international communications reopened ‘white 
drugs’ would pour in from the Balkans and Far East. He wanted to stay on in the role, but 
overtly expressed a lack of personal interest and warned that advocacy by the British embassy 
for him doing so would be misinterpreted. He suggested a multi-state effort involving Britain, 
the US, Canada and League of Nations.258 The UK Foreign Office and Home Office thought 
his fears ‘fully justified’ but preferred it be taken up ‘on an international basis’ so Britain was 
not ‘saddled with the job’.259 As 1943 drew to a close the future of Egyptian control remained 
uncertain. With Egypt’s ratification of the 1912 Convention Anslinger re-focused his limited 
regional attention on Iran and Afghanistan. His attention would not fully return to Egypt until 
the beginning of 1944.  
 
The cases of Iran and Egypt, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, highlighted a sharp divide in 
Anglo-American policy. British attention to the issue throughout the war only became live 
when direct interests were at stake. In the Far East this issue touched on important questions 
of colonial governance. In the Middle East it was a battle fought over abstract international 
control efforts and obligations. When faced with a choice of expending even minor political 
capital in pursuit of control efforts, every time Britain chose to ignore the issue. The US, 
although subsuming the issue when broader interests were at stake, for example trade 
agreements, nevertheless proved willing, time and again, to expend significant diplomatic 
leverage on it. 
 
Conclusion: 
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259 Williams (FO) to Harris (HO), 19 January 1944; Reynolds (HO) to Williams (FO), 3 February 
1944, BNA-FO371/39364. 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
74	  
	  
With much of the system’s technical core hiding out in Washington and the political arm – 
the League OAC – held in stasis: the locus of drug diplomacy politics shifted to bilateral 
interactions. Latin America remained (for the most part) an American sphere of drug policy 
influence. It was the wartime bilateral interaction between Britain and the US over the Far 
East that drove the evolution of the international system during this time period. Yet, there 
were many other important bilateral and multilateral engagements such as the Middle East 
and Anglo-Canadian interactions (see Chapter Two).  
 
The years 1939-1943 had witnessed major shifts in the international drug control system. 
With London’s blessing, the technical arm of the League drug apparatus had fled to 
Washington and came under increased US influence. Simultaneously, a set of relationships 
had developed in London that would serve as an information exchange and counter-weight to 
this new US influence. Nevertheless, the rapid realignment in the Anglo-US power balance, 
coupled with changes in British strategy, allowed the US to heavily influence British drug 
policy. The colonial opium issue was the clearest example of this. Anslinger successfully 
bluffed Britain claiming a high level of resolve within the US government on the issue. 
Britain came to view its options in rather stark terms. The first option was to fight to sustain 
colonial monopolies it did not currently hold, and whose benefits it did not currently feel, 
while swimming against the tide of international commitments. The consequences of this 
would be to potentially seriously alienate US public opinion and anger their key ally, upon on 
whose future cooperation they were growing ever more dependent.  
 
The second option was to agree to US demands as far as possible; to ignore the administrative 
problems until after the colonies were firmly back in their hands; and finally to reap what 
public relations victories the change in policy would afford - both within the US and within 
China. Faced with this choice it is unsurprising that the British chose the latter option. 
Nevertheless, had Anslinger not used his wartime leverage and pushed the issue it is unlikely 
that such a resolution would have occurred. By the close of 1943 the Commissioner could 
justifiably feel that he had had gambled and won. He then quickly pivoted to using his 
strategic opium reserve to try to force recalcitrant producing states into joining the control 
system.  
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At the outbreak of war the core question dividing states regarding the control system was 
how to deal with the existence of colonial opium monopolies and opium smoking.260 This saw 
states divide into three camps. On the one side were the US and its allies who advocated strict 
adherence to scientific and medical usage. On the other were producing states, many of who 
were economically dependent on the very opiates these control advocates sought to eradicate. 
In the middle were the old colonial powers. These states were torn by their desire to fulfil the 
normative goal of eradicating opium abuse and the recognition of the practical difficulties of 
immediate prohibitions. Arguably, it was the existence of this old colonial buffer which had 
blunted the leverage the production control efforts in the interwar years. With the resolution 
of this issue, the stage was set for a more coherent system, divided between two groups: 
supply control advocates and producing states. With the power relations heavily weighted in 
favour of the former the system could take on a new forward momentum. 
 
Although a number of derivatives of the colonial issue remained to be resolved, Britain had 
reduced its economic interests in opium and gained a new stake in a supply-centric system. 
Controlling non-medical and non-scientific use in its colonies would require illicit supplies to 
be suppressed in other territories. The potential for a drug détente between the US and Britain 
appeared altogether possible after 1943, particularly as drug manufacturing states. Despite 
this convergence of interests, however, their approaches to international control remained 
quite different. For the British, pragmatism, self-interest and consensus would remain the 
default setting for drug diplomacy. For the US, it would be a single-minded commitment to 
strict controls in all parts of the globe. These differing approaches, the US favouring 
immediate and strict prohibition and the UK favouring incrementalism and various forms of 
regulation, would determine not just their own relationship, but also the shape of the 
international drug control system going forward. 
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Chapter 2: Drug Diplomacy During World War II and Beyond – Part II, 1944-46. 
 
Introduction: 
Britain and the US entered 1944 with very different policy focuses. The US focused intensely 
on a broader global push that would pave the way for a reconstituted international system and 
a new production limitation convention. Their immediate goal in 1944 was to push Iran to 
ratify the existing conventions. From this position they could then use their post-war leverage 
to push for a new international poppy limitation convention that would finally restrict opium 
production to strictly scientific and medical purposes. Under this agreement India and other 
producer states could finally be forced massively to curtail opium production and use. 
Without the acquiescence of traditionally recalcitrant states like as Iran and Afghanistan, 
however, the illegitimate international trade would render efforts to limit ‘legitimate’ 
production worthless. 
 
Britain’s prime concern in 1944 was Burma given the intense military drive underway in 
1944 and 1945 and the need to decide civilian government policies along with the precedents 
these would set for other liberated territories.  Enforcing immediate prohibition on smoking 
and opium eating was viewed as a practical impossibility, particularly in frontier regions. It 
would result in smuggling; undermine government power and potentially spark social unrest. 
Britain sought a way to square their practical concerns with their awareness of US anti-opium 
sentiments, particularly since American forces would be operating in Burma. The result was a 
drawn out policy process that revealed a strong British belief that US opium policy was naïve 
and impractical but also a continued fear that the Washington anti-opium lobby were a 
dangerous and unscrupulous collection of people. 
 
As 1944 progressed a consensus hardened within the US government that they could use their 
wartime leverage to force the issue when needed. It was not until late in 1945 that the extent 
of their disagreement over Burma became apparent to both the US and Britain. By this time 
the United States had hardened its views and interpreted the British policy as reneging on its 
November 1943 commitments. This then combined with Britain offering only qualified 
support for a new production limitation convention and resulted in a large diplomatic blow-
up. All of this was occurring in a context where control system politics were once again 
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coming to the fore and various actors began jockeying for leverage within the emerging 
United Nations framework. Meanwhile, existing issues continued to smoulder and complicate 
drug diplomacy.  
 
Part 1: Old Problems Continued: 
Liverpool as Smuggling hub: 
Towards the end of 1943 opium smuggling via Liverpool to North America re-emerged as a 
‘common interest’ for Canada and the US. Throughout 1944 the two continued to report 
seizures of Indian Monopoly opium. Anslinger and Sharman sent angry letters to Thornton at 
the Home Office calling Liverpool ‘neck and neck’ with Basra as a centre of illicit traffic. 
They claimed that opium, was ‘freely available;’ the prices ‘extremely low’ and penalties 
‘negligible’. Both men attributed the problem to a lack of will or capacity on the part of 
Britain. 261 
 
Requests from the UK and other branches of the US and Canadian governments to Anslinger 
and Sharman to turn a blind eye to the trade and leave offending crew members aboard ships 
in furtherance of the war effort only fuelled their anger. Thornton’s responses did not 
alleviate the tension. Anslinger had dispatched Arthur Elliott Felkin, PCOB Secretary and 
Washington ‘inner circle’ confidant, to London to ‘vigorously’ press the issue. Thornton 
claimed ignorance and vowed to look into any reports forwarded. This response infuriated 
Anslinger who wrote to Sharman: ‘it isn’t any wonder that the traffic thrives. It doesn’t need 
to be organized’.262 The Commissioner was quietly compiling these complaints, particularly 
those against the Indian opium monopoly, into a dossier that could be used at a post-war 
production limitation conference. Nevertheless, with the monopolies issue out of the way, 
Anslinger decided the time was opportune to make his feelings known to Thornton. 
 
In August 1944 Anslinger wrote ‘we understand each other well enough to use plain 
language.’ He claimed that he had initially mistaken the statistics regarding British penalties 
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for smuggling for those handed out by Japanese courts before the war (The US Treasury had 
in 1942 publicly characterised the Japanese penalties as ‘an open scandal’). He went on to say 
that these ‘pointless and ineffective fines’ were not a deterrent ‘but actually encourage the 
traffickers.’263 Unmoved, Thornton simply dismissed Anslinger’s complaints for the 
remainder of his tenure. 
 
In October 1945 Major Coles (see Chapter One) informed Anslinger he had resumed control 
of the Home Office Drugs Branch and looked ‘forward to a renewal of…collaboration’. He 
immediately picked up on a pending correspondence with Thornton, welcoming Anslinger’s 
suggestion for an arrangement with India to station a US representative to flag up illicit 
shipments headed for the US and UK. Anslinger’s wrote to Coles that ‘it is with a great deal 
of pleasure that I read your note’.264 The two had not always seen eye to eye during the 
League days, but had a sufficiently amicable working relationship and Anslinger hoped they 
could move beyond the stonewalling of the Thornton era.  
 
Britain, Canada and Latin America: 
Between 1943 and 1944 Britain squeezed opiate supplies to Canada while quietly increasing 
exports to Latin America. Their goal was to increase market share in Latin America and 
improve dollar earnings. By December 1943 they were providing only 50% of the minimum 
Canadian requirements. Britain blamed a 1943 supply disruption from Turkey causing 
‘severe shortages’ of opium. In early 1944 supplies tightened further and the High 
Commissioner in London was asked to make ‘strong’ representations on Canada’s behalf. 
This time, he was permitted to include incriminating intelligence that Anslinger had privately 
supplied to Sharman. This showed that manufacturing firms in Britain had been exporting 
narcotics to Chile while an Indian supply mission had recently offered US firms one hundred 
thousand pounds of raw opium cake.265 
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By supplying Chile, Britain was undermining Anslinger’s regional strategy. Anslinger 
offered to supply Chile’s narcotic needs in return for an end to their domestic production and 
manufacturing. Further, he believed Chile was self-sufficient and simply re-exporting all 
narcotics imports to other countries - including Argentina and Brazil. Argentina had not 
ratified the 1912 Convention and the US refused to supply it with narcotics. Both Anslinger 
and Sharman believed Thornton was knowingly permitting excess supplies to be sent to Chile 
as he had done for Cuba and Mexico in 1941-1942. At that time Anslinger was pressuring 
both Cuba and Mexico to reduce consumption, production and smuggling.266 
 
In May 1944 Sharman sent on a stern cable to London, which he described to Anslinger as 
‘pretty hot stuff’.267 Anslinger continued to feed Sharman intelligence and in July 1944 
forwarded a Brazilian government acknowledgment that Britain had replaced Germany as its 
main supplier. Meanwhile, in another regional victory for Anslinger Brazil promised to 
prohibit post-war cultivation ‘in compliance with [his] wishes’.268 This set the stage for Brazil 
emerging as a key US regional ally during the 1950s. 
 
For Sharman these cases highlighted that Britain was lying, claiming supply shortages to one 
of its largest pre-war markets, while diverting supplies to capture Latin American markets. 
When the evidence was presented to London it suddenly claimed a ‘marked improvement in 
supply’. It then began to argue that ‘manufacturing capacity’ was now the main obstacle to 
supply. Neither Sharman nor Anslinger believed it. The Home Office would later offer the 
unconvincing explanation privately to the State Department that the supply shortages arose 
from the accumulation of stocks for use in liberated areas. The ‘sufficiently improved’ 
situation facilitated increased exports to Canada. Although welcome, it did not fulfil 
Canada’s yearly requirements, nor compensate for their drained stocks.269 
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In the meantime, the PCOB provided Sharman with further ammunition releasing an analysis 
of ‘Trends in Trade’ in narcotics for 1938-42. This claimed that ‘the markets lost by 
Continental Europe [were] now largely supplied by the United Kingdom’ which 
‘undoubtedly…had become the principal exporter in the world’. Germany’s loss had been 
Britain’s gain. The vast majority of this shift was in Latin America where Britain’s market 
share grew from one per cent in 1938 to seventy-seven per cent in 1942.270 
 
The Dominions Office offered a complicated and unconvincing series of explanations. In 
reality the PCOB report hit on the core issue: London wanted to snap up Germany’s market 
share in Latin America thereby securing Britain’s pharmaceutical export industry and paving 
the way for new dollar earnings which would strengthen their balance of payments situation. 
Wishing to leave the affair behind them, and undoubtedly regretting a July 1943 suggestion 
that Canada seek some of her supplies from the US, London reiterated their commitment to 
meet Canada’s needs. Sharman described this as ‘an attempt to justify a situation that cannot 
be justified.’ Nevertheless, careful not to overplay his hand, he acknowledged the situation 
had ‘largely been ameliorated’ thanks to the ‘force with which the facts were communicated’. 
The severe shortages Canada had faced in 1944, where some hospitals reported being unable 
to obtain codeine, were not repeated in 1945 and a more sustainable Anglo-Canadian 
arrangement gradually emerged.271 Further, by the close of 1944, the US and Britain had 
reached an arrangement regarding Latin American whereby both would be limited to 
exporting half of any country’s annual estimates. This meant countries could not double up 
on purchases. Thornton’s subsequent efforts to spin this agreement as evidence of British 
shortages were unsurprisingly met with scepticism by his North American counterparts.272 
 
Egypt: Russell Pasha’s Offensives: 273 
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Russell Pasha had, by the close of 1944, reached out to a number of actors regarding his post-
war role in Egypt. Anslinger was non-responsive either because the letter was misplaced or 
because he was focused on other issues, such as Iran and the post-war international 
organisation. The British government, meanwhile, sought to internationalise the problem. 
Russell Pasha continued a broad press offensive and undertook a diplomatic mission to 
Lebanon and Syria in March 1944, where he found conditions disheartening. Neither was free 
from French control and could avoid a difficult suppression campaign by claiming a lack of 
autonomy. Notables were ‘a law unto themselves in their own district’, ignoring the central 
Government and frequently stipulated fellahin tenants cultivate cannabis. High prices were 
further driving cultivation into North Syria where Government control was even weaker than 
in Lebanon. Russell Pasha secured the support of General Holmes (British Commander of the 
IXth Army) who provided material assistance for suppression efforts. General Holmes, a 
convert to the opium cause, assured him that tackling the traffic was, in his view, part of the 
war effort and a high priority. 
 
Russell Pasha argued Turkey remained the main threat for heroin. He had received an angry 
rebuke from the Turkish officials for suggesting Turkish opium was being smuggled into 
Egypt via Syria but maintained seizures in Aleppo suggested Anatolia was the origin. He 
attributed the angry Turkish response to the poor relationship between the French Authorities 
in Syria and the Turkish Authorities. Overall, he claimed the Lebanese and Syrian ‘problem’ 
could only be completely solved ‘after the war when something similar to the League of 
Nations takes shape.’ States could then be pressured through the international system to 
ensure they met obligations.  
 
Anslinger finally responded to Russell Pasha in March 1944 (five months after his initial 
contact). Offering platitudes Anslinger remained non-committal. He said that ‘no greater 
calamity could befall…narcotic control in the Middle East,’ than Russell Pasha leaving and 
predicted ‘a very speedy recrudescence of the “white” drug traffic.’ He promised that he was 
pushing the State Department ‘to make some move’ but warned that ‘the time is not far 
distant when the curtain will fall on the stage for you, Sharman, and myself’. He also 
intimated that he was focusing on ‘the limitation of production project and our chief attack is 
on Iran’. Despite this focus on Iran Anslinger was to have his attention drawn back to Burma. 
 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
82	  
	  
 
 
Part 2: The Burma Dilemma: 
Britain’s Burma dilemma centred on placating American wishes while accommodating local 
logistical barriers. Britain remained sceptical of US paranoia over troops becoming addicted 
to opium. There were no recorded cases for British troops operating in the region.274 
London had warned in a memo to Washington that their November 10th announcement would 
‘not immediately be so sweeping’ regarding Burma. Nevertheless, since Burma was an area 
where US troops would be operating, the Federal Government, undertaking some selective 
cognitive dissonance, read the announcement to include Burma.275 
 
The practice of smoking prepared opium was not widespread, but the so-called, ‘quasi-
medical’, eating of opium was. Further, it was sold through a system of government run 
shops – many interacting untidily with local political conditions. Further, London had 
concluded in October 1943 that complete suppression was unattainable until cultivation in the 
neighbouring Yunnan Province of China could be halted.276 Britain therefore included the 
reference to prohibition’s success being dependent on ‘other countries’ in the November 10th 
Statement to inoculate against US accusations of backtracking. Highlighting the British goal 
to reframe the control debate as one of regulation, London believed that they had restricted 
drugs, via ‘stringent regulations, to medicinal and scientific purposes’.277 The key would be to 
convince, or secure US acquiescence in this vision. 
 
Short term vs. Long Term: 278 
Sounding out a way to proceed, London began to reframe the Burma opium question as a 
long-term reconstruction and development problem. The Government of Burma convened an 
Expert Committee in late November 1943. It quickly adopted a conservative approach 
building on the existing policy legacy rather than advocating any radical changes. They re-
examined the high profile 1931 ‘League of Nations Commission of Enquiry Report’ that had 
triggered the 1932 commitment to total suppression of eating and smoking. Towards this 
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eventual end the Government had taken steps to minimise opium’s availability, mostly by 
tweaking state-controlled supply channels and regulations.  
 
The Committee praised the Government for being ‘most scrupulous in observing its 
commitments’ and argued the 1931 Report had been overlooked by ‘recent discussions in 
America’. They suggested that long-term policy work towards amplifying existing trends 
based on the twin pillars of increasing control of opium consumption and accelerating 
progress on suppression. Conscious of international opinion, they recommended avoiding any 
actions that appeared driven by monetary concerns. Government policy had to appear to be 
driven by public health and safety concerns, not economic exploitation.  
 
Turning to the short-term the Committee simply noted, in what became know as ‘Paragraph 
28’, that policy fell to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in Burma. He had drawn up policies, 
with the Governor’s approval, and had already enacted them in areas under British control. 
These short-term policies aimed to balance strictness with flexibility. It committed the 
Military administration not to reopen opium shops unless forced by circumstance. If 
reopened, their goal was to ensure opium was obtained through licit channels, with stiff 
penalties to discourage the illicit market. British forces could also use opium as currency to 
procure goods and labour from locals if necessary. Perhaps most controversially, it allowed 
the extension of cultivation to areas where it was hitherto prohibited until normal civil 
government could be restored and regular supply channels reopened. 
 
Second Guessing Paragraph 28 and Dissent: 
Despite this self-assured report, the Burma Office, in January 1944, questioned whether the 
US would accept the short-term policy. They were adamant that US demands for immediate 
prohibition were ‘out of the question’ and fraught with ‘positive dangers’. Further, they 
wanted to use the issue to draw a red line between civil and military command and make 
clear that ‘actual administration will be in the hands of the British Civil Affairs officers’.279 
Nevertheless, they reopened discussions on ‘Paragraph 28’. 
 
At the same time dissent within the Expert Committee surfaced. Emerging as a strong 
contrarian voice was Lt. Col. K. Lindsay, a medical officer with first-hand experience of the 
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issue. His views had been suppressed, as they would have been inflammatory to US opinion. 
Bypassing the Committee, he pushed his views up the bureaucratic chain. He criticized the 
‘pre-arranged policy of the League of Nations’ and the ‘well meaning but misinformed 
bodies in Europe and America trying to force their ideas on oriental people’. He referred to 
the former as ‘an international ring of statistics-bound opiophobes’ and ‘anti-opium 
propagandists’. He wrote that he originally viewed opium as a pure vice, but had come to 
appreciate its benefit, particularly for the coolie class whose work ‘is about the hardest in the 
world.’ Offering his ‘medical and social view’ he said that total prohibition ‘would be foolish 
as well as wrong’.280 
 
The Foreign Office remained on the side-lines as the Burma and Colonial Offices thrashed 
out these questions. However, their private comments proved sympathetic to Col. Lindsay’s 
assertions. Mr. M. S. Williams of the Foreign Office remarked that ‘no doubt there is truth in 
what he says but it won’t affect our policy.’ Mr. A. L. Scott of the Foreign Office wrote:  
 
I cannot say how whole heartedly I endorse Col. Lindsay’s views. Most unfortunately 
it will not affect HMG’s policy. One only wishes the voice of moderation and common 
sense could sometimes be heard!281 
 
By February 1944 the State Department began making enquiries about the implementation of 
the November 1943 Statement and the Foreign Office prodded their colleagues for a 
preliminary response.282 
 
The View from the US: 283 
After the apparent success over the Colonial powers US drug policy formulation splintered 
somewhat. Immediate efforts focused largely on pressuring Iran. Anslinger and the ‘inner 
circle’ opened numerous diplomatic fronts. Meanwhile, League old hand, Elizabeth 
Washburn Wright, both invigorated by and jealous of Anslinger’s achievement over Britain 
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and the Netherlands, clumsily orchestrated her own campaign.284 Out of the friction between 
these various manoeuvres a US drug diplomatic doctrine was given a new legislative basis. 
This legislation merged the traditional US drug policy ideological goals with wartime 
outcomes, creating a clear strategic reference point for US officials going forward into 
peacetime.  
 
Congressman Walter Judd was a stalwart supporter of China and had spent many years in the 
country as a medical missionary in the 1920s and 30s.285  In February 1944 he began 
championing legislation (apparently at the behest of Elizabeth Washburn Wright and 
independent of Anslinger’s manoeuvres286) that would eventually come to be known as ‘the 
Judd Resolution’ with a speech in the House of Representatives.  
 
In words that would become the language of the ‘Judd Resolution,’ he argued that the war 
risked an explosion in the illicit opium traffic, but also an ‘unprecedented opportunity’ for 
eliminating it. The British and Dutch November 1943 announcements meant the US had ‘for 
the first time the support of certain western empires without whose support our efforts have 
been doomed to failure’. Outcomes would now depend on opium growing countries. Iran as 
the world’s ‘greatest producer’ could reignite the supply line to US opium ‘addicts’. Now that 
lend-lease money and materials was making countries like Iran newly ‘dependent’ on the US, 
they could use this ‘special influence’ to encourage production limitation to the world’s 
legitimate needs – less than 400 tons a year.  
 
China had largely suppressed cultivation; Japan was ‘going to be smashed’; the Russians had 
‘controlled opium very rigidly in their own land’. The US now had the opportunity to 
‘eliminate it from the world as we eliminated it from the Philippines.’ He claimed ‘the Asiatic 
peoples trust us on this’ and that ‘such a unique opportunity may not come again in years.’ 
Like the Civil War, he suggested, ‘it would seem that it is taking another war to bring about 
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the abolition of another form of slavery even more destructive of the dignity of and well 
being of man’. 
  
It was a speech that pulled together decades of US policy and moulded it to the changed 
circumstances the war had produced.  The eventual ‘Judd Resolution,’ would lift entire 
sections verbatim from the speech and became the basis for US Federal drug diplomacy 
going forward. With major US bilateral victories largely absent for the rest of the war, the 
Judd Resolution would set the trajectory for American international drug policy for the 
coming post-war era. 
 
Britain and the Grey Area of Empire: 
The Burma Office and War Office were awaiting the final decision from Admiral Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia.287 He had been briefed to 
keep in mind a number of complicating factors, including the potential hardship to native 
growers; political difficulties in districts where the habit was endemic; negative side effects 
of increased smuggling; and the impact of Chinese supplies nullifying prohibition.288 The 
Foreign Office and the Washington Embassy were told to sit tight.289 
 
This sparked an agitated response from Ambassador Halifax. He was ‘not very happy about 
the attitude of the Civil Affairs Authorities in Burma’ and warned their ‘insistence 
on…compromising with local customs and conditions, is likely to meet with strong 
opposition from the Americans, whose penchant for drastic measures is illustrated in 
the…State Department’s Aide Memoire’. He warned of ramifications for broader Anglo-
American relations: ‘if the people interested in this opium question get excited and go out to 
attack our policy they will mobilise pretty substantial public support’. 290 
 
The Foreign Office asked that the War Office give ‘full weight’ to his warning.291 The latter 
bucked against the interference. They considered the short-term policy decided, and Halifax’s 
concerns relating to ‘a far wider issue’. They also reiterated that allowing ‘uninformed 
American public sentiment to interfere’ would ‘open the door to similar interference in any 
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other sphere of imperial domestic policy’. They initially tried to avoid forwarding the 
Ambassador’s letter to Mountbatten, but succumbed to Foreign Office insistence.292 
 
Around this time a frank meeting took place between the Home Office and the State 
Department about opium. The former pointed out that the government was still considering 
the Burma question. George Morlock angrily concluded they were ‘hesitant to permit the 
military to close the monopolies and suppress opium’ and were trying to delay. He suggested 
to Anslinger that the US consider unilateral action.293 The stage was set for a potential 
diplomatic blow up. 
 
Part 3: A Fresh US Drug Doctrine: HR 241 – ‘The Judd Resolution’: 294 
Both the House and Senate passed HR 241, the Judd Resolution, unanimously in June 1944. 
It stated ‘this World War ought to be not an occasion for permitting expansion and spreading 
of illicit traffic in opium, but rather an opportunity for completely eliminating it’. The 
President was ‘to approach the Governments of all opium-producing countries’ urging ‘they 
take immediate steps to limit and control the growth of the opium poppy and the production 
of opium and its derivatives to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and 
scientific purposes’.295 
 
Soon, the State Department served international notice they would be pursuing it as official 
US policy.296 This had major implications for Britain. A central tenet of British opium 
strategy was to deflect attention from India. This had been part of the motivation behind 
making the November 10th announcement.297 The Judd Resolution brought new US attention 
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to India (along with Iran and Afghanistan). Acting Treasury Secretary Gaston wrote an open 
letter to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs highlighting the centrality of India to the 
post-war system. He claimed that five thousand shops in the Indian States sold opium which 
was showing up in US seizures. He argued that India was growing 200-300 tons annually for 
domestic non-medical purposes which served as a ‘reservoir’ for the illicit traffic.298 Secretary 
of War Stimson wrote a public letter painting production control efforts ‘both as a war 
measure and as a part of the permanent program for peace’.299 
 
The Resolution also represented a strong shift in the locus away from the FBN towards the 
State Department. Anslinger had filled a power vacuum created by exceptional wartime 
conditions. The State Department was always likely to reassert control once these conditions 
ended. The Judd Resolution accelerated this and formalised the bureaucratic realignment. 
Anslinger would retain a potent role in the international sphere, often through private 
channels (see Chapter Three). However, the State Department once again became the 
overseer of US drug diplomacy.  
 
The US had moved from having no unified strategy to having a unanimous congressional 
resolution urging the President to pursue Anslinger’s framework on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis. It largely represented a reiteration of traditional US goals. Nevertheless it 
married these broad ideological aspirations with the changed geopolitical circumstances and 
Anslinger’s strategic vision and established them as Executive policy. 
 
The Judd Resolution served as a vital focal point over an era of increasingly fractured and 
uncertain policies. The Resolution represented a coherent and tangible rallying point for US 
diplomats wondering what US overseas policy was. In so doing it provided a vital sense of 
overarching direction for US bureaucrats and set the stage for a new diplomatic offensive, a 
significant portion of which would be directed towards Iran but also Afghanistan and India.  
 
Part 4: China Prepares for Post-war: 
Britain remained deeply sceptical about claims of opium progress in China. They believed 
that if a strong central government emerged there was hope for control. If China slipped back 
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into civil war production limitation would collapse, particularly with levels of addiction 
expected to be left in the wake of the Japanese occupation. Under these circumstances Britain 
believed the trade would simply be ‘continued by Chinese enterprise’.300 The political 
outcome in China would have enormous practical implications for British colonial opium 
policy. For the US China remained its key ally in multilateral settings. Having a strong and 
stable China would be key to US drug diplomacy going forward. 
 
The nationalist – communist divide re-emerged sharply as the new locus for the opium issue 
in China in 1944. The Kuomintang had worked to weaken communist support during 1943 by 
accusing them of planting poppies. The US Embassy at Chungking believed the claims false 
and part of a ‘propaganda campaign’ to discredit the Communists and lay the public relations 
groundwork for a military campaign in the northwest. Further, the Embassy was receiving 
numerous reports that Chiang’s officials were actively engaged in the trade, particularly 
transporting opium from occupied areas into the unoccupied ones.301 Anslinger, aware of 
these complications but also the pro-Chiang Washington climate, remained silent.  
 
Chiang continued to burnish his anti-opium credentials. His annual Opium Suppression Day 
message in June 1944 claimed huge successes while outlining new eradication and anti-
smuggling efforts. The validity of his narrative came under increasing scrutiny from the 
Western press. A New York Times reporter, embedded with the Communists, wrote that 
there was no evidence that they were cultivating opium. The article led Assistant Treasury 
Secretary Gaston to describe Kuomintang accusations as ‘another pretty little Chungking 
invention’.302 
 
In March 1945 London forwarded an internal memo on China to their US counterparts. 
Although Chiang’s resolve was ‘undoubted’, the nationalists were outmatched. Illicit profits 
were ‘fantastic’ and the main sources of supply were areas under warlord control and/or 
inhabited by non-Chinese tribes people with local potentates strong enough to ignore Central 
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Government fiats. Further, the British argued there was no evidence to support the ‘frequent 
rumours, believed to have been put out by Chungking propaganda sources,’ that the 
Communists were growing opium.303 
  
By the close of war it was undeniable the problem remained acute in both occupied and 
unoccupied areas. Moreover the core political and ideological underpinnings remained 
unchanged. Opium loomed so large in the Chinese national consciousness that all sides 
fought for the moral high ground. Chiang had little real control over the trade, but sought the 
anti-opium mantle to counteract the communists’ wartime public relations gains. 
Furthermore, anti-opium efforts (synonymous with anti-imperialism in China) would 
inoculate against his appearing too close to his Western allies. However, by trying to paint 
the communists as the perpetrators of a trade his own generals were complicit in, Chiang 
undermined his credibility within US Government agencies. Publicly, however, US support 
remained unwavering. Moreover, Chiang’s image as an anti-opium crusader had assisted with 
broader US regional drug control strategy – particularly regarding the monopoly system. 
 
Britain assumed the role of dispassionate observer of China. Nevertheless, the implications 
for its regional opium policies remained. Britain had agreed to prohibition but warned it 
would depend on success in surrounding countries. Whether Britain wanted to play this card, 
particularly regarding Burma, remained uncertain. The US, meanwhile, was in the midst of 
implementing the Judd Resolution and looking towards a post-war control system. It is 
towards the former aspect we now turn. 
 
Part 5: Pressuring Britain, India, Iran and Afghanistan: 
Implementing the Judd Resolution: 
The State Department produced a framework for implementing the Judd Resolution. States 
were asked to: (1) strictly limit production to medical and scientific purposes; (2) adhere to a 
system of estimates equivalent to the 1925 Convention; (3) commit to take part in a post-war 
production limitation conference. These were then transmitted via memoranda to the various 
states. The British Foreign Office received two memoranda in September 1944. The first 
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urged Britain to consider taking steps to limit production in Burma and India.304 The second 
was a copy of the memorandum sent to the Iranian Government. The US asked that Britain 
help by making representations to the Iranians and said a similar request was being made to 
the Soviet Government.305  
 
These memoranda called for restricting cultivation to a closed list of countries; establishing a 
control body with ‘absolute and complete independence’ to enforce compliance; mechanisms 
to ensure fair pricing, product standardization and a fair system of distributing the costs of 
administering the system; and limitation to annual world medical requirements as they stood 
in 1944 – around 400 tons. The US estimate for actual world production in 1944 was 2400 
tons, leaving an excess production of around 2000 tons.306 
 
India: 
India had traditionally bucked against all US pressure. Opium eating was far more prevalent 
in India than smoking.   In 1939 they had pre-emptively rejected new production limitation 
obligations. They warned the League in 1939: ‘No such obligation could be taken until the 
organization of medical services throughout the country has been greatly advanced’.307 The 
Indian position was unchanged but in 1944 the State Department pushed on two indirect 
pressure points. The first related to export legacies. India had largely stopped exporting 
opium after 1935. However, it continued to export for medical purposes to the UK and minor 
amounts of raw opium to French and Portuguese Settlements in India, Nepal, Zanzibar and 
Pemba. All were technically legitimate under international law as they were exported at the 
request of the recipient state. Nevertheless the US argued that the British November 10th 
Statement militated against export of raw opium for use in the manufacture of smoking 
opium.308 
 
The second pressure point was the Indian States, for which the Government of India was not 
in a position to enter into binding obligations. The Government claimed it had maintained 
their cooperation through persuasion not injunction. The State Department now wished to 
impose concrete obligations on these 570 States, which contained over one-fifth of the 
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population of India. It claimed they produced 185 tons of opium (or almost half of world 
medical requirements in 1944) sold through thousands of shops. As such, they wanted these 
states either ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ represented at future conferences.309 
 
Past experience suggested long odds. Nevertheless, by late 1944 the US believed their best 
option was to focus on negative publicity and hope that they ‘could work the same game on 
the India Office Policy that we did on the Colonial Office on Smoking opium’.310  
 
Iran: 
Anslinger’s 1943-4 diplomatic ‘attack’ in relation to Iran had failed. Iran had introduced no 
new legislation, reneged on a promise to establish an import/export certificate system, and 
cultivation and consumption patterns were unchanged. Many in the US concluded 
government control was too limited while Anslinger received OSS reports that government 
stores were flouting basic domestic controls and reselling opium stocks to U.S. Merchant 
Mariners and Indian troops.311 With his efforts stalled and following the passage of the Judd 
Resolution the Anslinger appeared content to step aside and watch the State Department lead 
the charge. 
 
Yet internal pressure for reform was stirring in Iran. In June 1944 a vocal anti-opium 
movement emerged, led by the Iranian Anti-Opium and Alcohol Society. It began publishing 
statistics, often contradicting official ones, and reached out to the US Government for help. 
Simultaneously, the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) witnessed visceral speeches, which US 
officials acknowledged were ‘grossly exaggerated’ and had ‘little basis in fact’. Domestic 
conspiracies that ‘other foreign powers with more imperialistic designs than the United States 
might be interested in preventing’ the abolition of opium also emerged. Partly in response to 
this stirring, the Foreign Minister began to sound out US willingness to provide crop 
substitution assistance.312 
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The US eventually offered an economic package to incentivise control. Iran would receive a 
125-ton share of the post-war licit market - perhaps ‘guaranteed’ through a tripartite 
successor to the Turkish-Yugoslav agreement (see below). This would mean drastic 
reductions from their estimated average annual production of 750 tons. To mitigate this, the 
US promised extensive technical assistance; to continue US purchases of Iranian opium; to 
refrain from growing poppies; and to discourage opium production in the American 
Hemisphere.313 
 
These efforts, once again, came to naught. Practical cooperation actually deteriorated when 
the new Director of the Opium Monopoly ceased his predecessor’s ‘habit of furnishing the 
consulate informally with information’, leaving the US dependent on unreliable Anti-Opium 
and Alcohol society statistics. Further there remained no movement on the legislative front.314 
The failures in Iran were made all the more visible in comparison with Afghanistan.  
 
Success in Afghanistan? 
Early in 1944 the US engaged in a delicate balancing act of trying to prod Afghanistan 
towards suppression, without alienating them. The US had temporarily suspended their 
practice of not purchasing opium from countries without an import-export certificate system. 
In January 1944 the US Ambassador warned the Afghan Foreign Minister, ‘in a friendly 
spirit’ that unless such a system was established the US would have to cease importing 
Afghan opium after the war. He also offered the incentive of a slice of the licit post-war 
market and pointed out the comparative advantage of Afghan opium, given its relatively high 
morphine content. He also pointed out there would be no legitimate market for smoking 
opium in the Far East after the war.315 With no particular sticks available to wield the State 
Department left the Afghan Government to examine their options. 
 
In November 1944 the Afghan government shocked observers by announcing the complete 
prohibition of all opium cultivation after March 1945. This went far beyond US requests and 
was quickly touted by Representative Judd as the first successful outcome of the Judd 
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Resolution. The State Department praised the decision as driven by ‘humanitarian 
sentiments’ in the face of ‘financial sacrifices’ and expressed the hope that other producers 
would follow suit. The reasons for the far-reaching decision were not clear. The Council of 
Ministers claimed that despite its profitability they lacked the necessary controlling 
organisations to regulate the trade. As a result, the social costs (both moral and material) of 
continued cultivation were claimed to outweigh the benefits.316  
 
Representative Judd tried to use the decision to pressure Iran. He gave a press interview 
claiming Iranian lend-lease ports had become a ‘seat of opium infection threatening the 
United States directly’.317 Iran remained unmoved and the State Department avoided applying 
tangible pressure. With the lack of traction over Iran the overall US strategy once again 
appeared to stall. Soon the Burma issue would also re-emerge and undermine the very 
successes the US had touted regarding the old Colonial powers.  
 
Part 6 – Britain Responding on Burma and the Judd Resolution: 
Towards a Response on Burma: 
In August 1944, the War Office maintained that, despite ‘American anxiety’, complete 
prohibition in Burma was impractical and the goal was to minimise the illicit market: ‘in one 
word, the Military Administration aims at control’. Lord Mountbatten reframed the problem 
as one of socio-economic development and suggested a twofold response: ‘gradual restriction 
of availability of opium with a gradual improvement in standards of living and education.’ 
The War Office went further and reinterpreted the Judd Resolution as referring only to the 
‘spread of illicit traffic’.318 
 
Other Far East commands had been ‘holding back’ waiting to see if Burma’s directive would 
resemble that expected for Malaya. It was now apparent that Burma would not be able to give 
a ‘clear-cut directive,’ leading the Colonial Office to change tack. Britain could issue 
substantially similar directives for Malaya, Borneo and Hong Kong and so decided to move 
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ahead with these three independent of any Burma directive.319 The question remained, then, 
whether and how to coordinate a Burma directive with the US. 
 
By this stage the decision on whether to consult the Americans was informed by three main 
factors. First, the State Department Aide-Memoire had reserved the right to take unilateral 
action to protect their troops. Second, Britain had promised to consult with the Americans 
over the implementation of their policy. Third, and conversely, the recent Charter of the 
Colonial Civil Affairs Committee now explicitly gave Britain the right to unilaterally 
prescribe civil affairs policies on liberated territories. This technically removed the obligation 
to consult. However, Lord Halifax’s fears coupled with the threat of American unilateral 
action drove a decision to consult the US first via an explanatory statement of policy.320 
 
Lord Mountbatten, meanwhile, began to second-guess his own government’s policies – 
possibly due to private contact from Ambassador Halifax in Washington. He feared the long-
term policy had been made explicit enough to the US. Further he warned he could not 
‘deplore too strongly a solicitude for the native growers of opium which I detect’ in the 
arguments assigning blame to Siam and China and that opium profits should be ‘the very last 
consideration we should allow ourselves to be influenced by’ – particularly given US 
perceptions. He feared Britain would be accused of protecting opium producers in Burma 
from foreign competition and these would they would become harder to dislodge. He further 
suggested that ‘if we do not intend to come into line with the rigid American point-of-view 
we should say so as soon as possible.’321 
 
The Burma Office sought to quell Mountbatten’s misgivings. They argued that the long-term 
policy of ‘ultimate suppression’ had long been clear and the UK was being ‘quite frank’ with 
the US over short-term accommodations. Further, they sought to quell Lord Mountbatten’s 
concerns surrounding the extension of cultivation:  
 
The tribesmen of the various Kachin Hill tracts use opium in their tribal religious 
ceremonies and also attach considerable importance to its medicinal properties. 
Prior to the Japanese Invasion cultivation was prohibited in most areas and 
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Government provided a limited supply for these purposes. When Government officers 
retired from the hills the tribesmen were informed that the prohibition against 
cultivation was withdrawn; as Government could not meet the tribesmen’s 
requirements it was only reasonable to allow them to grow what they needed. This 
will be the situation on our return and an immediate renewal of the prohibition orders 
would cause unrest. Opium production in these areas is very small and the quality is 
so bad that no-one outside the hill tracts would use it. 322 
 
They admitted US criticism seemed ‘unavoidable.’323 Mountbatten nevertheless feared the 
‘policy may be misrepresented by ill-disposed critics’ and his military administration was 
being used for ‘economic and sociological experiments’ with ‘little regard for either the truth 
or for my good name!’324 In January 1945, the Secretary of State promised that the note for 
the US Government would be re-examined in light of Mountbatten’s observations.325 
 
Dealing with American “Idealism”: 
In February 1945 the Burma Office completed a revised note regarding control measures. The 
Foreign Office agreed to frame it as a series of ‘positive’ proposals so the US would have to 
find reasons to object.326 Ambassador Halifax was told to transmit it along with an 
explanation that: ‘although it does not follow verbatim’ the State Department September 
1943 memo’s suggestions it covered ‘precisely the same ground’. Privately, the Foreign 
Office expected the US would ‘welcome it’. When, towards the end of March 1945, the State 
Department had not replied, the Foreign Office became ‘disturbed’ and urged the Embassy to 
make enquiries.327 In the meantime the US State and Treasury departments expressed full 
satisfaction with the separate policy directive for Borneo, Malaya and Hong Kong.328 Also, 
some potentially useful information came to light. Two young officers serving with the 
Burma rifles reported to the Burma Office that: 
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The American forces operating in Burma have caused rather an awkward situation, 
since the British Forces were prohibited from supplying opium to the populace as 
payment for goods and services, except in very exceptional circumstances, but the 
American Forces made payment with opium freely and in large quantities, and 
consequently, secured labour, etc. which the British Forces were unable to secure. 
 
One Burma Office official wrote: ‘This fact, if true, would be a useful card to have up our 
sleeve if the Americans should try to take any high moral line about our proposed policy in 
regard to opium’.329 London adopted a wait and see approach, with the added confidence that 
they had the potential counter to ‘United States idealism’ in unofficial negotiations.’330 
 
Responding to the Judd Resolution Memorandum: 
After acknowledging receipt of the two US Judd Resolution memoranda in September 1944, 
an administrative blunder at the Foreign Office saw them misplaced until December. In a 
quick flurry of activity the Foreign Office sought the advice of Britain’s embassy in Iran and 
other departments.331 In August 1945 Britain finally responded. They promised ‘sympathetic 
consideration’ to furthering US goals and promised both HMG and the Government of India 
would participate in a post-war production limitation conference. However, Britain preferred 
to leave specific provisions to the conference when producing states would be present and a 
consensus could be built. It was exactly the kind of consensus-oriented approach that the US 
was trying to head off. As for the suggestion Burma and India prohibit production and export 
for other than medical and scientific purposes, London simply refused, restating old 
arguments.  Further, regarding the US request to lobby Iran on production limitation, Britain 
reiterated that it was best left to the production limitation conference, but that Britain would 
advocate that Iran participate.332 
 
The US Responds over Burma: 
One week later, on August 8th 1945, the State Department responded to British opium policy 
in Burma. They acknowledged the difficulties but argued the short-term policy was ‘not 
consistent with established United States policy’ and therefore they could not agree. In 
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particular they took exception to shops potentially being reopened, given the presence of US 
troops. They also pre-empted and neutralised the British trump card regarding US troops 
trading opium. The Note claimed that Narcotics authorities in the US had only recently 
learned about the practice and that the War Office, having been notified that it was a violation 
of US policy, immediately instructed Theatre Commanders to prohibit further use. 
 
The State Department memo tore into British policy. They presumed that the reopened shops 
would dispense opium for smoking as well as eating. This, they pointed out, was not ‘at all in 
consonance’ with Britain’s November 1943 Declaration and claimed that the experience in 
Hong Kong showed that government licensed shops had failed to undermine the inflow of 
illicit opium from the Chinese mainland during the 1930s. They argued that the only effective 
policy was prohibition together with enforcement and Britain’s policy would worsen the 
regional and global situation. They explicitly urged the British Government ‘to reconsider’.333 
 
The response threw London into a tailspin. They quickly convened a meeting of the inter-
departmental opium committee.334 The question of opium in Burma, it seemed was destined 
to drag into the post-war era and potentially represent a significant sticking point in Anglo-
American drug diplomacy for the foreseeable future. While this was playing out questions 
regarding occupied Europe and the future of the control system within the new United 
Nations organisation were being decided. These will be considered in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion: 
The final years of wartime bilateralism and the Anglo-US division over Burma highlighted 
the deeper Anglo-American policy divide. Britain, while paying lip service to US 
prohibitionist impulses, sought to reframe the issue as one of regulation and socio-economic 
development. Being successful in these latter points could lead to ultimate success in the 
former. Yet Britain remained committed to a policy of gradualism which it saw as necessary 
on the way to the end point of eradication. The British approach to opium control in Burma 
and the Far East more broadly remained one driven by regulatory impulses, not a 
commitment to immediate prohibition. The quiet move towards a new form of opium 
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maintenance, in the more sanitised form of opium pills would highlight this point strongly as 
we shall see. 
 
In these final years of the era of bilateralism the UK focused most closely on Asia while the 
US focused on the Middle East. The UK maintained no ostensible interest in the latter region 
despite efforts by the US and by regional actors, such as Russell Pasha, to pressure it to take a 
more active role. This era was drawing to a close and the world tilted towards a new 
international governing system. All efforts would become focused on the shape of the post-
war control system rather than regional, national or local battles. Britain, as became apparent 
in its response to the Judd Resolution, merely had to stall on other issues of contention, such 
as Burma, India and production limitation, claiming that resolution on these issues were best 
kept for a multilateral meeting. The broader Anglo-American divide would thereby become 
co-opted into the post-war institutional processes and become new and deep fissures within 
the system – the goals of pragmatism and suppression via regulations vs. outright prohibition; 
and consensus-based policy making over hard nosed diplomacy. On all the former points 
Britain remained the core protagonist, on the latter it was the US. Issues of the Anglo-
American drug relationship left unresolved during the wartime era were to become a core 
determinant of the shape of the post-war control system and its political cleavages. 
  
Meanwhile, these final wartime years witnessed major domestic changes, particularly in the 
US. The Judd Resolution shifted drug diplomacy back to the State Department, thereby 
diminishing Anslinger’s international role. He had made highly effective use of the American 
strategic opium reserve, the hiatus of the PCOB and DSB in Washington and the general 
confusion of wartime to instigate his own diplomatic initiatives abroad. Now, the 
construction of the post-war system would become the explicit remit of the State Department, 
and one which they would be extremely reluctant to relinquish back to Anslinger’s hands (see 
Chapter 3). The State Department generally proved more measured in approach and tone and 
sought to balance the issue with other US interests. Nevertheless, their strategy, enshrined in 
the Judd Resolution, was largely that developed by Anslinger and his allies throughout the 
war. 
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Chapter 3: Creating the Post-war Multilateral System: 
 
Introduction: 
This thesis has dealt with the exceptional wartime situation for drug control. As we have seen 
the technical remnants of the League system had been hiding in Washington. Anslinger and 
his Washington based ‘inner circle’ allies used the confusion of the era to push an aggressive 
bilateral agenda of control. Now, the transition to the post-war era offered a tantalising 
opportunity to reshape the international system. However, many states (including Britain) 
initially aimed for conservatism and continuity with the League drug apparatus. Britain’s 
broader policy focused on maintaining its great power status by building the great power 
alliance into the post-war international order.335 Broader foreign policy concerns produced 
dangerous pitfalls. Against these broader issues, narcotics control appeared extremely low on 
this list of concerns and remained a functional issue. Britain was willing to engage with and 
support narcotics control efforts provided there was no direct threat to UK interests.  
 
How the US would cooperate with the League to transfer the drug apparatus to a new 
international organisation; how far the State Department would engage in aggressive drug 
diplomacy; and whether the US could work with its wartime allies to construct a post-war 
system remained open questions. The transition period represented a time of immense 
opportunity but also risk. Should the ‘inner circle’ lose the political initiative an impotent or 
even retrograde system could emerge. Neither of these prospects was particularly worrisome 
to the British who favoured consensus and continuity while building an ‘honest broker’ role 
for themselves. 
 
The Judd Resolution in 1944 helped the State Department re-exert control over US drug 
diplomacy, thereby ending Anslinger’s wartime ‘cowboy diplomacy’. Now, as the Allies 
edged closer to a new ‘United Nations Organisation’ (UNO) alliance politics and a widening 
gulf between the West and the Soviet Union saw Anslinger almost entirely pushed out of the 
decision-making process. Despite this he continued to utilise every means to inject himself 
back into the policy process. Britain also witnessed a change in domestic leadership as Major 
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Coles took up the reins at the Home Office drugs branch once again. He was keen to re-exert 
Home Office suzerainty over this issue and wrest influence back from the Foreign Office. 
 
Washington’s relationship with Britain on this issue, lacking the animosity of the past, turned 
increasingly on questions of personnel and administrative matters. The broad strategic 
questions dividing the two nations had narrowed considerably and a new era of relative 
harmony seemed to prevail. Britain viewed itself as close to the vanguard of the new post-war 
drug control order. Pragmatism and self-interest remained the core of their policy, but they 
felt increasingly comfortable evangelising the merits of the control system while quietly 
directing it in ways congruent to their broader economic and political goals. The key 
question, therefore, was whether the allies could agree a framework to reconstitute the 
League system within the new UNO and how far they were willing to go in promoting this 
outcome. 
 
Part 1: The Remnants of the League System: 336 
The Policy Body:  
The Opium Advisory Committee (OAC) was the pre-war system’s ‘principal organ’ and 
policymaking arm, comprised of government representatives. It was a creation of the League 
General Assembly and was a committee of the League Council. The Council selected the 
countries represented, which had traditionally been open to all that had expressed an interest. 
It began with eight members but by 1939 twenty-four governments were represented. 
Germany, Italy and Japan had withdrawn cooperation and the Soviet Union had never been a 
member. The OAC had ceased operation during the war and how to reconstitute it remained 
the most highly contested question. 
 
The Technical Bodies: 
The Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) was a creation of the 1931 Convention. It oversaw the 
creation of a set of estimates for international manufactured drug requirements (including 
those countries that could not or would not provide their own). It would then issue, through 
the Secretary General of the League, estimates of world requirements for manufactured 
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narcotics. In this way supply could be matched to demand and thereby, in theory, eventually 
eliminate excess global supplies and starve the illicit market.   
 
The Permanent Central Opium Board (PCOB) was a creation of the 1925 Convention. It 
provided a general supervision of the international trade, trying to ensure that excess 
quantities were not building up in certain jurisdictions. It compared national estimates 
provided to the DSB and the eventual national statistical returns to ensure governments were 
remaining within their estimates. It then had the power to embargo exports to a given country 
it determined to be consistently exceeding its estimates. 
 
The Controlling Authority was a proposed organ of the system envisioned by the draft 
production limitation convention in 1939. It would be tasked with managing the international 
production of narcotics. It would be comprised of the Chair of the DSB and four independent 
experts chosen from producing and consuming countries. It was expected to function in the 
same manner as the DSB but would focus on estimates of requirements of raw opium and 
poppy straw (from which morphine could be extracted). It could then establish the yearly 
quantity of global production and assign export quantities to each producing country. 
 
The Secretariat: 
Within the League Secretariat, a specialised staff dealt with drug issues. Originally the Social 
Section had handled drugs, but they had been separated in 1931 with the establishment of an 
Opium Traffic Section – albeit sharing a chief with the Social Section. In 1940, a drug control 
service, with its own chief, Bertil Renborg, was set up. Where to situate the drug secretariat 
within the broader UNO secretariat became a hotly contested question during negotiations. 
 
Part 2: Towards a Production Limitation Convention? 
As Bertil Renborg wrote, the 1931 Convention had created: 
 
a planned economy on a world-wide scale. It regulates a whole industry throughout 
the world, from the point at which the raw materials enter the factory to the point at 
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which they finally reach the legitimate consumer. The only missing link was at the 
time the limitation of the production of the raw materials. 337 
 
Controlling production became the defining issue of the post-war multilateral framework. 
The Pre-War Global Opium Market: 338 
Prior to the outbreak of war twelve countries produced raw opium. Of these only India, 
Yugoslavia, the USSR and Japan manufactured morphine and other opiate medicines. Iran, 
India, Turkey, Yugoslavia, the USSR, Korea, Afghanistan and Bulgaria produced raw opium 
for export. China and Indo-China produced for domestic consumption alone and not for licit 
export. According to rough PCOB estimates, between 1934-1937 a world total of 18, 504 
tons of raw opium had been produced. Of that roughly 65% had been produced in China, 
17% in Iran, 6% in Turkey; 2% in the USSR; 1.5% in Yugoslavia and roughly 1.5% in 
Afghanistan, Korea, Japan, Indo-China and Bulgaria combined. Chile meanwhile accounted 
for an insignificant 45 kg over the four years. 
 
Of the estimated 18,504 tons, 83% was unaccounted for. Further, only 1,350 tons (7%) was 
used to for legitimate medical morphine. 800 tons was exported to opium smoking territories 
(Thailand, British Malaya, Indo-China, Formosa, Kwantung, the Netherlands Indies, Macao 
and Manchukuo) and 1,100 tons was used for domestic consumption by ‘addict’ populations - 
neither use was considered legitimate by the US and its control advocate allies. Although 
lacking official statistics from China it was estimated that all 12,000 tons produced was 
domestically consumed.  
 
Poppy Straw & Opium Substitutes: 339 
The 1925 Convention came into operation around the same time that Hungary had discovered 
a new method for extracting morphine from the whole dried poppy plant (known as poppy 
straw). This eliminated the intermediate ‘opium’ stage and thereby minimised the risk of 
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leakage into the illicit market. The process was soon adopted by Australia, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland. It was viewed as an economic 
threat by traditional producer countries, many of who called for an outright ban as a 
precondition for negotiating a production limitation convention. Since it was not covered by 
any conventions, statistics regarding scale of production, trade or stocks were unavailable.  
 
The question of how to control this industry remained open. Further, the emergence of 
synthetic drugs such as Dolantine offered the tantalising prospect of a world without the need 
for opium poppy. This was viewed positively or negatively depending on a state’s economic 
and policy vantage point. Control advocates welcomed it. Producer states feared it. 
 
The Producer Bloc: 
Turkey, which had worked during the 1930s to corner the global licit market and cultivate its 
image as the tightly regulated global good citizen producer, favoured levelling the playing 
field through a production limitation convention. Yugoslavia, representing the broad concerns 
of the producer bloc, was in ‘principle’ supportive but highlighted ‘essential’ prerequisites. 
Poppy straw production should be forbidden; A clear distinction should be drawn between 
opium for smoking and opium for manufacture of drugs; alternative development provisions 
should be included, to assist producing countries and share the costs of regulation globally; 
minimum prices for producers should be assured as well as the destruction of confiscated 
drugs.  
 
Yugoslavia had successfully worked in the 1938 OAC meeting to establish these as the 
bedrock principles of the Producer bloc, and won significant support from a number of 
consuming nations.340 It was expected that these principles would become the basis for any 
post war discussions on a production limitation convention. 
 
The Sceptics: 
Prior to the war, Canada articulated the sceptics’ position and also its interests as a key 
consuming nation, worried about the effect of restricting supply on the price and access to 
opium. ‘Sympathetic’ towards the goal it questioned whether there was a sufficient 
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foundation of facts and co-operation and claimed statistics were insufficient. Statistics were 
almost completely lacking from Afghanistan, China, Manchuria and Jehol. In other cases, 
like Iran, they were approximate; in others still vital information was lacking, such as the 
case of the prepared opium monopoly in Peru. Meanwhile, India would be obliged to make 
formal treaty reservations for the Indian States. The latter’s stocks, Canada pointed out, 
exceeded legitimate medical and scientific needs of the entire world, thereby creating a huge 
gap in monitoring world production.341 
 
The Moderates: 
Other states downplayed these obstacles. British India claimed to control the only routes 
through which opium could leave India and that leakage into the illicit traffic had been 
minimal. France, Poland and Belgium argued these obstacles were not insurmountable and 
reminded the conference that the 1931 Convention limiting manufacture had been concluded 
with similarly insufficient data yet produced ‘excellent results’. Switzerland was similarly 
supportive but wanted to ensure guaranteed access to necessary supplies of opium for 
manufacturing purposes.342 
 
Questions of Regulatory Design: 343 
An essential question centred on how to design a production limitation system. The two 
alternatives proposed were: a quota system or a free order system. Producing-exporting 
countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia) largely preferred a quota system. They 
argued it would ensure supply and price stability and guarantee market allocations to 
compensate for increased regulatory costs. Iran favoured a free order system, presumably to 
minimise regulatory constraints and recognising it would need to shrink production under a 
quota system. 
 
Consuming states also advocated a free order system to maintain market competition and 
lower prices. A compromise was reached in 1939 for a quota system allowing for a 
preference in orders to provide some consumer choice. A suggested way to administer it was 
to establish an international selling office based on the centralised model of the Turko-
Yugoslav opium combine export office of the 1930s. This had formed an effective monopoly 
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for the two countries and was something the US sought to recreate and expand after the war 
(see below). Success, however, still depended on reaching agreement between the various 
producer countries on allocating quotas (see Chapter 6). 
 
Most states agreed that an internal monopoly was the best way to regulate production, 
although some objected. Bulgaria claimed a monopoly would place too heavy a regulatory 
burden on small producers and advocated merely a ‘special organisation’. 
 
The US Takes the Initiative: 344 
Following passage of the Judd Resolution (see Chapter 2) in 1944 the State Department 
began requesting producing countries to prohibit non-medical or scientific production and 
export and to suppress illicit activity. The responses from governments were mixed and 
highlighted the remaining political and economic barriers to agreement. 
 
Afghanistan had declared in November 1944 that it would prohibit all cultivation from March 
1945. Mexico and China reiterated their commitments to suppressing illicit cultivation. The 
USSR said that it was studying the issue. The Turkish Government promised to engage with 
any production limitation conference that would ensure ‘equal conditions for all producers’. 
The UK (and India) expressed interest in a production limitation conference but refused to 
commit to strict medical and scientific use immediately in all its colonies (see Chapter Two). 
Iran and Yugoslavia gave no response. A number of others, including Bulgaria, Indochina 
and Siam were unable to engage given wartime conditions.  
 
Production limitation, however, represented just one strand of a process to create a new 
international drug control system, one we shall return to in later chapters. The most 
immediate and pressing problem was how to recreate a multilateral framework to govern and 
facilitate interstate cooperation as well as adopt treaties and pass resolutions in pursuit of 
control. It is towards this battle that we turn to next. 
 
Part 3: The Technical Bodies: From League to UNO: 
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The immediate question was how much of the League apparatus would survive into the post-
war system. The system had evolved organically over two decades and was almost 
inextricably tied to the League, but had its foundation in separate, overlapping treaties. 
Unlike the OAC, the PCOB and DSB had their own treaty basis and would not dissolve with 
the League. Nevertheless, their continued functioning depended on a facilitating international 
organisation. 
 
The PCOB and DSB had maintained some continuity for the ‘system of estimates’ 
throughout the war from their branch office in Washington (see Chapter One). The haphazard 
growth produced overlapping functions and complex bureaucratic arrangements.345 They also 
represented an area of international consensus. Whatever the desire to see the PCOB and 
DSB rationalised or unified, states agreed that continuity was essential. 346 Far from being 
bystanders in the UNO creation process the members of the PCOB and DSB assumed a new 
global political role and even began advocating policies for specific countries as in the case 
of Germany. The PCOB in particular pursued a greater political role. This was facilitated by 
the ‘inner circle’ which viewed greater policy activism by the PCOB as an effective tool in 
pushing the control agenda on reluctant countries. 
 
Part 4: Personnel Questions and Personal Diplomacy: 
Early ‘Inner Circle’ Moves: 
As 1941 progressed Sharman and Anslinger began to contemplate the shape of international 
control in the event of a Peace Conference being called. Anslinger had, in May 1941, reached 
out to his German counterparts, Werner Thomas, head of the Rauschgiftzentrale of the 
German Kriminalpolizeiant in Berlin, to hedge his bets in case of a British loss, or a peace 
agreement. He wrote that he hoped ‘that your Government will return you to this work in due 
course, and that after the war we shall be able to see each other again and to collaborate as we 
did in the past’.347 By November 1941 both Anslinger and Sharman were tilting towards 
having ‘an all-inclusive treaty’ ready to place on the table of a peace conference. They were 
also aiming to do it ‘outside the orbit’ of the politically tainted League Secretariat and its 
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Swedish head Bertil Renborg.348 The two men were already contemplating the radical 
opportunities a new post-war order would provide to remould the system. This impulse only 
grew stronger over time.  
 
Circumventing ‘The Big Swede’:349 
The ‘inner circle’ had been highly reticent to see Bertil Renborg come to Washington during 
the War. Helen Moorhead described him as ‘stupid’, while even the British Foreign Office 
described him as a ‘clumsy ass’.350 He had faced no danger in Geneva and was seen as having 
good relations with the German government. Further, his role as head of the drug section of 
the League Secretariat would raise complications for the PCOB and DSB ‘branch offices’. 
Ignoring these political difficulties he descended on Washington and almost immediately 
created new problems. As Helen Howell Moorhead wrote: ‘he wanted everything to carry on 
in the most correct foreign office style…he could not realize that it was better not to raise 
certain questions…to have certain letters go unanswered’.351  
 
An angry correspondence between Renborg and the Canadian government in 1942 convinced 
the ‘inner circle’ to push him out of Washington, especially as it became apparent there was a 
divergence between his post-war vision and that of the ‘inner circle’. Renborg favoured a 
conservative approach of ‘strict codification of existing engagements’.352 The ‘inner circle’ 
wanted an activist agenda pushing for a new production limitation convention and a radically 
redesigned OAC.  
 
Matters worsened when Renborg blocked the Chinese ‘inner circle’ ally, Dr. Victor Hoo, 
from appointment to the PCOB in 1942. Anslinger and Sharman assumed this was because 
‘he realized that Hoo would go along with both the United States and Canada in all policies’. 
Renborg secured the nomination of another Chinese national, Dr. Woo. The action, 
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orchestrated from London, led Anslinger to conclude that it had ‘all the earmarks of the 
Renborg-Delevingne combine’. Robbed of this opportunity to strengthen their grip on the 
PCOB Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’ accelerated efforts to marginalise the London-based 
remnants of the League system. The first step was pushing Renborg back out of Washington 
to London or Geneva, where he could cause fewer problems. As early as 1942 the Foreign 
Policy Association (FPA) took the lead in advocating his removal from Washington.353 
 
Part 5: Renborg’s Recipe for Continuity: 354 
As early as February 1942 Renborg moved to control the post-war planning process. He 
pushed for a meeting of the OAC to discuss various business including post-war control. 
Anslinger and his State Department ally George Morlock, successfully worked to ‘drop 
something on it from a great height’ and his plan died.355 Undeterred, in March 1944 Renborg 
drafted a plan for the post-war international organisation. Once again it received no support 
from the US.356 He reworked it in September 1944 and this time pursued international 
support. He noted that his views were ‘entirely unofficial’ but declared himself ‘in favour of 
the status quo’ since it ‘worked reasonably well’ and hoped to see the League system moved 
and adapted to the UN.357  
 
The Secretariat: 
Renborg favoured a distinct secretariat section because drugs represented ‘a very special 
problem’ with ‘no or few similarities to other questions’. Unlike most of the League’s 
technical activities it dealt with international treaties and therefore both law and 
administration. It also affected many different areas of human activity - agriculture; trade; 
manufacturing; commerce; and treatment. He feared that lumping drugs in with other issues 
like social or health questions could result in irrelevant aspects becoming ‘overemphasized’ 
and non-experts addressing highly technical questions. 
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Technical vs. Policy Bodies: 
Renborg argued that simplification was ‘an urgent necessity’, but rejected amalgamating the 
PCOB and DSB with the OAC.  The former were ‘expert bodies with specific functions and 
powers of criticism and sanctions’. The latter was a policy making body. He also argued that 
amalgamating the PCOB and DSB would be difficult. The resulting body would ‘be the judge 
in its own case’, i.e. estimating requirements and then judging government compliance. He 
suggested a potential compromise of amalgamation with separate sections and members. 
Further, Secretariat functions could be merged. 
 
Renborg also pushed to clarify the precise competence of the expert organs. He wrote: ‘they 
should not intervene with Governments with regard to their administrative systems or to their 
drug policy’. If they had concerns they should report them to the OAC’s replacement which 
could then make investigations and recommendations. He argued for a continuation of the 
past arrangement in which all countries who desired membership were allowed to join. By 
1944 there were nineteen countries producing raw materials and as many as twenty-five 
countries manufacturing drugs. This was all in total opposition to the ‘inner circle’ 
conception which, as we shall see, favoured a small, handpicked OAC replacement and a 
more politically potent PCOB. While Renborg’s efforts represented the League old guard's 
continuity efforts, Helen Howell Moorhead via the Foreign Policy Association was also 
quietly leading ‘inner circle’ efforts to circumvent and remove the old guard as we shall see.  
 
Part 6: The ‘Inner Circle’ Plan: 
Helen Howell Moorhead and the FPA: 
By 1943 the FPA was taking the lead role in crafting the ‘inner circle’ post-war settlement 
framework. Acting as a public face, they left Anslinger freer to operate below the radar. Their 
goal was to salvage the DSB and PCOB and destroy the remnants of the OAC. This, they 
hoped, would result in a new, leaner and more activist committee being built. Producing a 
clear ‘independent’ organisational blueprint ready for adoption became central to their 
strategy.358 
 
Anslinger and Sharman: Driving from the Back Seat: 
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By 1944 it became clear that the US State Department and the Canadian Department of 
External Affairs would handle all international organisational questions ‘from top to bottom,’ 
including opium control. This meant Anslinger and Sharman had to inject themselves through 
backchannels while appearing to remain distant. For example, US officials in charge of post-
war international organisation planning were barred from consulting outside the State 
Department. However, George Morlock was able to informally consult Anslinger and relay 
his views to his State Department colleagues.359 
 
Early Anglo-American Divergence: 
During a frosty April 1944 London meeting between George Morlock and British drug 
officials, divisions began to emerge. Sydney Harris for the Home Office made clear his 
preference for continuity with the League system. He argued that any new production 
limitation agreement should be left to the OAC after the war. The ‘inner circle’ believed he 
and ‘the Home Office pundits’ hoped to deflect ‘criticism or publicity’ by insisting on a 
return to the toothless OAC framework of consensual policy making. Morlock, refused to 
commit the US to cooperation with a re-established OAC. He suggested ten to twelve experts 
meet and discuss the situation. The US, he warned, was interested in ‘practical steps to 
combat the illicit traffic but…not interested in meetings dominated by obstructionists’.360 
 
Canada follows the ‘Inner Circle’: 
Sharman, meanwhile, was asked by Hume Wrong at the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs to give his opinion. He viewed his relations with Wrong as ‘extremely close and 
cordial’. Sharman strongly advocated the emerging American/’Inner circle’ conception: a 
much smaller OAC consisting of 8-12 members, not the previous 24; and a ‘technical’ 
committee consisting of country experts not political appointees who at OAC had ‘nothing to 
contribute except defence of their own countries’ interests.’361  
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Building a ‘Technical’ Committee:362 
Advocating a ‘technical’ committee comprising national drug administrators was attractive 
for several reasons. Firstly it framed the ‘inner circle’ conception as technocratic as opposed 
to political. Secondly, it would foster the development of supply focused and police 
enforcement oriented national control agencies and expertise. Sharman and Anslinger had 
hated health professionals attending OAC. They claimed they were unfamiliar with the 
policing issues, the illicit traffic and tended to ‘complicate matters, as so much of what they 
say…sounds like “expert material”, which it very definitely is not’. Thirdly, it would ensure 
Anslinger drove US drug diplomacy rather than the State Department. This would 
simultaneously strengthen his position in Washington against potential reorganizational 
attempts. 
 
Anslinger’s more radical hope was that government representatives would appear before 
experts to argue against resolutions they did not approve of. Thereby the burden of proof 
would lie with political representatives, and the experts could decide whether to accept, 
modify or reject the case. The ‘inner circle’ aimed to keep broader health and social questions 
out of discussions, and argued the new drug control system should not placed under a health 
of social welfare section of the new international organisation. Herbert May anticipated 
‘considerable opposition from some “Foreign Offices”’. Further there was a grudging 
recognition that some level of politicisation was inevitable. Ensuring government buy-in 
‘without letting technical questions be affected by...political considerations’ was the key. 
 
Membership: 
The ‘inner circle’ aimed for an OAC of eight ‘technical experts’ with the option to expand as 
countries developed expertise. Sharman argued to the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs that the ‘most efficient and result-producing body’ had functioned for ten years prior 
to the war. This was an unofficial gathering of six to eight national administrators in a hotel 
room in Geneva (and continuing correspondence throughout the year). They would exchange 
intelligence and coordinate cross-border police efforts. Even when Germany had ceased 
cooperation with the League, the German Narcotics Chief, ‘an exceedingly efficient man’ 
continued to attend, although using a fictitious name and national affiliation.  This 
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cooperation continued to bear fruit even after the Anschluss when, for example, Germany 
imprisoned an Austrian Trafficker.363 
 
The Secretariat: 
Similar to Renborg, the ‘inner circle’ wanted to see the drug secretariat remain independent 
of other UNO secretarial functions, such as Health or Social Welfare. This would prevent the 
medicalization or social welfarisation of the issue, with the potential that the opium 
secretariat could come under the leadership of health experts with no understanding of the 
supply and enforcement issues.364 These represented the core of ‘inner circle’ hopes and 
aspirations. Converting them into political reality was the next step. 
 
Part 7: Forward Momentum: 365 
Movement was initially stalled by uncertainty about the post-war organisation. In October 
1944, proposals for the UN began to emerge and the ‘inner circle’ quickly moved to action. 
The State Department soon concluded that opium would be subsumed into the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC). Remaining non-committal, they welcomed FPA proposals and 
permitted George Morlock to begin building a coalition of overseas supporters by 
disseminating proposals through US diplomatic missions. 
 
Both the US State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs were 
sceptical about producing an apolitical successor to the OAC. Nevertheless, Anslinger and 
Sharman seeing matters as ‘starting off on the right foot’ pressed ahead. Representative 
Judd’s vocal support and legislation helped solidify the US position while Sharman ensured 
the Judd Resolution received favourable attention within the Canadian Government.  
 
Part 8: OAC Resurrected or Reborn? 
As the OAC would officially dissolve with the League Renborg aimed to hold a final wartime 
meeting to draft an agenda and proposals for the new organisation thereby ensuring a fait 
accompli of continuity. In Washington, Helen Moorhead wrote that she ‘would very much 
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regret the calling of a meeting of the old O.A.C. That is now pretty completely dead. It would 
be too bad to revive it...and then shortly afterward wipe it out altogether by the new set-up.’366  
 
Renborg received the support of the London Four (HO, FO, PCOB and DSB) and was 
awaiting approval from the Acting Secretary General of the League. The American position 
was to formally abstain, given that it was not a member of the League, but to attend as an 
observer. Anslinger, Morlock and Sharman meanwhile once again set about circumventing 
Renborg’s efforts.367 As Sharman wrote:  
 
we should let the dead past bury itself, if they can be convinced that death has 
actually taken place and that mortification is due to set in, and...we should not aid in 
any attempt at resurgence.368 
 
They should aim instead for: 
 
a new born child in the narcotic world which will grow up and develop into 
something which will be well worthwhile, unfettered by the ideas and activities of 
grandparents or great grandparents of a bygone age.369 
 
Morlock Proposes a Successor: 
Sensing a policy vacuum George Morlock took the initiative within the US government and 
began to advocate for a ‘Narcotics Advisory Committee’ (NAC) to replace the OAC. It 
would be composed of all parties to one or more of the Conventions. The real work would be 
done by a Standing Committee of the NAC composed of representatives designated by 
ECOSOC chosen from: the US; UK; USSR; China; France; Netherlands; India; Canada; 
Egypt; Turkey; Yugoslavia and Mexico. Representatives would be heads of their domestic 
narcotics administrations. Voting would be on a majority basis and the UN Secretary General 
would establish a Narcotic Drugs Section (NDS), separate to any other division of the UN 
Secretariat. The ‘inner circle’ met informally in Anslinger’s office to strategize and quickly 
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solidified around Morlock’s criteria. They also looked forward to the prospect of unifying the 
conventions into a single ‘all inclusive’ convention and central committee with unified 
executive, administrative and judicial functions, but recognised it may take years.370 
 
Part 9: After Dumbarton Oaks:371 
After the Dumbarton Oaks agreement it became clear that the League would voluntarily 
dissolve. The State Department then began to formulate a coherent strategy for the new UNO. 
Since the US was not a member of the League it had no official say in its dissolution. 
Nevertheless, for drug control, the State Department asked Helen Moorhead to draft ‘the very 
best plan’ she could, and they would ‘give it every consideration.’ During preliminary 
discussions with the State Department Moorhead urged that it be considered an independent 
subject under ECOSOC. She strongly argued against considering it a social issue and sought 
to reframe it as an economic problem. It centred on controlling a commodity from growth 
through to its sale and creating measures to prevent leakage into the illicit traffic. It was also, 
she argued, not a health issue: 
  
the international control apparatus…efforts are directed to keeping a commodity, the 
production of which is restricted, in legitimate channels. And while it has social as 
well as public health implications, the control, with its special enforcement and 
prevention machinery lose its effectiveness…if associated with a social welfare or 
public health agency...The opium problem is at present, and will continue to be for a 
foreseeable period, largely a restrictive economic and policing problem.372 
 
Soon the Foreign Policy Association memo became the de facto, albeit unofficial, US 
framework for the post-war system. Meanwhile, the dissolution of League functions and the 
drafting of the UN charter were to be decided at the upcoming San Francisco Conference. 
With the State Department now firmly in control of the process all eyes turned to San 
Francisco. 
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In Britain, Dumbarton Oaks saw the elaboration of their post war foreign policy strategy 
based on Anthony Eden’s ‘three pillars’. First among these was the creation of a ‘World 
Organisation embracing the bulk of the nations and eventually, perhaps, all nations’.373 This 
policy became clearly applied in the field of drug policy and led to divisions with the ‘inner 
circle’. The UK saw narcotics control as a consensus ‘technical’ issue, ostensibly above 
politics and therefore a useful tool towards strengthening international representation and 
involvement in the new ‘World Organisation’ and which could be used to trumpet its efficacy 
and provide a beacon to other areas of international cooperation. The details of that 
cooperation were, from the start, secondary to the goals of consensus and relative harmony. 
 
Part 10: San Francisco and Beyond: 
The San Francisco Conference proved highly unsatisfactory to the ‘inner circle’. Drug control 
received comparatively little attention and Anslinger was almost completely shut out by the 
State Department. This was unsurprising given broader tensions within the ‘big three’ 
alliance between Britain, the US and Russia and the genuine risk the entire endeavour could 
collapse in discord. Further, as Hoopes and Brinkley point out, smaller states were 
increasingly wary of the level of power concentrated in these three states. With these 
fundamental issues and deep divisions over major foreign policy concerns, such as Poland 
and fundamental questions around international security, the structure of the United Nations 
and its General Assembly, the US took a strong activist role in guiding the conference 
through to conclusion.374 This inevitably drove a deprecation of avoidable issues, such as 
drugs, lest they cause unforeseen hiccups. 
 
The US Delegation made a ‘declaration of principles’ on drugs but took no tangible 
leadership. These principles advocated that: 
 
the [UNO] will be entrusted with supervision over…international agreements…and 
that there shall be established an advisory body to advice directly [ECOSOC] and 
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that the existing agencies be regarded as autonomous agencies to be brought into 
relationships with [ECOSOC].375 
 
Soon ‘newcomers’ in the State Department began advocating a complete merging of the 
PCOB, DSB and OAC successor into one body composed of non-governmental experts. 
Anslinger was appalled, privately pointing out to that he could not think of one potential 
‘expert’ whose advice he would wish to follow.376 Further, he expected it would ‘meet with 
hearty British disapproval’.377 Sharman described this ‘complete divorce, without alimony, 
between narcotic control in the domestic governmental and international fields respectively’ 
either ‘amusing or pathetic, depending on the point of view.’ DSB President, Malcolm 
Delevingne agreed ‘it would be a great mistake’ and expected a cold reception from the UK, 
who would likely push back against excluding government representation.378 Elliott Felkin, 
Secretary of the PCOB, was similarly vocal in his opposition.379 
 
Overall the San Francisco conference was viewed as a defeat by the ‘inner circle’ and they 
were forced to launch another offensive to ensure drug policy was not lost in the post-war 
agenda. They quickly focused all their attention on London, where UN Preparatory 
Commission negotiations would take place. Anslinger began orchestrating a national press 
campaign. In October 1945 the Women’s Christian Temperance Union claimed the San 
Francisco Charter left ‘the world open to traffic…of the scourging drug’ opium and that 
opium control was ‘left out of the Charter in deference to the profit motive of ‘certain 
nations’’. Hearst Newspapers supported this view with a string of editorials.380 
 
Undermining Renborg: 
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Bertil Renborg appeared the favourite to head any new drug secretariat. Anslinger and 
Sharman worked feverishly to prevent it and ensure Leon Steinig, ‘in whom everyone has 
confidence’, assumed the role.381 In August 1945 he wrote to the US UNO Preparatory 
Commission delegation decrying Renborg’s ‘absence of impartiality, inability for 
straightforward action, excessive ambition and lack of judgement’. This, he claimed, surely 
disqualified Renborg from the role given the competence requirement outlined in Article 101 
of the UNO Charter.382 
 
Renborg’s machination’s further provoked their ire. On November 1945 he circulated a 
memo suggesting that narcotics control could be viewed as a ‘means of preventing 
international aggression’. Sharman described the suggestion as ‘tripe’ and ‘extraordinary that 
mental excrescences of this kind should emanate…from the holder of a position which would 
normally imply the necessity for brains and judgement’.383 He and Anslinger worked to 
portray Renborg as incompetent and therefore unsuitable. When this did not work they 
painted Renborg as a Nazi sympathiser.384 
 
Slowly increasing its engagement in the process Britain was unsure how to proceed. Canada 
was strongly against Renborg but did not wish to appear to block his nomination because he 
was not a national of the United Nations nor did they wish to be on the opposing side to the 
British. Major Coles of the Home Office Drugs Branch remained a staunch advocate for 
Renborg. He correctly surmised that the Canadian opposition stemmed from a personal 
quarrel between Sharman and Renborg and maintained that Renborg was the best person for 
the position. Regarding alleged Nazi sympathies, Coles claimed to have no knowledge other 
than rumours that Renborg had visited Finland during the Russo-Finnish war and become 
involved in ‘undesirable activities’. The British decided to try clear up the allegations. The 
US threw their weight strongly behind Leon Steinig but the British felt he was not ‘big 
enough for the job’, labelling him an ‘intellectual’ who ‘does not make a formidable 
impression’. Although finding no evidence of Nazi sympathies, the British recognised that 
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Renborg had lost the confidence of the US, Canada and a number of others. In the end they 
accepted Steinig.385 
 
 
 
Part 11: The British Position – The Home Office Reasserts Control: 
Britain was re-establishing a locus of policy. The Home Office had moved its main expert, 
Major Coles away from the issue during the war. Thornton took over and relations with 
Anslinger and the US deteriorated quickly. The Foreign Office stepped some way into the 
breach to ensure no broader rupture occurred with their US ally. The Colonial, India and 
Burma Offices were forced to take a back seat due to their relative wartime weakness in 
Whitehall and their influence was largely channelled through sporadic meetings of the 
Interdepartmental Opium Committee. Lastly Malcolm Delevingne, officially a member of the 
DSB, provided some much needed advisory capacity. The result was a British wartime policy 
confused by bureaucratic rivalry; broader foreign policy concerns; wartime exigencies and 
pre-existing League rivalries. 
 
When Major Coles returned to the Drugs Branch he was determined to reassert his agency’s 
suzerainty. Soon a clearer British strategy emerged under Coles based on two central tenets: 
continuity and conservatism. As Sharman had remarked in mid-1944, ‘I note with interest the 
British attitude, which I have long prophesied, that they want the limitation problem to 
continue to be handled through the [OAC]’.386 Further, the British sought a cosmetic change 
in their international reputation and consistently sought to portray themselves at the vanguard 
of international control efforts whenever possible. 
 
London’s main disagreement with the ‘inner circle’ was over how much to leave to the new 
UNO to decide and how much to try alter the system before multilaterism took root once 
again. There was some agreement with the ‘inner circle’ on general points. The Home Office 
agreed that the OAC successor should be made up of government representatives, not merely 
a body of experts. This could be smaller with ‘more carefully selected members’ since some 
OAC members had only been there ‘for reasons of prestige’. The PCOB and DSB could not 
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be allowed to lapse and should maintain their ‘special position’ as ‘impartial non-political 
organs’. London was willing to consider amalgamation of the PCOB and DSB, but only after 
the UNO became fully operational and after broad consultations.387 Overall, Britain was 
aiming for minimal activism before the UN met, merely a stable transfer of League functions. 
Once reconvened difficult questions could then be tackled. 
 
Soon, Phillip Noel Baker, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who had a long 
engagement with the drug issue, began to advocate more radical proposals. He suggested all 
questions be left to the General Assembly of the UNO. This was completely contrary to 
‘inner circle’ goals to have Preparatory Commission recommendations ready for the first 
General Assembly. Further, he wanted all the existing machinery, including the PCOB and 
DSB to be ‘integrated’ into the UNO. Lastly he wanted to see the creation of two or three 
international factories supplying all global medical requirements of drugs. The Home Office 
flatly refused to establish this latter point as a tenet of British policy given expected 
controversy.388 
 
He quickly alienated the India, Colonial and Burma Offices by failing to consult them and the 
Home Office soon sought to quell his enthusiasm. They called a meeting of the Inter-
departmental Opium Committee to clarify British Policy. At the meeting a consensus-
oriented resolution was drafted. It called on the UN Preparatory Commission to recommend 
that the UN assume responsibility for this issue. Members of the PCOB and DSB would 
temporarily remain in their positions. The General Assembly would ask ECOSOC to appoint 
a committee to advise on the adaptation of the system. ECOSOC would then seek 
international agreement to appoint new members of the PCOB and DSB, pending revision of 
the conventions, and the secretariat question would be left to the Secretary General. The 
British Delegation was ready to introduce this resolution in the Preparatory Commission 
meeting but eventually deferred to the Chinese Delegation’s resolution (see below).389  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 HO Memo: International Control of the Drug Traffic, 26 October 1945, BNA-CO 323-1885-6. 
388 File Minute, 19 November 1945; Noel Baker to Chuter, 15 October 1945; Minutes of the Thirty-
Ninth Meeting of [IOC], 21 November 1945, BNA-CO 323-1885-6. 
389 File Minute 2, 19iNovember 1945; Chuter Ede to Noel-Baker, 31 October 1945; Minutes of the 
Thirty-Ninth Meeting of [IOC], 21 November 1945; Draft Recommendation for Submission to 
Committee 7 ([LON]), 21 November 1945; Logan to Acheson, 14 December 1945, BNA-CO 323-
1885-6. 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
121	  
	  
Noel-Baker refused to give up and in January 1946 sought the support of the Secretary of 
State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, in pushing more radical proposals. The Home Office 
responded angrily and resolved to clearly reassert suzerainty. The Interdepartmental 
committee was again convened and the various departments closed ranks with the Home 
Office. The Foreign Office was left awkwardly defending Noel-Baker’s behaviour as mere 
bureaucratic crossed wires. The Home Office claimed that Noel-Baker ‘underestimated’ the 
success of the pre-war system and that the present issue was taking up from where the League 
had left off, rather than rebuilding the system from scratch.390  
 
Despite a difficult few months, by January 1946 Britain had finally outlined its conception of 
and strategy for the post-war system. Part of this represented the reassertion of control by the 
Home Office over the Foreign Office. Soon, the complexity of the UN process saw other 
agencies happily divest responsibility. The Colonial Office was glad to see the Home Office 
take the lead and admitted their interest only became ‘live’ over ‘methods of control’.391 
Nevertheless, Noel-Baker was not finished and would take his efforts to the Preparatory 
Commission. 
 
Part 12: The UN Preparatory Commission: 
After the San Francisco conference the ‘inner circle’ rushed to regain some control. Helen 
Moorhead left for the Preparatory Commission in London to try and influence events behind 
the scenes in an unofficial capacity. The Preparatory Commission would be preparing the 
Agenda for the first Assembly of the UN. As she departed, Moorhead wrote to Anslinger that 
she would ‘try to think each time what you would have done’. She worked her way into 
important Preparatory Commission meetings, to many of which even the former Acting 
Secretary General of the League was not invited. Some access was gained ‘irregularly and 
must be kept quiet’ and she was careful to direct communications privately to Anslinger 
avoiding regular Treasury Department channels. As she watched events proceed she was 
soon lamenting to Anslinger that it reminded her of San Francisco with the ‘inner circle’ 
being cut out by the State Department.392  
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The State Department promised Anslinger the US delegation would support Preparatory 
Commission proposals for an independent commission reporting directly to ECOSOC. Soon 
it became apparent that no such instructions had been sent and the delegation was avoiding 
leadership. Morlock wrote to Anslinger on November 5th that ‘All our efforts have been in 
vain’. Anslinger thought it ‘discouraging’ and believed his efforts since San Francisco 
‘nullified’. The Chinese delegation, expecting the US delegation to propose a new 
independent commission, soon stepped in to take the lead with their own resolution. The US 
delegation remained silent on this and Anslinger privately fumed that they appeared to have 
‘laryngitis’.393 
 
Anslinger had written to the Chinese official Victor Hoo in October, saying that his 
‘splendid’ views were entirely in line with the US.394 Now he asked Hoo to be his eyes in 
London. Events, he said, needed ‘very close watching’. He feared that ‘we have been thrown 
together with and subordinated to “social welfare”’. Anslinger continued, ‘how often must 
the same error be repeated within one generation?’ He also hoped to bring about a parallel 
attitude with the Canadian delegation. 395 
 
Anslinger soon learned the US Delegation had instructions to leave the matter to the General 
Assembly in January, without Preparatory Commission recommendations. The reason given 
was that it would raise difficult questions for other matters, such as the Fiscal Commission. 
The State Department did not want to come out in favour of a special commission for opium 
with direct contact to ECOSOC (i.e. a decentralised opium commission) and thereby tie the 
US to this course more broadly. Morlock learned from within the State Department that the 
US delegation were hoping another country would take the lead and were generally sceptical 
of the issue’s relative importance.396 
 
In London, Adlai Stevenson, the head of the US delegation, took little interest and his staff 
warned Helen Moorhead to keep a ‘sense of proportion’. She lamented to Anslinger that if 
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only they could get instructions sent to the delegation, the Chinese resolution would pass. She 
wrote, ‘Other countries are waiting [for] our lead’. Anslinger worked to prod the State 
Department from Washington. He arranged a General Federation of Womens’ Clubs 
resolution calling on the State Department ‘to take prompt action to bring about the creation 
of an [OAC] not related to health, welfare or other section but to report directly’ to ECOSOC. 
In the meantime, Anslinger demanded a ‘show down’ with the State Department.397 
 
Victor Hoo and the Chinese delegation pressed ahead with their Resolution proposal 
recommending the creation of a new OAC reporting directly to ECOSOC and sought 
Moorhead’s advice in drafting it. On 30 November Anslinger’s efforts bore fruit. The State 
Department telegrammed their London delegation to support the Chinese resolution, although 
the precise terms were to be left for ECOSOC determination. The State Department were also 
aware that Britain had a similar resolution ready to be tabled. They asked their delegation to 
ascertain British intentions and the content of their resolution and potentially outsource the 
diplomatic heavy lifting. Victor Hoo, meanwhile, secured the support of a number of 
delegations, including the USSR.398 
 
On the same day, Anslinger and the State Department met for their ‘showdown’. State 
blamed a clerical error for the instructions not being sent. Anslinger claimed that the US was 
not taking the lead and asked whether the US would push for a separate narcotics section 
within the UN Secretariat, independent of health or social welfare. The State Department 
refused to be drawn, preferring (like the British) to defer secretariat issues to the Secretary 
General. Anslinger lamented that the recent US record ‘did not look well’ but the State 
Department retorted that it was ‘a question of timing, not of substance’.399  
 
The Chinese resolution was introduced on December 6th and passed unanimously. It 
recommended that a Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) be established at the first session 
of ECOSOC. It was the only one of its kind, with every other suggestion by the Preparatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Moorhead to Anslinger, 22 November 1945; General Federation of Womens’ Clubs Resolution, 1 
December 1945; Anslinger to Moorhead, 28 November 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-
5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945). 
398 Moorhead memo, 29 November 1945; State Department to American Embassy, London, 30 
November 1945; Moorhead memo, December 1945, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 
[UNO] #2 (1945). 
399 Memo of meeting: International Organization for Narcotics Control, 30 November 1945, 
FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1 [UNO] #2 (1945). 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
124	  
	  
Commission labelled ‘possible’ or ‘for consideration’. Back in the US, Anslinger went to 
work promoting the achievement through the Hearst press, and made sure to credit Victor 
Hoo as the man who ‘formulated it and steered it to unanimous adoption’ and privately 
thanked Hoo for his ‘magnificent work’.400  
 
Membership and Staffing: 
An important key question was size and membership of the new CND. China suggested 
fifteen members. Anslinger suggested ten to start, plus the Presidents of the PCOB and DSB 
as voting members. He suggested: the US; UK; China; France; India; Canada; Egypt; Turkey; 
Mexico; and the USSR. Each had a central narcotic administration implying that the head of 
each narcotic administration would be the country representative. For the US this would be 
Harry Anslinger. In Canada it would be Col. Sharman. Further, it promised a reliable bloc of 
‘inner circle’ (US, Canada and China) and allied states (Egypt and potentially Turkey, 
Mexico and the USSR) who could outvote more conservative states like the UK, France and 
India. The Netherlands and Switzerland were left off the list likely for this reason, but 
ostensibly because they did not have narcotic ‘problems of sufficient importance’.401 
 
Shifting Sands: 
Moorhead concluded that the ‘inner circle’ had been pushed out of the negotiations as ‘the 
result of not having a top ranking official in the State Dept. to support Anslinger’. She met 
with Adlai Stevenson before departing London and warned the US ‘had won a battle, but not 
the war’. She told him that the US delegation at ECOSOC should have a drugs expert and 
that Anslinger was the most competent. Stevenson remained non-committal. Moorhead, 
pointed to a changed British dynamic. Delevingne was unwell and had been pushed out by 
Major Coles. Noel-Baker remained unpredictable. Delevingne said the Home Office would 
try to control him in the Assembly, but there was a risk he would ‘go off on his own and 
make a “rousing speech”’. For Moorhead this was just another reason for Anslinger to attend. 
She had witnessed their ‘new born child’ coming into being. It now required a ‘guardian’ 
within the US Delegation, not an ‘outsider’ like herself.402 
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Outcomes: 
Overall, the ‘inner circle’ had mixed results from the first round of political battles. They had 
not radically reshaped international control. The State Department deprecated the issue and 
minimised US involvement. Through a mixture of bureaucratic ‘oversight’ and machinations 
Anslinger had been excluded from the official process. The wartime situation of Anslinger 
driving US narcotics diplomacy appeared largely at an end. Meanwhile, Delevingne was 
pushed back out of the British policy process and the Home Office had fully re-exerted 
control under Major Coles. However, part of the ‘inner circle’ agenda, of securing a solid 
institutional basis for the new CND, had been salvaged by the work of Victor Hoo and the 
Chinese Delegation. A significant question now was whether Anslinger and Sharman could 
inject themselves into the UN process.  
 
Part 13: The UN First Session: 
During the plenary of the General Assembly in January 1946 the UK delegate, Mr. 
Henderson made a statement in support for the Chinese proposal and lauded the international 
control system as ‘an object lesson in international cooperation’.403 His speech set the tone for 
the session. The British and Chinese delegations proceeded to take a clear lead while the 
State Department quietly advocated long-standing US goals. They instructed the US 
delegation to support a 10-15 member commission. Further (thanks to lobbying by Anslinger 
and Moorhead) the US delegation would push to secure Leon Steinig as head of the drugs 
Secretariat and ensure its independence from any health or social unit.404 
 
The US, British and Chinese delegations had largely coalesced around a general framework. 
They now worked to hammer out details like the number of members. The UK favoured 
fifteen members, plus the two presidents. China favoured fifteen maximum. Anslinger and 
Morlock eventually yielded on giving voting rights for the Presidents of the PCOB and DSB 
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in the face of determined opposition, yet maintained the CND should be composed of no 
more than thirteen members.405 
 
In the end they agreed on 15 state members. The PCOB and DSB Presidents could act in a 
consultative capacity but would not be members, nor have voting rights. On US 
recommendation it was stipulated that representatives should be directors of narcotics 
administration or similarly qualified persons. China, the UK, USA, USSR, France, India, 
Netherlands, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Peru and Poland would be 
represented. The question of amalgamating the PCOB and DSB was postponed until the first 
session.406 
 
Anslinger described progress as ‘almost too good to be true’. Helen Moorhead described 
herself as ‘very satisfied’. Thanking her old friend Arthur Henderson for his opening speech 
Helen Moorhead called for CND to become ‘A group of law-enforcement officers, getting 
together to bring more effective pressures on the illicit world’.407 
 
Part 14: Transfer: 
On 18 April 1946, the Assembly of the League asked Member States and League officials to 
facilitate the UN’s assumption of the League’s roles on the issue. By August the UN 
Secretary General had established an independent Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND) within 
the Department of Social Affairs of the Secretariat of the UN. Further, the UN Secretariat 
assumed provisional responsibility for administrative and financial support for the PCOB and 
DSB and their secretariats. Leon Steinig was named Director of DND.408 Arthur Elliott Felkin 
became Secretary of a new combined PCOB/DSB Secretariat. With these actions the UN had 
assumed political and secretarial functions of drug control system. The League era had 
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officially ended and the UN era had begun. The First Session of the CND was fixed for 27 
November 1946. 
 
Conclusion: 
As Sharman wrote later, ‘the Narcotic Commission was one of the first bodies, if not the first 
body, created by the Assembly’.409 The ‘inner circle’ and the League Officials had 
successfully salvaged the system’s key apparatus during the war, overseen its transfer to the 
new UNO and ensured it was highlighted as a priority for post-war international cooperation. 
Far from a clear ‘inner circle’ success, however, the battles around the creation of the UNO 
represented a mixed outcome. The ‘inner circle’ had spent most of their time fighting a rear-
guard action. What emerged was a moderate coalition centred on China, the UK and the US 
State Department. The ‘inner circle’ had done much of the heavy lifting on designing the 
institutional framework. However, none of the delegations proved willing to push the 
envelope and the result was a consensus-oriented system that would await the return to 
multilateralism before making any major forward momentum on the great questions of 
controls and goals.  
 
In one sense the outcome represented a failure by the ‘inner circle’ to utilise a moment of 
tremendous uncertainty to remake the system. Nevertheless, this underplays the changed 
dynamic. The massive bilateral shifts in policy, particularly surrounding the opium 
monopolies, and the occupation of a number of important states, had begun a new trajectory 
towards control and had changed the governing arithmetic within the system. True, they had 
not resolved the key questions of control prior to the UN meeting as they had hoped. 
However, their work during the war and in preparation for the UN General Assembly helped 
set the trajectory of policy towards realisation of many of their goals. It would simply take 
time, patience, normative and interpretive shaping, precedence and perseverance. As time 
progressed it become clear that some issues which had deadlocked the interwar years had 
been left behind. However it also became clear that key policy, political and economic 
divisions remained. 
 
Meanwhile, the episode highlighted the innate possibilities for closer Anglo-American 
relations. Part of this stemmed from the radically changed situation around the colonial 
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opium monopolies. Despite Anslinger’s role in pushing Britain towards the policy shift, with 
Anslinger and the hardliners marginalised from the process, the State Department sought a 
path of least diplomatic resistance – at times even trying to outsource efforts to the UK. The 
UK on the other hand was anxious to demonstrate its commitment to drug control efforts, 
while avoiding any major forward momentum or radical changes before the CND properly 
emerged. They relished the opportunity to cooperate with the moderate US delegation which 
would only serve to strengthen broader Anglo-US relations at this critical juncture. It was for 
these reasons, and the low political costs of the issues at stake for the UK, that a functionalist 
US-UK relationship emerged over the creation of CND and supported or at times driven by 
consensual Chinese and Canadian attitudes. 
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Chapter 4: Winning the peace: the Anglo-American Battle for Post-war Prohibition and 
Regulation: 
 
Introduction: 
As peace arrived, and the creation of the CND looked certain, questions of national and 
regional control loomed large. Whoever could win the peace in rebuilding models of control 
would drive international drug efforts. National precedent would drive international reform. 
First was the question of re-establishing regulatory frameworks in post-war Europe. Germany 
was the key to this given its historical centrality to the global licit drug market but also its 
political lynchpin status in post-war geopolitics. If national controls could be re-established in 
Germany, then the international regulatory framework, based on the ‘system of estimates’, 
would likely be preserved and potentially strengthened. The Allies had minimal ideological 
differences about how to implement controls and the administrative tenets were clearly 
mapped out under existing treaty law and German domestic legislation. The key was whether 
the Allies could subsume relevant national interests and grievances in order to work together 
to achieve this.  
 
For Britain, reeling from a post-war economic crisis, hard economic issues, such as protecting 
their successful drug export industry from a resurgent European market was perhaps key. For 
the US the FBN and Anslinger saw the re-emergence of European narcotics controls as being 
underpinned by success in Germany. In Germany broader questions of national strategy 
crossed paths, but ultimately its formulation operated in something of a silo while its 
outcomes were completely dependent of European political and security outcomes. In the 
case of Japan the US had a potential beacon for the rest of Asia. He and his agents spent huge 
efforts and political capital on this issue. With the strong support of the MacArthur 
Administration, a culture with a minimal history of opiate consumption and a unified US 
control of territories, success would be far more straightforward to achieve in Japan than in 
Germany. 
 
Next was the question of the frontiers of international drug policy reform. Momentum 
towards a production limitation convention had stalled prior to the outbreak of war. Division 
of this market had to begin to be settled before moves towards completing the global planned 
opium economy via a production limitation convention could be made. The actual shape and 
dynamic of that market was unclear by 1945-6. The US hoped for the creation of a tripartite 
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Turkish-Yugoslav-Iranian producer framework that would prevent the proliferation of small 
opium producers in Latin America and the Balkans. Whether it was politically possible 
remained to be seen. Further, whether Britain and the US could undertake an orderly carving 
up of the post-war market remained another open question. 
  
Further, the question of ‘quasi-medical’ and other non-medical and scientific consumption 
remained. Here there was a clear Anglo-American divide. If Britain could continue a form of 
opiate maintenance that fit its new obligations to end opium smoking in many of its Asian 
colonies, it would provide an alternative to the US model of outright prohibition. On the other 
hand, if the US could demonstrate in Japan that the strict implementation of its prohibitionist 
framework was practicable and achieved its desired goals, then it would claim its approach 
vindicated.  
 
This chapter highlights a general Anglo-American drug rapprochement over this period that 
would percolate up towards the United Nations. Further, it focuses on a number of regional 
actors. In Europe the key battleground was Germany. In Asia, China was soon overrun by 
internal strife, but a number of centres of activity emerged – the most instructive were Japan, 
Malaya, Burma and India. In the Middle East, Iran continued to cast an enormous shadow 
over control efforts. Meanwhile, on the economic stage, the road to a stable global licit 
market ran through Turkey and Yugoslavia. At the heart of all these narratives remained the 
division between Anglo-American drug diplomacy. Germany provided the archetypal 
example of cooperation over the expansion of regulatory policies while Asia provided the 
archetypal example of Anglo-American division over the expansion of prohibitionist policies. 
 
Part 1: Re-establishing the System of Estimates: 
The PCOB: 410 
In its May 1946 memorandum the PCOB pushed for headquarters in Europe to allow ‘close 
contact’ and ‘technical advice’ to governments rebuilding narcotics control on the war-torn 
continent. Prior to the war ten countries had ceased cooperation. Germany, which remained a 
special case; Austria and Luxemburg, which had quickly re-established post-war cooperation; 
Danzig, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were no longer independent entities; the USSR, 
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Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Siam, none of which had, as of 1946, resumed 
full cooperation. As a result there remained an extensive area in East and South East Europe, 
including important producing countries, not sending statistical returns. To plug this gap the 
PCOB would focus the thrust of its political efforts on the European continent. 
 
In South and Central America, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay and others had 
continued to provide ‘excellent’ returns. None were received from Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua or Paraguay, which made estimating the size of the global cocaine market difficult 
but immediate progress seemed unlikely. In Asia missing returns all centred on former 
Japanese possessions but the PCOB were confident the US would drive towards a speedy 
return to reporting. Many quickly began sending statistical returns in 1946. 
 
The PCOB Extends its Role: 
As national controls were being re-established, the PCOB tried to fill a political vacuum left 
by the cessation of the OAC. By November 1945 Elliott Felkin worked to cajole and 
encourage governments to re-establish national controls. He was often assisted by Anslinger 
and his agents, who for example, helped ensure Italy was ‘on the way back’ by November 
1945. Meanwhile, in Holland and Norway efforts were weakened as records had been 
destroyed but both proved ‘anxious’ to re-establish cooperation. Greece was slow while 
Bulgaria and Romania proved ‘very difficult’. Yugoslavia seemed ‘easier’ and likely to 
restart cooperation quickly.411 
 
With the OAC successor situation in flux, the PCOB secretariat sought to fill the void by 
coordinating across countries and advocating a vision for national control administrations. 
This was particularly evident regarding Germany, as we shall see. Anslinger wrote in 
December 1945, ‘the Board is taking a very particular interest in the narcotic controls set up 
in the four zones’.412 This political interference soon backfired on the PCOB, however, as 
Russia refused to work with them. A somewhat chastened PCOB was soon ready to cede this 
authority back to the OAC successor and once again confined itself to number crunching.413  
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The Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) Continues: 
The DSB maintained a strictly statistical role but struggled to build an accurate picture of the 
post-war market. It had to provide ‘estimates of requirements’ for states which did not 
provide any. In 1945, 51 countries and 80 territories provided estimates. To plug these gaps, 
DSB had to provide estimates for 20 countries and 26 territories. In its 1945 estimates it 
warned that for some countries it had not received estimates for years and were forced to 
establish estimates based on normal peacetime requirements. It highlighted that as National 
Governments were restored, they should try to ascertain actual requirements as soon as 
possible. Further it had to base its estimates on the territorial situation in 1939 and would 
need to readjust for any post-war settlement.414 
 
Part 2: Europe - The Case of Germany: 
Allied, and particularly US, goals for European narcotics control were twofold. First, ensure 
the supply of narcotics in legitimate trade. Second, keep the illicit traffic and addiction to a 
minimum. The division of Germany into zones rendered it the most complicated case for re-
establishing a system of control. It also represented the clearest example of emerging Cold 
War politics impacting drug diplomacy. Further it highlighted the difficulties of expanding 
the influence of the PCOB into national controls. Despite an Allied rhetorical emphasis on 
developing a national framework, zone-based systems quickly emerged. Under these, 
enforcement varied and the distribution of drugs was highly unequal with shortages in some 
areas and surpluses in others.415 
 
Britain welcomed narcotics regulation in Germany. One possible reason was that it could be 
used to prevent a resurgence of the German drug industry. Certainly certain domestic 
interests would favour the use of international regulations to protect British industries. If 
these interests successfully permeated diplomacy and policy circles, then Britain’s economic 
self-interest could be argued to have played a strong role in its enthusiasm for using the 
international control system to diffuse regulatory frameworks around the globe.416 
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Nevertheless, they retained a clearly watchful eye for threats to their national manufactured 
drug sector and prohibitionist interference in their colonial territories from international 
regulations. 
 
Germany was an area where Anglo-American policy interests sufficiently overlapped to 
allow unified action. Further, by highlighting their commitment to narcotics control in 
Germany, Britain could deflect attention from its policies in Asia. As the US expended 
significant political capital on enacting cross-zonal control in Germany, and saw this capital 
being devoured by emerging Cold War tensions, the US was in less of a position to challenge 
Britain and other Western allies on their colonial policies in Asia. Given this calculation, the 
emergence of functional Anglo-American cooperation on narcotics control in Germany, and 
Europe more broadly, was logical and understandable. 
 
The German Basis for Control & Cooperation: 
International perception of Reich drug policy implementation in 1938 and 1939 was positive. 
Anslinger wrote in November 1945 that ‘German laws are more strict and have a better 
constitutional basis than our own’.417 Re-operationalizing these laws and re-establishing 
international cooperation would be the key challenge. With its withdrawal from the League of 
Nations in 1933 Germany had relinquished its membership of the OAC and its member of the 
PCOB resigned. Nevertheless, it continued close unofficial correspondence with these control 
bodies and to submit statistics as per the 1925 and 1931 Conventions. In September 1939 the 
German government re-committed to the conventions regarding tackling illicit trafficking and 
collecting statistical information. However, it would begin withholding this information from 
the international bodies until the cessation of hostilities.418 A key Allied goal would be to 
obtain these statistics and reinstate full international cooperation and reporting. 
 
Situation in 1945: 
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The immediate concern for the US was to secure existing stockpiles, re-establish a control 
apparatus and ensure adequate medical supplies. The threat of a resurgent illicit traffic 
loomed large, as one US narcotics official wrote: 
 
The opportunities are not lacking. Milling thousands are without sufficiently gainful 
occupations; the highways are thronged with homeless seeking shelter and means of 
profit and support; the general chaos of German economic life; a surplus of currency 
in the hands of Allied soldiers which they cannot send home and are anxious to 
spend; adequate chemical knowledge to produce the drugs; thousands of acres of 
poppies to furnish the raw materials; all these are invitations to the narcotics 
trafficker.419 
 
The collapse of Germany had scattered statistical information and there was no clear 
authority to meet international obligations. Anslinger raised the matter with the War 
Department and soon Lt. General Lucius Clay, General Eisenhower’s Deputy on the Control 
Council, promised to uncover all available information and forward it on to Anslinger. It was 
soon evident that these records and personnel were located in the Soviet Zone. The US 
decided to use the PCOB, with whom the Soviet Union had previously maintained relations. 
They asked Soviet officials to provide access to these records in order to comply with the 
request of the PCOB for a report on Germany.420 Time would show the approach misjudged. 
 
America Alone – Advocating Centralised Control: 
US officials viewed zonal controls as ‘extremely unsatisfactory and ineffective’ and decided 
to bring a narcotic control officer from the US to their zone. Highlighting the perceived 
importance the role was initially offered to Anslinger who turned it down citing his focus on 
the creation of the UN. He nominated FBN Agent Samuel Breidenbach instead. Short-term 
fixes were soon instituted to try to bring order to the licit market, while press stories stoked 
fears of a burgeoning black market. Imports and exports were blocked and Military 
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Government officials sought to oversee the trade, from manufacturing through to physician 
prescriptions and ascertain the situation in other zones.421 
 
The US and PCOB, through quasi-formal cooperation, began pushing towards a unification 
of German narcotics control. Elliott Felkin sought an official PCOB visit. Fearing political 
complications, he met with Captain William Weatherwax an official from the US Forces 
Headquarters, European Theatre, in Paris instead. They decided to work towards a unified 
Western Zone policy, and eventually approach the Soviet authorities. On 3 September 1945, 
Felkin held another meeting in Paris, this time with Breidenbach and Weatherwax. They 
quickly agreed on the basic tenets of policy and met the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
M. Gaston Bourgois and the Director of the French Bureau of Narcotics, Mr. Razet. The 
minutes of the meeting were sent to the British government and eventually found their way to 
the Home Office.422  
 
Anslinger was encouraged.423 He expected Soviet stonewalling since ‘they must submit 
everything to higher levels’ but he also expected ‘that traffickers will have poor pickings in 
the Russian zone’. He believed the prospect for coordination with the British and French 
zones was strong. By September, however, progress had ground to a halt. Weatherwax was 
trying to get ‘out of the mess’ and back to the US, while Breidenbach tried to ‘break’ the 
deadlock but claimed the Army was simply ‘passing the buck’. He feared an acceptance of a 
zone set up but and warned nothing ‘short of a centralized national administration’ would 
prevent a resurgent illicit traffic, which would eventually threaten the US.424  
 
Anslinger, agreed but worried it ran afoul of State Department policy of avoiding centralised 
government in Germany. He worked to secure their support and counselled patience: 
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Even some control in the American, British, and French zones with proper uniformity 
and coordinated effort would be acceptable in lieu of the centralized idea. You should 
be prepared to accept as much. However, keep hammering away…we can retreat to 
still relatively safe ground.425 
 
The US Group of the Allied Control Council immediately cleared Breidenbach’s proposed 
controls in the US zone and sought to pass it through the Allied Control Council. However, 
on 1 October, the French Delegate objected to any central administration before French 
demands for the internationalisation of the Ruhr had been met. The Soviet Delegate argued 
that the central administration outlined in the Potsdam agreement should be set up before any 
others. General Clay temporarily withdrew the proposal rather than have it rejected. The 
French position soon hardened when De Gaulle publicly rejected any discussion of a central 
administration before the internationalisation of the Ruhr and Rhineland.426  
 
Meanwhile, the minutes of the September meeting with Elliott Felkin in Paris circulated in 
Whitehall. London initially advocated ‘examination’ but ‘not implementation’. They 
deprecated US concerns about troops and viewed the risk as being confined to Germans and 
therefore German responsibility. They wrote: 
 
The Americans have always been anxious about illicit traffic in drugs and attempted, 
during the S.H.A.E.F. days, to establish strict Br/US controls and travelling 
investigators in most of the liberated countries.427 
 
The US was therefore initially alone in urging a unified allied response - which initially also 
included a call for investigators with the capacity to cross zones. Britain offered only 
platitudes; France was concerned with power politics while Russia was enigmatic and 
impossible to pin down. 
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Britain: From Apathy to Activism: 
In response to the minutes of the September Paris meeting, the Home Office began forcefully 
advocating ‘concerting action’ and echoing US concerns.428 Sydney Harris, Under Secretary 
of State at the Home Office, warned the War Office that there was ‘a real risk that…control 
may break down’ and that it was ‘important that the British military authorities should keep 
in step not only with the French but also with the Americans who…attach the greatest 
importance to this particular subject’.429 
 
Without this Home Office advocacy, the issue could easily have been overlooked. Lt. Col. H. 
N. Fryer, from the Military Attaché’s Office, had initially described the PCOB enquiry as ‘a 
secondary matter’ and passed it off to colleagues to mollify Felkin and the PCOB.430 After 
Harris’ intervention UK military officials quickly concluded that ‘effective control can only 
be taken through central agreement’.431 Thus began an Anglo-American convergence on a 
unified narcotics control policy in Germany. 
 
US Unilateralism and the Shifting Western Tide: 
Breidenbach pushed ahead with US zonal efforts. The German Opium Law of 1929 was re-
established with some minor changes. Police enforcement was provided and control was 
exercised through opium offices established in each of the Zone’s three Lander. 
Administration was in the hands of the German Officials, with supervision by the US 
narcotics official. The eventual goal was to channel all information through the headquarters 
in Berlin which would also eventually absorb the three offices. The manufacture and sale of 
heroin was abolished, as were imports of narcotics into the zone from outside Germany. 
Exports had to be approved by the Chief of the Public Health Branch.432 
 
The US directives did not live up to Breidenbach’s hopes, but he viewed them as ‘a basis’ for 
improvement. Meanwhile the PCOB made new enquiries as to the situation in Germany but 
the Soviet authorities requested extra time to clarify the relationship between the PCOB and 
the League. Breidenbach wrote in frustration, ‘the Russians hang back for one reason – the 
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French for another’.433 Nevertheless, progress was discernable, albeit painfully slow for 
concerned US officials. 
 
The Battle of the PCOB: 
After numerous delays, in January 1946 the Allied Public Health Committee informed Felkin 
and the PCOB that they were studying the question.434 The Soviet delegate refused a formal 
response. They now associated the PCOB with the League and viewed it as therefore 
defunct.435 Shortly thereafter, a greatly disheartened Breidenbach returned to the US. He 
believed he had left a ‘legacy of possibilities’ but he was not optimistic for real results.436 His 
replacement, Arthur Giuliani, arrived in Berlin on 8 April 1946.  He wrote to Anslinger that 
he was immediately informed by General Stayer, of the Public Health and Welfare Section, 
that: 
 
protocols of the League, or the PCOB are not to be mentioned at all, particularly in 
quadripartite circles…he stated that Mr. Breidenbach ignored his wishes in that 
regard, a matter which caused him some embarrassment vis-à-vis the Russians. 437 
 
Giuliani and Anslinger believed the matter to be ‘a tempest in a teapot’. Nevertheless, until 
the PCOB could be explicitly brought within the UNO, the Soviet Union would veto any 
German cooperation. The general mood, Giuliani found, was hope that the UN could take the 
lead in facilitating the centralisation of control. In the meantime, he adopted a minimalist 
role, sticking to the letter of his mandate and working ‘to establish good will throughout the 
organization’.438 
 
By May 1946 the position of the PCOB began to be clarified and the Soviet delegates stopped 
viewing it as ‘League of Nations Business’. Anslinger further expected that CND would 
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make clear recommendations that Germany carry out its obligations under the various 
conventions when it finally met in 1946.439 
 
Refocusing on Zonal Efforts: 
Arthur Giuliani described the situation in the US Zone in May 1946 as ‘bad, but not so bad as 
any other Zones, where no attention whatever has been given to’ the issue. The black market 
had created ‘a mentality of law breaking similar to that which existed in the U.S. following 
[alcohol] prohibition’ but it could be tackled through ‘more efficient policing’. He worked to 
organise a system of reporting and control which the other zones could emulate and thereby 
pave the way for unified control.440 
 
Giuliani believed that the British had ‘considerably more’ control than the French. He spent a 
tremendous effort trying to ‘pierce the Iron curtain’ but many US officials believed their 
secrecy stemmed from ‘fear of embarrassing their own people, many of whom are involved 
in the black market’. Reports suggested there was no active control and no production, with 
shortages being filled from Russia. The situation in Berlin, meanwhile, was ‘ludicrous’.441 In 
August 1946 the US made its first shipment from the US zone to Berlin to relieve an acute 
shortage there.442 
 
Washington hoped the UN could advocate a centralized system. Giuliani was sceptical and 
felt it would merely result in ‘a modification’ of the diverse zonal systems. In July 1946 he 
advocated a Working Party to achieve some uniformity, even if centralization remained 
political ‘dynamite’.  The 1929 German Opium Law was the law of the land in each zone, but 
implementation and enforcement varied. His goal was to make some minor adjustments to the 
law and then draft a directive through the Working Party that would apply to all zones. 
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Further, since he was the only person trying to begin compiling statistics, he could try to use 
the working party to ensure some uniformity of statistical collection across all zones.443 
 
The British Zone: 
In June 1946 the British Zone’s Military Government issued instruction 95, ‘Regulations 
governing the control of narcotic drugs’. This recognised the German Opium Law of 1929 
and later amending decrees. It differed in some ways from the US Zone: there was no 
restriction placed on the manufacture of Heroin (Diacetylmorphine) and no restrictions on 
imports. British officials believed they had made ‘a good beginning’. Violations seemed 
minimal; narcotic supplies were controlled with the Army retaining those captured and little 
evidence of illicit imports. Effective policing was credited with lower lawlessness than the 
other zones. Giuliani even concluded British Zone law enforcement was superior to the US 
Zone. Giuliani’s overarching fear nevertheless remained accepting divergence between zonal 
regulations preventing eventual unification of control.444 
 
Towards a Western Unified Approach: 
Giuliani entered August 1946 with renewed British and French support and found the 
prospects for a Working Party ‘more encouraging now than ever’. The Soviet delegate, while 
agreeing in principle, soon proved obstructive. Giuliani described how the British delegate 
‘argued at least as vehemently as we did…showing extreme annoyance at the illogical way in 
which we were being stymied’ on easily manageable technicalities with the Soviet delegate 
claiming ‘that the Americans were using “secrecy” in their “personal project”’.445 
 
The matter was postponed until September when the Soviet Delegate unexpectedly withdrew 
his objections and the measure passed. Giuliani found the shift ‘inexplicable’. One hypothesis 
derived from his discussions with a member of the Allied Control Committee: 
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This business of fighting up to the last minute is typical, and is followed by 
capitulation as complete as this...It may be that the delegates cannot make decisions, 
but must get them from upstairs.446 
 
Regardless, Giuliani wrote to Anslinger, ‘we did the most we could do and…[w]e are now on 
the table’.447 Publicly, Anslinger maintained pressure, stating at the CND that ‘the division of 
the country into zones and Berlin into sectors, all contribute to making impossible the 
fulfilment of the international drug conventions’.448 
 
Offering solace to the PCOB, Giuliani wrote to Anslinger: 
 
Mr. Felkin should not feel too bad about rebuffs he may have received, for his 
efforts…have been the starting point of this whole business. This, of course, excepting 
your own efforts, which people seem to take for granted.449 
 
Giuliani promised to make US Zone returns to the PCOB and to try to get German officials 
back in the ‘habit’.450 In the meantime the DSB would produce estimates for Germany.451 
 
The Working Party on Narcotics Control: 
The first meeting of the Working Party took place in Berlin in September 1946. Giuliani was 
asked to draft proposals for amending the 1929 law and the group met again in November to 
discuss Giuliani’s draft law. The British and French delegates approved the proposals with 
minor suggested changes. The Soviet delegate immediately took issue with technicalities and 
Giuliani concluded they had ‘every intention of blocking the general proposal’. He held 
individual meetings with his French and British counterparts. He found expertise and interest 
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extremely lacking in the French Zone, and that they ‘show interest only when the productive 
capacity of the area is threatened’.452  
 
In contrast he found himself ‘in complete accord’ with his British counterpart with only two 
exceptions: forbidding the manufacture of heroin, which the British Zone would not pursue 
(see Chapter Six); and that no application be denied on the basis of need. Giuliani recognised 
that heroin was unlikely to be banned, given that its manufacture and sale was permitted 
everywhere else in Europe. The latter point, however, highlighted a deeper Anglo-US 
ideological division with Giuliani pushing for a decentralised provision mechanism based on 
the approval of order forms and import certificates, and the establishment of a quota system, 
if necessary. The British delegate pushed for a command economy based on a centralised 
system of control. Giuliani ‘pointed out that this was quasi-socialization of medicine, a 
system which is generally regarded with disfavour at the moment in the States’. The two 
failed to reach agreement and decided to leave the matter to the Working Group.453 
Towards a Tripartite Framework? 
By December Giuliani concluded that accord was impossible and ‘from the very first, the 
Russians sabotaged my whole proposal’. The French delegate suggested moving ahead with a 
tripartite agreement. Giuliani wanted to continue ‘until all hope of reaching agreement is 
gone’ and hoping that the UN would manage to ‘force the issue in the meantime’. 454 In 
December 1946 Anslinger and the US Delegation introduced a resolution that was 
unanimously adopted urging the Allied Government to ‘establish…effective narcotic control 
for all Germany’.455 
 
Giuliani called it ‘gratifying’ but shortly thereafter, the Soviets attacked the Working Party 
for failing to achieve anything. Finally, at their fifth meeting in January 1946 the Soviet 
delegate stated that no revision of the 1929 Opium Law was required. It was deemed 
impossible for the Working Party to continue.456 Efforts to effect a unified control in 
Germany appeared dead, a victim of emerging Cold War politics. At no time did deeper 
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British, French or US national interests appear to drive their early cross-zonal drug control 
efforts. Instead it was a determined US technocratic pursuit of control coupled with their 
success at rallying Anglo-French support – made easier by the latters’ self-interest in having 
effective narcotics controls in Germany. It would militate against a resurgent illicit traffic on 
the continent and prevent an unregulated narcotics industry challenging theirs. Further, 
Britain had evolved a policy of building up the economic strength of their zone as a bulwark 
against communism.457 The Soviets on the other hand remained cool to drug control concerns 
and sought to torpedo a potential precedent for inter-zonal cooperation.  
 
The US, Britain and France would continue to work together on narcotics control, while the 
Soviets would pursue their own course. Meanwhile, Giuliani wrote in January 1947 that the 
‘PCOB is a long way from getting the statistics!’458 Giuliani refocused his efforts on building 
narcotics squads in the US zone and ensuring that narcotics stayed on the agenda of the 
Allied Health Committee even if no forward progress could be made.  
 
The US had expended large amounts of political capital trying to establish a centralised 
system of narcotics control in Germany. The British, in consonance with broader economic 
and foreign policy goals, as well as recognising it would place them alongside the US on this 
issue and distract from British control efforts in Asia, readily offered support. France, 
recognising the likely futility of the effort and the negligible political cost, similarly offered 
support. Nevertheless, absent an initial British push of support, US efforts would never have 
gotten off the ground. Further the issue fitted within a broader trend of moving towards a 
Western zonal framework of cooperation. When the Soviets reneged on all drug cooperation 
a sufficient level of agreement had been reached by the Western Allies to allow a tripartite 
framework of control to emerge. The PCOB, despite being burned for its political overreach, 
had also played a key role in facilitating this Western coalescence on German narcotics 
policy. The PCOB and DSB would remain wary of running afoul of emerging Cold War 
politics going forward and consciously avoided any potential regulatory overreach. 
 
Part 3: The Divided Anglo-American Asian Paradigm: 
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The divergence between US and British policies came into relief in Asia. Whereas Britain 
and the US were able to work together around re-establishing narcotics control in Germany, 
an essentially conservative and technocratic endeavour, they diverged once again when it 
came to the frontiers of narcotics control: the implementation of complete prohibitions in 
Asia. Britain maintained an essentially pragmatic attitude to its colonies underpinned by a 
willingness to compromise with local needs. The US saw Japan as the perfect opportunity to 
implement its strict prohibitionist model. Further, the US prosecuted Japan’s violations of the 
narcotics conventions as war crimes and thereby as a precedent to dissuade other countries 
from flouting international narcotics laws. US control advocates also found an important ally 
in Japan with General MacArthur.  
 
The US in Asia: Japan: 
Unlike Germany, the US had unified control of Japan and its territories. The American 
commanders had little notion of what to expect when they took control. The received wisdom 
was that Japanese forces pushed opium onto their Chinese enemies to sap their will to fight 
but Japan was a country with a minimal history of domestic opiate use, and this had changed 
little during the war. It was a signatory of the main international drug treaties, the 1912, 1925 
and 1931 Conventions. It had passed a series of domestic regulations beginning with the 1898 
Opium Law. All raw opium and coca leaves produced were subject to licence mandating they 
be sold to the Government. Only government opium could then go to market. Permits and 
authorisations for use and possession were granted to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, 
pharmacists and drug manufacturers, while all wholesaling operations were kept under strict 
government and police supervision.459 Imports and exports were subject to a system of 
certification.  
 
Drugs could be purchased with a medical prescription and drug addiction was a matter to be 
reported to the police by physicians. By the end of 1938 there were 3,600 registered ‘addicts’, 
the majority of who were supposedly Korean. Treatment and ‘cure’ was provided by charity 
organisations, which claimed high success rates. For example, in 1938 310 out of the 316 
‘addicts’ in treatment were reported as being ‘fully cured’. Opium smoking was strictly 
forbidden, with severe penalties. There also existed an Advisory Opium Commission, created 
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by an Imperial Ordinance in 1931, tasked with examining control in all Japanese territories. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Bureau was responsible for the illicit traffic and maintaining 
contact with control authorities in other countries. By 1939 27 tons of raw opium was 
produced in Japan proper while 26 tons was produced in Korea.460 
 
In August 1945 Harry Anslinger announced that hundreds of civil affairs officers would 
follow US troops into liberated territories in East Asia, expressly trained to suppress the illicit 
traffic in narcotics. He told reporters how the ‘officers and their aides will start back on the 
road to health the peoples who fell victim to drug addiction through Japanese connivance to 
rule them by weakening their wills with narcotics’. Portraying the British, Dutch, French and 
Chinese policies as being in lock-step he claimed ‘it should take only three to four months to 
get most of those addicts back to normal once the process starts…but it will be a matter of 
putting them on cold turkey to get them back.’461 
 
 
 
Re-establishing Control: 
China wanted the US to ensure the total de-narcotisation of Japanese policy by complete 
prohibitions on production and manufacture being written into any peace treaty. George 
Morlock for the US State Department was non-committal and suggested that the Chinese 
CND representative Dr. Sze, take up the matter at the proposed production limitation 
conference.462 General MacArthur pressed ahead with control efforts. It is possible that he 
was influenced by his personal lineage with the Philippines and had internalised the US 
prohibitionist policy implemented there around the turn of the century.463 He moved quickly 
to establish a five-point program of control, with reports to be made to him within thirty days. 
Within fifteen days an itemised statement of all stocks of narcotics, including location and 
owner had been compiled.464 
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By October 1945 efforts were underway within the US to use the violation of international 
narcotic conventions to indict members of the Japanese government for war crimes. 
Anslinger took a leading role on this. An FBN Agent was appointed to uncover information 
to be furnished to the War Crimes Office.465 This was viewed as an important precedent by 
the ‘inner circle’. Sharman wrote in 1946: 
 
It is, I think, good policy to establish in practice the principle that a deliberate 
Government policy involving the use of narcotics in direct defiance of international 
conventions previously subscribed to is an international offence.466 
 
In October 1945 General MacArthur issued a directive to the Imperial Government. All new 
cultivation was prohibited and existing crops were to be destroyed. All stocks were frozen 
and all trade, without approval of the Supreme Commander, was prohibited. All imports, 
absent his approval, were prohibited, and exports were completely prohibited. It received a 
wave of positive press in the US, with some claiming it would knock out ninety per cent of 
the world’s illicit supply. Others contrasted US policy and British imperial policy. The latter, 
they claimed had used the trade to finance its empire while the US took every opportunity to 
extinguish it. In General MacArthur’s statement the policy was justified in light of ‘well-
documented evidence of Japanese use of opiates in attaining their quest for an empire and as 
a means of subjugating conquered peoples’.467 
 
Days later General MacArthur issued similar instructions to forces in Korea. Within two 
weeks reports were publicised of an illicit cache valued at fifty million US Dollars seized by 
US forces. Anslinger also worked with Elliott Felkin to ensure that the government of Japan 
properly filled out PCOB forms.468 General MacArthur appeared to take a strong personal 
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interest.  A former FBN Agent Lt. W. L. Speer, related a story about a meeting between 
himself, an FBN agent Mr. Oyler and General MacArthur, to Anslinger: 
 
Mr. Oyler had walked out to the elevators ahead of me, and when I came out he was 
talking to General MacArthur. All I heard of that part of the conversation was the 
“Bureau of Narcotics”, after Ralph introduced me to the General as “the narcotic 
control officer, a former agent in the Bureau of Narcotics”, the General asked, “How 
am I doing with narcotics”, Ralph replied, “pretty good, General”. The conversation 
lasted about three minutes much to the astonishment of everyone as I have never seen 
the General stop to talk to anyone before.469 
 
Speer reported ‘good cooperation’ from Japanese officials who were ‘eager for suggestions’. 
He argued that the main problems stemmed from insecure stocks and poor record keeping.470 
By December 1945 US officials were assisting the Imperial Government in drafting a new 
directive. It was largely modelled after US domestic legislation, the 1914 Harrison Act, at the 
suggestion of Mr. Oyler, although he was careful that the FBN not be seen to be playing a 
role. Anslinger wrote that ‘the results speak for themselves’ and that he was ‘greatly pleased 
with the intelligent approach’ taken by Speer and Oyler.471  
 
Efforts continued apace and by late 1946 Japan was held up as an international exemplar in 
post-war control. The October 1946 PCOB report both condemned Japanese actions during 
the war and praised the US military occupiers for their efforts. Anslinger suggested bringing 
the report to the attention of General MacArthur, whom he was ‘sure’ would ‘be as pleased as 
we are about this’.472 International control advocates believed they had effected a de-
narcotisation of Japan’s foreign policy.  
 
How much the reinstitution of controls in Japan would impact on the global illicit market 
remained to be seen. As with the Philippines four decades previously, the US brought an 
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ideologically pre-fabricated policy to an area it occupied and was determined to implement it. 
Like the Philippines, the US press was quick to highlight all indications of success and 
attribute them global significance. Success implementing the US vision was conflated with 
success in outcomes. Japan, like the Philippines before it, became a poster-child for US anti-
opium efforts and a counter to the supposed half-measures of the old colonial powers, 
particularly Britain.  
 
Part 4: Britain in Asia - Malaya, Hong Kong & Borneo: 
Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo highlighted the difficulties faced by Britain as it sought to 
implement bans on opium smoking. The ban had been agreed to in 1943 when the political 
considerations favoured avoiding a clash with the US and ignoring any expected policy costs 
until after the war. In 1945 these administrative costs had to be paid. The British colonial 
dilemma continued to be driven by competing needs. On the one side were the local realities 
of existing ‘addicted’ populations, for whom there was no ‘cure’, and even if there was, no 
medical infrastructure to implement it. On the other was the political necessity of deferring to 
the US concerns, even if they were viewed as irrational and unworkable. 
 
The Colonial Office hosted a meeting in April 1945 to discuss Malaya given its relatively 
high level of ‘addiction’. Administrative difficulties quickly came into relief. There was little 
success in obtaining staff for the Civil Affairs Administration, with only three doctors filling 
eighty places. This, the Colonial Office decided, necessitated maintenance of consumers on a 
prepared form of opium until a longer-term solution could be found. It was agreed to issue a 
form of ‘prepared opium on medical certificates’ but this raised a question of supply. One 
option was to re-establish their factory in Singapore ‘in a modified form’, but they feared 
accusations of reintroducing the opium monopoly in a disguised form.473 
 
It was decided that ‘opium tablets’ would be supplied to ‘satisfy the genuine needs of 
confirmed addicts’, and avoid the necessity for re-establishing the factory in Singapore. 
Certificates would be issued by Medical Officers or authorised practitioners. To pre-empt US 
criticisms it would be made explicit that ‘addicts’ would ‘as soon as practicable’ be provided 
treatment in government institutions. Further, to demonstrate resolve, enforcement of the ban 
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on opium smoking was to be made the responsibility of the Police, with ex-Malayan Customs 
Officers drafted in to assist.474 
 
Because the question ‘was solely one of medical treatment’ the Colonial Office decided that 
tablets would not be denied even if consumers were not already registered to receive smoking 
opium. As a ‘political gesture’ to the US to prevent the perception they were switching one 
form of sustaining opiate addiction for another, vague instructions on  ‘the desirability’ of 
diminishing provision would be issued. Medical officers bucked at the idea of being 
‘restricted’ in treating their patients and overall it was agreed that the officers ‘could be relied 
upon to exercise discretion’.475 
 
Malcolm Delevingne argued that no revenue should be seen to derive from sale given past 
US ‘suspicions’. The Colonial Office rejected this on the basis that medicine was normally 
charged for in government hospitals and issuing free opium could encourage increased 
consumption. The US State Department had requested that all seized stocks be destroyed but 
this was also rejected due to supply shortages and transport difficulties.476 
The Colonial Office also paid lip service to treatment options, such as examining the methods 
used by Chinese doctors, and social antidotes to drug consumption such as the provision of 
‘recreational facilities as a counter attraction to opium smoking’.477 Forty five million tablets 
would be provided for the post-military phase, at a cost of £45,000 to be met by ‘Malayan 
funds’.478 Some provision was also made for supplying tablets to Borneo and Hong Kong, 
however, neither was viewed as being as ‘greatly troubled with the opium problem’ as 
Malaya.479 
 
Overall, British policy aimed for as much continuity as possible, while trying to defer to US 
wishes. Opium smoking was to be abolished, although the success of implementation 
remained to be seen. The US perception was that the problem was one of political will. 
Governments needed to resolve to eradicate non-medical opium supplies and force ‘addicted’ 
populations into treatment. The British viewed this approach as impractical for many regions 
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in Asia. Medical infrastructure, assuming effective treatment even existed, was largely absent 
in many colonies. The medicalization of maintenance was a middle ground between outright 
prohibition and the continuation of quasi-medical usage. The former was seen as practically 
unworkable while the latter was seen as politically unsustainable. Burma and India, however, 
which had never committed to the immediate eradication of non-medical and non-scientific 
consumption remained a different story and highlighted that the response in Malaya, Hong 
Kong and Borneo was driven largely out of a desire to satisfy American wishes. 
 
Burma: 
In February 1946 the State Department, under renewed pressure from Congressman Judd, 
pushed for a response to their note on opium policy in Burma. Judd intended to publish the 
note and the British reply as soon as it was received.480 By June the Foreign Office continued 
to ‘stall’ as the Burma Office had not responded. Initially the Foreign Office believed that the 
postponement of the first meeting of CND in mid-1946 made the issue less urgent. However, 
they soon concluded otherwise ‘since Congressman Judd is setting the pace’.481 The Foreign 
Office believed that ‘the State Dept. clearly do not wish us to have our tails twisted over this 
opium question but it may be difficult to avoid unless we state our position over it clearly 
soon’.482 
 
By August 1946 the Foreign Office was still awaiting a reply.483 The political costs of 
inaction on Burma had decreased drastically and this was reflected in the slow British 
response. With the first CND approaching, the soft State Department attitude suggested the 
issue had fallen right down the international and US agenda. Anslinger also figured little in 
discussions. In September the Burma Office provided a reply. Although ‘not perhaps quite as 
full as we may have wished’ it was agreeable to the relevant Foreign Office officials and 
Major Coles as UK Representative to the CND.484 
 
Stalling by the Burma Office had allowed the situation on the ground to change. US forces 
had withdrawn, thereby neutralising their immediate cause for concern. Further there were no 
reported cases of US troops acquiring the opium habit in Burma. This confirmed British 
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assertions about the past experience with their troops. The practice of opium smoking, 
meanwhile, was to be made illegal. In direct response to US concerns, they would abolish the 
system of licenced shops supplying registered ‘addicts’ with opium for eating.485 Opium 
eating for ‘religious and ceremonial purposes and for “quasimedicinal” and scientific uses’ 
was exempted and an, as yet undetermined, form of opium maintenance was to be 
provided.486 
 
The US Government was cautioned that the ban would take time to become effective.487 The 
State Department proved willing to declare victory and move on and the Secretary of State 
politely noted ‘with satisfaction the decision’ to prohibit smoking and abolish the system of 
licensed shops’. Other details were glossed over.488 
 
 
 
The Trans-Salween Shan and the Wa States: 
Prior to the war the questions of limitation of production of opium within the nominally 
sovereign Shan States in the border regions of Burma and the Wa States, located to the 
northeast of the Shan States, were largely avoided in formal international discussions. Further 
the Governor omitted discussion of these areas from the formal reply to the US. Most of the 
trans-Salween Shan and the Wa States only came under some form of administration 
following agreement with China as to the frontier in 1941. These areas produced surplus 
quantities of low-grade opium which tended to enter the illicit market either via ‘Ministerial’ 
Burma, China or Siam. Just prior to the war the Government of Burma began to admit to its 
position as a producing country. This fact was now solidified by the inclusion of the Shan and 
Wa States even though administration in those areas was extremely light. With the CND first 
meeting looming and discussions turning to a production limitation agreement the Burma 
Office expected the issue to draw attention.489  
 
It was decided that the Government should highlight their commitment to a long-term 
strategy, that first aimed at controlling production in the area, then limiting production and 
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consumption in the Shan States and eventually a total prohibition on production. London 
believed, with this long-term strategy in place, it would be defensible for the Government to 
purchase surplus opium stocks in these areas and use them partly to meet local demand for 
opium eating.490 Prior to the first meeting of CND extensive details remained ‘to be filled in’ 
but the Foreign Office warned that a production limitation convention may necessitate ‘the 
ultimate elimination of opium production in the trans-Salween areas as soon as may be 
practicable’.491 
 
Major Coles seemed less concerned and defended the Burma Office proposals as ‘a very 
satisfactory scheme for dealing with a very troublesome subject’. Thus began a strong UK 
protectionist policy around Burma, as we shall see later. Further, Major Coles suggested there 
may actually be an international market for surplus Burmese opium and suggested 
determinations be made over whether it really was ‘low grade’ or whether it could be 
‘workable commercially’.492 
India: 
India remained steadfast in response to the Judd Resolution inquiries in protecting ‘quasi-
medical’ opium eating ‘until medical facilities in India are very much more extensive than 
they are at present’.493 They supported the proposed production limitation convention in 
principle but refused to ‘undertake any fresh obligations’.494 Although sporadic bursts of 
interest in pressuring India arose within US control circles, few thought serious diplomatic 
leverage was an option or that Indian intransigence could be overcome. Movement towards a 
production limitation convention appeared the best hope to bring new pressure to bear on 
India. 
 
Towards a Post-War Asian Opium Stalemate: 
Overall the situation in Asia remained divided along Anglo-American lines. On the one side 
was Britain, representing the old colonial attitude. They had made tremendous efforts during 
the war to accommodate US concerns and enacted significant reforms. The US, meanwhile, 
continued to express a singular approach. Nothing short of outright prohibition, rigorously 
enforced, would resolve the colonial opium issue. As peace descended, positions began to re-
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settle on pre-war lines. The US, consciously replaying its experience in the Philippines (albeit 
with a drastically smaller opium using population and no monopoly) successfully inculcated 
its vision of control in Japan.  
 
Britain, grappling with the administrative issues it had ignored when it issued its November 
1943 statement, sought ways around complete implementation of prohibitions. Opium 
consumption was easier to prohibit in law than in reality. They were forced into changing the 
style of opium maintenance, but not the underlying continuance. Without a ‘cure’ or medical 
infrastructure, opium consumption would have to be provided for, lest an expansive black 
market take root in certain colonies. In Burma and India little had changed and greater issues 
of colonial control would soon push the opium issue right down the agenda. With the window 
for bilateral US pressure now closed, the UN would become the key forum for keeping this 
issue alive as states moved towards a production limitation convention. 
 
 
 
Part 5: Iran – The Key Recalcitrant: 
The question of member state representation on CND began to loom large in 1945-6. In 1945 
the Iranian Desk at the State Department inquired whether Iran could be represented on the 
Commission, arguing it would be preferable to have them ‘in’ than ‘out’ and that it could be 
used as a diplomatic ‘lever’ to pressure them to increase controls. Anslinger responded 
angrily. Repeatedly frustrated by Iranian promises, he lacked any faith in their ability to 
change and pointed out that during the League OAC meetings it had been represented by the 
‘head sales manager for the Iranian Opium Monopoly, and who not only tried to sell opium to 
the representatives of the other countries but opposed everything of a constructive nature’. 
Anslinger wanted only one representative from opium producing countries on the 
Commission: Turkey.495  
 
The State Department had yet to receive a reply to their official note of September 20th 1944. 
A bill introduced into the Majlis in September 1945, for the ratification of the 1925 Geneva 
Convention, was still pending. No bill had yet been introduced ratifying the 1912 Hague 
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Convention without the much-maligned reservation to Article 3(A). In a final Judd 
Resolution push, the US Tehran Embassy was asked to try to ‘persuade’ the Government to 
limit production, suppress the illicit traffic and consider joining a reconstituted Turkish-
Yugoslav opium agreement. The Embassy made little effort and warned that ‘patent 
instability’ was of such a ‘critical’ nature that little progress could be expected.496 
 
Within Iran, however, a new domestic movement for prohibition had emerged. The Anti-
Opium and Alcohol Association published a brochure titled, ‘Prohibition of the Cultivation of 
the Poppy and the Advantages of this Measure for Iran’, written by Mahmoud Fateh, a former 
Minister of Agriculture. It argued for complete prohibition of cultivation and for poppy to be 
replaced by cereals.497 Despite these stirrings, little tangible appeared to be forthcoming.  
 
The US Embassy pointed out that the government was preoccupied with the situation in 
Azerbaijan but promised to ‘keep pressing…pointing out [the] particular desirability at this 
time of publicity favorable to Iran’. On 21 March 1946 the Prime Minister created a 
commission to study how ‘to stop production of opium and smoking of this deadly poison’. 
On 10 April, he issued instructions to the Governors of all Provinces that all cultivation 
should cease within the year. The Ministries of Agriculture and Finance were told to draw up 
the necessary enforcement measures. Further the sale of opium in shops as well as its eating 
and smoking was prohibited. The State Department doubted the decree was being enforced. 
The Embassy wrote that the ‘Degree of compliance will depend in part on the development of 
the present government towards totalitarianism’ and warned it ‘will be extremely difficult to 
enforce the Prime Minister’s orders’.498 
 
However, the US noted the action was ‘In consonance with his General Program to do away 
with elements of [the] economic and social structure…that make Iran open to foreign 
criticism that it is reactionary or backward’. The US press and political circles responded 
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jubilantly. Representative Judd, speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives, 
claimed it as the second success of the Judd Resolution after Afghanistan.499  
 
Initial indications suggested the effort was genuine. In June the Prime Minister, Ahmad 
Qavam, announced that all government officials had 15 days ‘for total cure’ and stated that 
the order would have ‘secret agents’ carrying it out. In July the Council of Ministers made 
clear that the Opium Monopoly had to be disbanded with complete prohibition of cultivation 
and use. Government efforts at suppressing the 1946-7 crop appeared to cause an increase in 
illicit activity, as well as prices. Anslinger and the Treasury Department believed there to be 
‘every indication’ Iran was sincere and pushed again for Iran to ratify the drug conventions 
without reservation.500 
 
The State Department remained sceptical. Analysts at the US Embassy questioned whether 
the goals were achievable and warned that no crop substitution had been outlined to mitigate 
economic hardship to growers. They suggested the Iranian Government seek US government 
assistance. The Ministry of Finance made clear that they would seek American financial 
assistance. Reports emerged that the Anti-Opium Commission had placed an order for 100 
million ‘anti-opium tablets’ with the USSR. Black market prices continued to rise and the 
Embassy expected that less accessible parts of the country would disregard the decree and 
that years of more intensive government activity would be needed to eliminate the 
cultivation.501 
 
Elizabeth Washburn Wright argued that complete prohibition was premature and would result 
in continued cultivation in ‘inaccessible regions’. Further she claimed that Iran was needed to 
balance against the Turkish-Yugoslav duopoly. She questioned, ‘where would America and 
the manufacturers of medicinal opium in other countries turn?’ US efforts had been to 
develop a tripartite licit supply system, which aimed to prevent smaller countries becoming 
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exporters. This, she claimed, would be undone, with a proliferation of smaller exporters in the 
Balkans, Europe and South America and ‘the world would be flooded with the uncontrolled 
drug’.502 
 
Wright lobbied in Washington to build support for this view. Anslinger was non-committal, 
warning that ‘until we know what the real situation is in Iran, we should proceed very 
cautiously’. The State Department also sought to quell her interest, requested that she leave 
the matter to Anslinger and the upcoming CND.503As the CND met, the question of Iranian 
national control remained unresolved. The difficulty the US experienced in articulating a 
clear strategy for Iran highlighted the complications surrounding this issue and the central 
place Iran had in ensuring the efficacy of a global production control system. 
 
Iran presented an example of US policy being driven by pragmatism over policy orthodoxy. 
The State Department pushed back against over-zealous Iranian moves to shift towards total 
prohibition, without effective economic alleviation and alternative development measures. 
Unlike Japan, there were real obstacles to diminishing opium consumption and production. 
Like Malaya, Burma and other British possessions, Iran had no adequate medical or 
enforcement infrastructure and in areas outside government control, little capacity to enforce 
anti-opium decrees. The US press had been quick to highlight the difference between the US 
and the British Empire in Asia given US policy in Japan. When it came to Iran the US acted 
more like the old colonial powers - willing to subsume a strict anti-opium policy orthodoxy to 
pragmatic geopolitical and local concerns. 
 
Part 6: Re-building the global licit market:  
The Remnants of the Turkish-Yugoslav Opium Agreement: 
The Turkish-Yugoslav Opium Agreement was concluded on 17 December 1934. It gave the 
Central Opium Bureau at Istanbul the exclusive right to sell opium grown in either Turkey or 
Yugoslavia. The agreement divided markets, with Yugoslav opium supplied to the US and 
Turkish opium supplied to Europe and others. By 1938 ‘perpetual difficulties’ had 
undermined the agreement. Iranian opium, which had traditionally found a home in Asia, 
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increasingly competed for the European market. Prices became depressed relative to the US - 
which prohibited Iranian opium imports. Yugoslavia offered compensation, but Turkey 
demanded a repartition of the markets and a levelling of prices.504  By 1939 the agreement 
became increasingly difficult to sustain as the two sides sought to carve up the international 
market against a backdrop of deteriorating European politics. 
 
In 1940 the monopoly raised its prices when it learned US manufacturers would not be 
permitted to buy Iranian opium under any circumstances. Anslinger warned Ankara that the 
US would re-evaluate its policy if US importers continued to be ‘subject [to] unfair price 
disadvantage’. After some discussion he promised to support the monopoly for ‘the time 
being’, but would explore options.505  Eventually broader geopolitical concerns drove the US 
to temporarily lift bans on the import of Iranian and Afghan opium (see Chapter One). Both 
were warned, however, that this was a temporary wartime measure and that after the war; the 
Turkish-Yugoslav opium would again become preferred. 
 
In July 1945 the US approached Turkey and Yugoslavia to suggest a revival of the 
agreement, with the goal of including Iran. Yugoslavia suggested it was premature and 
Turkey declared that political stability needed to return to Yugoslavia and Iran first.506 
Eventually, with the political deterioration in Yugoslavia, the declarations by Iran and 
Afghanistan that they would prohibit all cultivation, and the relatively low morphine content 
of Indian opium, Turkey quickly emerged as the key to the post-war licit market. 
 
Turkey: 
During the war the Allies purchased Turkish opium to supply their war efforts, but also to 
deny the crop to the enemy. This latter act was known as ‘preclusive buying’.507 By the close 
of 1943 Britain and the US had come to different conclusions about its efficacy. Bertil 
Renborg claimed it was ineffective, demonstrated by the apparently large stocks in Belgium, 
Norway and other German occupied countries. The State Department agreed and wanted to 
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cease efforts. The British Home Office rejected Renborg’s analysis and insisted it be 
continued.508 Eventually British persistence overcame the opposition and the practice 
continued.509  
 
The Allied wartime opium relationship with Turkey therefore developed along exceptional 
lines and would eventually need to be recalibrated for peacetime. For Britain the key was 
ensuring availability without price gouging, something they felt they had so far achieved 
through good relations with Turkey.510 Perceptions of Turkey in US control circles remained 
overwhelmingly positive and were helped when Turkey expressed full agreement with the 
Judd Resolution in July 1945.511 
 
As the war drew to a close Britain and the US were increasingly in competition for Turkish 
opium. The British Directorate of Medical Supplies called this situation ‘undesirable’ and 
called for a clear ‘apportionment’ of supplies and prices so that Britain could resume sales to 
their traditional markets.512 The two initially agreed to divide the 1945 crop equally.513 
However, Britain came to believe the US had bought up a significant portion of the 1944 
crop, while having major reserve stocks on hand, and British was thereby entitled to a larger 
portion of the 1945 crop. Thus began US and British ‘competitive buying’ of Turkish opium 
crops.514 
 
By May 1945 the British had secured 30 of the 50 tons deemed ‘urgently required’. They 
requested that the US allow them to purchase the additional 20 tons.515 Eventually Anslinger 
agreed Britain could purchase 75% of the 1945 crop.516 Despite this agreement, Turkish 
supply quickly deteriorated and prices doubled. The monopoly claimed large quantities were 
being diverted to illicit markets and smuggled through Syria, reducing the 1945 crop by 
roughly half, to 100 tons. Further, demand was increasing with the French, Swiss and Belgian 
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governments all now seeking Turkish opium. They could assure Britain only of 35 tons for 
the coming year.517 Britain had foreseen this issue and had advocated that one single source 
should buy all opium on behalf of the Allies to prevent Turkish price gouging. Britain had 
already purchased opium on behalf of the Dutch Government in 1945 and was examining the 
possibility for the Belgian Government.518 
 
The goal for the British in particular, was to keep downward pressure on prices until a more 
predictable post-war market emerged. For this to happen, conditions in Yugoslavia would 
need to become clearer along with the outcome of enforcement efforts around Iranian and 
Afghan prohibitions. Lastly the general trajectory towards a production limitation convention 
would need to become clear. For the US, sitting on large domestic stockpiles, these issues 
were less pressing than broader drug diplomacy goals of global supply reduction. Overall 
great uncertainties hung over the licit market. Anglo-American cooperation or competition 
would no longer act as the predominant determinant of global demand, supply and prices. 
The emergence of post-war competition in an imperfect and partly planned global licit market 
presaged difficult negotiations ahead for the new UNO, as we shall see. 
 
Conclusion: 
The German and Asian narcotics cases strongly correlated to broader geopolitical trends. 
They also highlighted the alignment of interests in the international drug control system. 
When discussions centred on questions of European-style regulation of a narcotics industry, 
as the German situation did, Anglo-American cooperation was possible. Where questions 
centred on difficult issues of total prohibition, as the Asian colonial questions did, agreement 
was not possible. How large an issue the US wished to make out of divergences depended on 
internal US politics and external geopolitical calculus. As the world moved to a post-war 
framework, narcotics loomed relatively small for broader State Department regional policies 
and, in most cases, Anslinger failed to place it on the agenda. The State Department had no 
desire to hold British feet to the fire on this issue in Asia in the face of serious governing 
concerns and Anslinger had lost his wartime leverage.  
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A battle for the narcotics peace had quietly raged in Asia along the traditional Anglo-
American divide. On the one side were the British trying to find national regulatory 
frameworks that fitted within the international cooperative environment and satisfied US 
demands as far as possible, while working to accommodate local obstacles rather than run 
rough shod over them. On the other side was the US advocating the absolutist vision for 
prohibition, but increasingly unwilling to exert political leverage on its allies to achieve that 
vision. How far Britain could make its incremental regulatory approach work would have a 
major impact on Anglo-American drug relations and international control efforts more 
broadly. Similarly, how well the US could adhere to its own absolutist vision as it 
encountered new governing and geopolitical exigencies in Asia and the Middle East, would 
determine the direction of international efforts.  
 
As the immediate crises around the occupation of Germany and Japan settled down and the 
two powers faced a plethora of post-war issues, neither had any appetite to re-fight old 
Anglo-American battles over narcotics. The crux of Anglo-American narcotics relations, and 
thereby the global approach, increasingly centred on the division of a global licit market and 
negotiating a production limitation convention. Britain and the US would have to work 
together to unite the various social, economic and political interests around the world behind 
a new convention process and throw all their efforts into producing consensus. This would 
involve deploying a mixture of sticks and carrots, which only a joint Anglo-American effort 
could effectively wield. Both appeared to recognise their role in this process, saw the 
desirability of a production limitation convention and implicitly acknowledged their reliance 
on one another to produce it. These factors became only more apparent against a backdrop of 
a deteriorating global political environment. By 1947, with the battle for the narcotics peace 
largely secured, and a UN framework in place, a new era of narcotics multilateralism was 
underway, now based at the United Nations. It is towards these multilateral processes we now 
turn. 
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Chapter 5: New Battles: The CND First Meetings, 1946-1948: 
 
Introduction: 
Emerging from the tense post-war negotiations the key uncertainties for CND were how it 
would operate in practice, how it would fit into broader geopolitics and whether it would 
function as a talking-shop or a tool to enforce a specific vision for the system. The most 
coherent vision came from Anslinger and Sharman. They sought an enforcement body 
advocating prohibitionist and repressive responses. The first three meetings of CND in 1946-
8 would be pivotal. The first two meetings served to sound out the political context within 
which CND would operate and how the structures would function in practice. Following this 
a major political push would occur around the Third Session towards concluding a new 
Protocol and then advancing discussions around a new production limitation convention and 
even advocating a new ‘single convention’ unifying all previous agreements.  
 
Most immediately, however, states sought to ensure a sound legal basis for the system of 
control. On this Britain took the lead, offering legal expertise and driving a consensual 
process around ensuring the continued functioning of DSB, PCOB and the existing 
conventions structure. Once this was secured states began to look towards enforcing the 
existing conventions and extending the prohibitions on opium smoking to all territories of the 
globe. Once they had enshrined this as a universal legal norm, control advocates planned to 
redirect global efforts towards enforcing the prohibitionist framework. On this the US 
ostensibly took the lead – although its ability to act as bilateral enforcer, utilising the UN as a 
bully pulpit, became increasingly dependent on State Department willingness to risk broader 
diplomatic ripples. As time passed between 1946-8 the State Department became increasingly 
risk averse, to the point where lead US Delegate Harry Anslinger was muzzled in the 1948 
CND discussions and even forced to make a positive statement regarding Mexican efforts, 
which was diametrically opposed to his actual views. Overall the two approaches indicated 
the emerging Anglo-American roles as the two key pillars of the post-war system. The UK 
led the consensual-codification approach, and the US led the political activist, enforcement 
oriented, prohibitionist approach. 
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The immediate forward political direction was around extending the control of manufacture 
to synthetic drugs not previously covered by the 1931 Convention. The international 
community was able to speedily conclude negotiations around this issue, highlighting the 
relative consensus around dealing with the drug issue at the manufacturing point on the 
commodity chain. Part of this stemmed from the fact the burden of control fell on wealthier 
manufacturing states with greater regulatory capacity and a desire to carve up the market 
among existing firms and create new barriers to entry.  
 
Next was the question of production limitation. It became clear that PCOB would be the lead 
agency in overseeing any future control arrangements. Control advocates hoped a single 
oversight/enforcement body would enable more aggressive control efforts at the international 
level. Around opium it was unclear what the means to achieve this were. Should states aim 
for an interim agreement, as the Chinese delegation would suggest, or towards a long-term 
agreement, encapsulated within a new ‘single convention’ as the US suggested? In the middle 
remained states like the UK, which privately professed scepticism as to the political 
feasibility or practicality of a production limitation convention. Their chief interest remained 
to protect their own economic interests, including cheap sources of opium. Meanwhile, the 
question of whether new controls over the coca leaf and cannabis were practical or even 
required remained an open discussion. Sceptical states, such as the UK, saw no reason to 
oppose further study on these issues. Control advocates, such as the US, pushed these studies 
as a means towards setting the trajectory towards stricter control.  
 
The UK’s new legal expertise role gelled with their self-conception as the moderating force 
and honest broker within the system, untethered to the control advocate or producer blocs. It 
was no longer fighting a rear-guard defence of the colonial monopoly system. Meanwhile, its 
core drug control interests focused on shielding broader colonial practices from damaging 
political precedents and protecting domestic drug manufacturers. British colonies were 
largely in compliance, or seen to be moving towards compliance, with the international 
system. As time progressed towards the all-important Third Session of CND in 1948 this 
British role only strengthened, particularly as their delegation came under the leadership of 
Mr. Thornton of the Home Office and Major Coles departed the scene. 
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Overall the system moved towards a solidification of political cleavages. The spectrum of 
post-war drug policy had begun to emerge. On the one side remained the control advocates, 
led by the US and supported by Canada and, to a lessening practical degree due to the Civil 
War and eventual revolution, China. On the other side would remain the producer states. The 
key question being whether a clearly cohesive producer states voting bloc would emerge. 
Occupying the middle ground once again were European powers, represented most strongly 
by Britain. Britain settled comfortably into this role and was happy to watch the shape of 
debates take form before engaging its political capital to resolve potential choke points and 
conflicts. Britain self-consciously adopted the role as pragmatist-in-chief while the US under 
Anslinger continued its role as aggressive prohibitionist, while being increasingly muzzled by 
the State Department. Beginning with the first CND the battle for the shape of the post-war 
system began to emerge. Beneath the initial consensus discussions around synthetics and a 
production limitation convention lay a deeper struggle over whether CND would become an 
enforcement body or a cooperative environment aimed at facilitating control. The 1946-8 
period would be pivotal in answering this question. 
 
Part 1: The First and Second Session of CND: 
Drafting the Protocol & Resolution: 
The Drafting Committee appointed to consider the Secretariat’s draft protocol and resolutions 
met in September 1946. It consisted of representatives of China, Yugoslavia, France, Peru, 
the UK, the US and USSR. The UK delegation concluded that the Draft Protocol was 
‘inadequate’ from a legal viewpoint. It was soon broadly agreed that the Secretariat’s draft 
was ‘defective’ and that the UK’s observations should form the basis of an alternative draft 
protocol.519 By late September 1946 a unanimously agreed draft protocol, together with two 
draft resolutions were submitted to ECOSOC. This was almost entirely the work of the UK 
delegation.520  
 
One major issue of disagreement arose when the Soviet Union, China and Czechoslovakia 
strongly opposed inviting Franco’s Government in Spain to become a party to the Protocol. 
Others, particularly Britain, disagreed and the matter was left to ECOSOC to work out. At 
ECOSOC the Soviet Delegate argued that cooperation on drugs would represent an ‘opening 
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wedge to more extensive relations’. The US State Department took the view that purchasing 
Spanish cooperation on the system of narcotics control was too costly if bought at the price of 
losing the ‘Eastern group’ of states.521  Phillip Noel Baker, representing the UK, reiterated 
that they deplored General Franco’s Government. He argued that the Soviet delegation 
wanted ‘to exclude General Franco from the Convention’ while Britain wanted ‘to exclude 
him from the illicit traffic’. With the UK the sole dissenter, and the US abstaining, a Soviet 
Amendment to exclude the Franco Government from the Protocol passed and the issue was 
temporarily resolved.522 The UK’s policy fitted within their broader aspirations, first outlined 
by Anthony Eden after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, of ensuring the UN embraced ‘the 
bulk of the nations and eventually, perhaps, all nations.523  
 
The CND First Session: 
CND officially met on November 28th 1946 in New York. Initial discussion centred on 
procedure. A questionnaire was approved to bring information on raw materials up to date, 
while also including questions on synthetic drugs. Anslinger tried to set the initial tone of the 
session by giving a speech on drug addiction in the US. He claimed that the US had 
witnessed a large decrease in addiction during 1917-38 due to effective international controls 
matched by strict domestic enforcement.524 He then took every opportunity to impress the US 
approach on the visiting delegates. As a colleague wrote to Anslinger: 
 
you are doing a marvelous job as far as educating the boys from the other side as to 
how to handle narcotics. The two members from Holland…were amazed…and Mr. 
Delgorge, in particularly, hoped that they might some day control things as they are 
done in this country.525 
 
Iran: 
The laws in Iran appeared to be moving towards outright prohibition (see Chapter Four). 
Whether these laws were being implemented at a statutory or a practical level remained to be 
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seen. A law prohibiting all use and cultivation had been introduced into the Majlis in 1945 
but stalled when the parliamentary session ended. The Prime Minister and Council of 
Ministers had issued a number of decrees around the issue and on September 9th, the Council 
of Ministers issued a decree making opium possession and transactions illegal. November 
22nd was set as the date when prohibition would come in effect – exempting medical use and 
Government exports.526 
 
At CND Iran sought to roll back on its commitment to prohibition thereby sparking a 
diplomatic ruckus. Their delegate claimed the decree only applied to 1946. Anslinger sent 
frantic cables back to the State Department urging he be sent copies of their initial decree so 
he could pressure the Iranian delegation.527 By mid-1947, the Majlis had still not met, 
preventing it making the program legally permanent. The US officially maintained ‘every 
indication points to its being a permanent policy’. They claimed that ‘competent observers’ 
believed that the crop had been drastically curtailed and in 1947 was not more than 15% of 
the previous year.528 
 
By early 1948 Anslinger was receiving new intelligence. Political changes had pushed out the 
Chief of the Opium Monopoly Mr. Nikpay. He began providing US agents with extensive 
information and claimed that the 1948 opium harvest could be the greatest in history because 
of a favourable illicit market. He further claimed the government decrees were the direct 
result of a political revolt in Azerbaijan Province in 1946, where the Soviet-inspired rebel 
government decided to issue a prohibition decree, despite the fact that no opium was grown 
in the region. He claimed it was explicitly meant as a propaganda ploy to embarrass the 
central government. The central government countered by issuing its own national decree. 
Nikpay argued the decree was completely ineffective given the scale of agricultural and 
economic reforms that would be needed to make it effective and that the monopoly continued 
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as before, although renamed as the Department of Prohibition. Further Nikpay claimed that 
parliament would not ratify the decree.529 
 
Anslinger privately wrote early in 1948 that:  
 
Iran has been behaving very badly during 1947. She sold 9 tons of opium to Iraq, 
which that government did not receive; 18 tons to Syria, which is not reported as 
having been authorized there; 22 tons to Siam where there is still opium smoking; and 
one item which gives us great concern, 56 tons to Indochina to be used for 
“disintoxification” of smokers. 530  
 
He went on: 
We have now prohibited all imports of opium from Iran for medicinal purposes 
because of her actions in supplying the illicit traffic in 1947. Accordingly, Iran is not 
to be trusted in any sense and should be completely outlawed. I have no sympathy 
whatever for Iran since her reentry into the illicit traffic after the war.531 
 
Once again the US felt burned by Iranian claims to be working towards controlling opium. 
This would present enormous complications as the US sought to move towards a production 
limitation convention. Nevertheless political considerations prevented Anslinger from 
publicly castigating Iran, as we shall see. 
 
Opium and the Japanese Peace Treaty: 
By the end of 1947 the outlines of peace treaty provisions began to emerge. Japan would be 
prohibited from cultivating and exporting narcotics. It would further be prohibited from 
importing except for strict medical and scientific purposes. The question was how to oversee 
this legitimate import trade. The US initially favoured PCOB oversight, but realised this 
would require treaty amendments. It was then suggested that CND appoint a ‘supervisor’. 
Col. Sharman thought this ‘an excellent opportunity’ for CND especially if the 
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recommendations were binding. He and Anslinger sought to carve out the most severe 
negotiating position to allow a retreat to a more minimal position of insisting that, if 
manufacturing was to be allowed in Japan, it mimic US controls. Both men worried that 
Foreign Office officials in the US and Canada would be ‘anxious to adopt the least penal 
line’.532 
 
Economic experts in the State Department objected to the prohibition of manufacture and 
export. Maxwell Hamilton, in charge of the Japanese Treaty at the US State Department, 
worried that singling Japan out for ‘punitive treatment’ might breed national resentment 
towards the drug treaty system. Anslinger (an old friend of Hamilton) argued that Japan’s 
historical record necessitated harsh restrictions.533 States struggled to find a compromise at 
ECOSOC level. China advocated direct UN control of supplies and a prohibition of Japanese 
exports. The USSR objected to ‘special provision’ for Japan. The US suggested a separate 
oversight body be designated by ECOSOC but balked at the idea of a UN style corporation 
overseeing the trade particularly given all the expense and logistics that would entail.534  
 
Eventually ECOSOC passed a compromise hammered out by New Zealand, with input from 
the US and UK. Governments negotiating peace treaties would make the ‘most stringent’ 
national controls while UN bodies would ‘be available to give such information and advice as 
may be requested’. This ensured a clear distinction between international and national 
controls. China’s goal to internationalise control of the Japanese drug market via the UN 
went unrealised, out of deference to state sovereignty. A core question of post-war narcotics 
control had been answered: UN control of narcotics could not supersede state control. 
Overcoming Soviet objections the UK amendment was adopted, allowing for information and 
advice to be supplied by UN experts when requested. This meant that the UN would have an 
advisory role, but only on the request of member states.535  
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Awakening the Peruvian Ally – Beginning the post-war coca push: 
Control advocates, particularly the US and Canada found a new and welcome ally in the 
Peruvian delegate Dr. Jorge A. Lazarte. After the first session, Sharman wrote to Anslinger to 
remind him of: 
 
The desirability of conveying privately to the Peruvian authorities the fact that their 
delegate not only made a most excellent impression and put his country right on the 
map in so far as the Narcotic Commission in concerned but that his attendance as an 
expert in the field of psychiatry did much to round out the all-round competence of the 
Commission from practically every angle. 536 
 
The US sought Peru’s support in utilising the UN to suppress indigenous coca consumption: 
 
It is clear that Indians of South America consume huge quantities of coca leaves and 
that the effects are distinctly harmful to the Indians and to the economy of the 
countries that coca-chewing is widely prevalent. The Individual countries will need 
strong support from the United Nations to enable them to put into effect repressive 
legislation, as the Indians will make great resistance. 537 
 
At the Second Session of CND Peru requested the UN help create visiting expert 
commissions to investigate coca chewing in Latin America and determine whether it was 
harmful. Other countries, the UK among them as we will see, were sceptical of these 
supposed harmful effects or that control was even feasible.538 
 
Abolition of Opium Smoking: 
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At its First Session CND unanimously adopted a US Resolution recommending that 
ECOSOC urge all remaining countries to prohibit opium smoking. By 1947 the only country 
where it was not prohibited was Siam and a number of Indian States.539 Siam claimed it had 
instituted a ban among its Chinese population, and considered rigorous measures to enforce it 
including publicly threatening deportation to China where their offences would be tried under 
Chinese law. Anslinger raised the issue at the Second Session of CND, highlighting that the 
Government derived almost fifteen per cent of its revenue from the opium monopoly. The US 
would continue to use the UN bully pulpit to pressure them to follow the British, Dutch and 
French lead.540 
 
Britain, France and the Netherlands professed adherence to goals of abolition, but were 
clearly struggling in a number of cases with implementation. Major Coles spoke vaguely of 
mixed outcomes in British territories, but overall portrayed a trend towards successful 
implementation. In Malaya, he claimed there had been hundreds of admissions to hospital for 
opium addiction, but none had experienced serious symptoms from deprivation and only 
minor smuggling from Siam. North Borneo reported no cases of smoking or patients 
suffering withdrawal symptoms. In Sarawak there existed a large illicit traffic, believed to 
stem from supplies left by the Japanese, and smuggling from the Dutch territory, while few 
addicts had received treatment. In Hong Kong the quantity of opium smoked had decreased 
although the number of addicts remained the same. There had been a slight increase in 
smuggling from Yunnan, China into Hong Kong, but this remained well below pre-war 
levels. Singapore reported 14, 000 ‘addicts’. Government stocks had been looted before the 
Japanese invasion and there remained a fear that these stocks were still hidden somewhere.541 
 
In French territories the monopolies had officially ceased selling non-medical smoking 
opium. Public smoking was prohibited and only medical needs could be supplied. ‘Dis-
intoxication centres’ were established, and opium for ‘progressive dis-intoxication’ could be 
obtained through prescription. Due to enforcement and anti-smuggling efforts, the price of 
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opium was claimed to have risen five-fold in the space of two years. In 1947 they expected 
the sale of opium to be fifteen tons compared to fifty tons in 1939 and 120 tons in 1920. 
Anslinger was privately highly critical of these ‘Dis-intoxication centres’. He highlighted that 
in 1947 Iran had supplied fifty-six tons to Indochina for these and by 1948 he privately 
insisted the French Government close the centres and cease purchasing opium for them 
overseas or he would ‘expose this situation’.542 Despite his threats and frustrations Anslinger 
would again be forced to mute his concerns out of deference to broader US foreign policy 
concerns, as we shall see. 
 
The Dutch delegate reiterated his government’s support for prohibition. He claimed that some 
hardship had been caused through a lack of provision of ‘dis-intoxication centres’. Further 
illicit opium was still available and police control was weak. In areas where the Netherlands 
exercised little authority, opium was sold openly and Chinese inhabitants continued to 
request the re-establishment of the monopoly. India had, In November 1946, decreed the total 
prohibition of opium smoking. They professed to have similar problems to the Netherlands 
but despite these great administrative difficulties, claimed to be seeing success. Anslinger 
requested that the question of ‘legal opium smoking’ remain on the agenda until it had been 
completely suppressed across the globe. Then the question could shift to the abolition of all 
opium smoking.543 For the moment, the question centred on the creation of a global 
prohibited activity before attention shifted to the entire suppression of that activity. 
 
Suppressing opium eating: 
The US maintained that in India and Burma opium eating was prevalent and ‘deleterious to 
health and should be suppressed in the same manner that the smoking of opium’ was. The 
Government of India had traditionally opposed suppression as we have seen. Their reasoning 
included the lack of medical facilities existing and the problems with implementation of 
restrictions rendering it ‘not humane’. By the second session of CND, however, the 
Government of India announced ‘in view of the world opinion, the Government had changed 
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its attitude’ and aimed to discourage eating.544 This marked a broader shift in India’s attitude 
towards the control system and presaged its emergence as a moderate producer state. 
 
 
 
Production Limitation: 
At its first meeting CND unanimously approved a questionnaire to further preparatory work 
around a production limitation convention. The US, strongly supported this questionnaire as 
‘urgent and important’:  
 
During the last six years Afghanistan, Iran, Japan and Korea have prohibited the 
production of opium; Argentina, Denmark, Austria, France, Czechoslovakia and the 
Netherlands have begun to cultivate the opium poppy for the direct extraction of 
morphine; Germany, Hungary and Poland have increased their production of poppy 
straw; and a new synthetic drug, Demerol, is rapidly replacing morphine.545 
 
Before controls could be instituted, there was a need to quantify the problem. The pre-War 
League Secretariat estimated total legitimate world raw opium requirements at 350-400 tons - 
not including prepared opium. By 1947 the figure for prepared opium had decreased, while 
the medical needs or derivatives of raw opium had increased, for example the use of codeine 
had doubled in some countries. The US even openly worried if it would be able to purchase 
enough raw opium for medical purposes in 1947. The Secretariat was requested to develop a 
new figure for world medical needs. This could then determine the need for raw opium, and 
illuminate the actual influence of poppy straw and new synthetic drugs on the global market. 
546 
 
The US, at the Second CND, developed a strategy based on dividing the issue. The goal was 
to first look at opium poppies, then coca leaves, then ‘Indian hemp’ and develop each subject 
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separately. The preference was for a unified production limitation convention covering all 
three. Absent this a convention covering opium was seen as the most urgent.547  The Third 
Session would be pivotal in working to generate political momentum towards a production 
limitation convention and the broader goal of a ‘single convention’ as we shall see. 
 
 
Internationalising the Criminalisation of Consumption: 
The Second CND solidified the trajectory for dealing with domestic drug consumption. The 
normative framework was established by a questionnaire circulated by ECOSOC in March 
1947. Questions were designed to suggest repressive and strict measures as the natural 
response, such as asking whether provision had been made to isolate drug ‘addicts’ from the 
rest of the population.548 States began vying to outdo each other at CND in highlighting the 
severity of control and punishment. Soon the arrest of ‘addicts’, doctors, illicit traffickers and 
other narcotics laws violators were viewed as metrics of success in international control. 
 
Turkey pointed out they had apprehended 142 ‘addicts’ in 1946, with 2 addicted to morphine, 
15 to hashish, 9 to opium and the rest to heroin. They further highlighted that convicted 
‘addicts’ were placed in ‘mental institutions’ for at least six months or until ‘cured’. Harsh 
prison terms and fines were prescribed for those violating narcotics laws, including increased 
sentences for those whose actions were deemed to have increased addiction, with their terms 
of imprisonment increased for each newly addicted person.549 
 
Iran pointed out that police had been authorised to enter private houses and confiscate any 
narcotics found while the Ministry of Health was taking measures to cure addicts with 
‘favourable results’ so far. Further, a Bill pending before Parliament contained a provision for 
the death penalty for anyone found smoking opium in the future. In response to this 
statement, the US requested and received approval that the CND report note with satisfaction 
the measures taken by Iran to suppress the opium traffic.550  
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In this area, the UK and North America diverged. Canada and the US criticised UK penalties 
as inadequate to deter smuggling. Sharman advocated for minimum prison sentences. Major 
Coles shot back that there was no legislative basis for these and pursuing them would be 
construed as interference with the judicial process. Anslinger pointed out the US judiciary 
were not so ‘sacrosanct’. His corrective method was to highlight the damage of the illicit 
traffic to ensure severe sentences. If his advice was not followed, ‘the press was notified and 
things took a turn for the better’. Colonel Sharman highlighted a Canadian case of a man 
receiving a five-year prison sentence for possessing fewer than three grams of opium, 
because he had a criminal record.551 The divergence between British and North American 
approaches in this area remained a consistent theme over the coming decades, as will be seen. 
 
The Commission, in order to move towards a standardisation of national laws, had the 
Secretariat undertake major, multi-year studies examining the various national responses. 
Further, as other UN agencies sought to engage with this issue, CND fought to maintain its 
monopoly of understanding. In January 1947 the Social Commission produced a document 
perceived by Anslinger and colleagues as portraying ‘drug addicts being sick persons’. This 
conception, at variance with the criminal conception held by control advocates within CND, 
was deleted once discovered and led to an apology by Leon Steinig and the drug 
Secretariat.552 Anslinger and Sharman were furious. Sharman wrote that: 
 
I am beginning to gather the impression that the germ of the old Genevese complaint 
has been firmly implanted and is flourishing in the administrative body politic of the 
U.N. Secretariat.553 
 
Anslinger agreed, writing that ‘we have to be just as much on the alert with the UN as we 
were with the League crowd’. Sharman and Anslinger were particularly aghast at statements 
that ‘the prevailing opinion is that effective methods are those of re-education rather than 
repression’, that ‘drug addicts should be cured rather than punished’ and that addiction should 
be viewed in the context of eliminating other ‘vices’ and ‘social scourges’ through ‘re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Ibid. 
552 UN CND 2nd Session, ‘Record of the Fifth Meeting’, 26 July 1947; Morlock to Anslinger, 15 
January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947). 
553 Sharman to Anslinger, 29 January 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box120/File1230-1, UN 1st Session 
#2 (1947-50). 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
174	  
	  
education and re-adaptation’.554  Further he and Sharman rejected the notion that ‘the drug 
addict who is not re-educated when the drug is taken from him will instinctively seek to find 
relief…in other vices’. As Sharman wrote, ‘one would almost think that the Narcotic 
Commission had not discussed this very subject in public two months previously’. He argued 
that the CND: 
 
With our well established machinery…would be well advised to keep thoroughly clear 
of everything except possibly the most tenuous connection with these impractical 
social uplifters, and that the most we should agree to would be for them to come and 
listen in at our meetings. 555  
 
They held their ‘fire’ and left it to Steinig to undo in the short term but they intended to raise 
it at the next session and determine which section of the UN Secretariat prepared the 
document so that the could ‘give them “the works”’.556 
 
Peru closely parroted US and Canadian conceptions. Their delegate spoke of ‘criminal 
addicts’ who sought to ‘induce others’, often giving away drugs for the purpose. Given this 
situation he argued that ‘such individuals should be confined to institutions’ and kept in 
isolation. Colonel Sharman, exercising the Chair’s prerogative, agreed with the Peruvian 
delegate and claimed that ‘such addicts derived real pleasure from inducing others to follow 
the same vice: in this way they increased the number of their potential sources of supply’.557  
The implications were clear: dissenting views from the prohibitionist and repressive approach 
to reducing consumption would not be tolerated. The UN would be used as a forum to 
expand, standardise and advocate repressive responses not only to trafficking but also 
consumption and addiction. 
 
Mexico: 
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Whether CND would evolve as an enforcement body in line with the original ‘inner circle’ 
conception would in many ways be determined by the early test case of Mexico. Anslinger 
chose to single out Mexico given political considerations affecting other potential targets; the 
direct US interest in Mexican illicit production given their proximity; and the strong bilateral 
leverage potential the US held. Britain, meanwhile, viewed the Mexico question as ‘one 
which almost exclusively affects the U.S.A. and in a secondary way Canada’.558  
 
At the Second CND Session Anslinger claimed that Mexico had nearly 10,000 poppy fields 
and hosted at least a dozen clandestine laboratories, altogether producing 30-40 tons of opium 
for the illicit traffic in 1947. He proposed a resolution highlighting these reports and asking 
ECOSOC to recommend Mexico take measures to fulfil its international obligations. The 
Mexican delegate protested that the army and air force had been working to eradicate poppy 
fields and suppress the illicit traffic. Anslinger and Sharman claimed that this had applied to a 
small number of fields. After some discussion the Resolution passed CND.559 
 
Regrouping in early 1948 the Representative of Mexico to the UN, Dr. Padilla Nervo 
protested to the US Ambassador while the Mexican ECOSOC Representative warned of 
‘political repercussions’ of the passage of the resolution. Further they highlighted the 
problems of control: small farmers received ‘easy cash’ for poppy crops; eradication was 
‘regarded as the acts of a totalitarian government’; and, alluding to US citizens’ involvement, 
the illicit traffic involved people that were ‘very hard to touch’. Despite these difficulties 
Mexico claimed to be working vigorously against the illicit traffic. Dr. Padilla claimed that an 
ECOSOC resolution would be utilised by government opponents and warned that there was a 
‘hysterical attitude’ within the Mexican government towards it.560 
 
Seeing clear potential for escalating diplomatic damage the State Department stepped in to 
defuse the issue. Dr. Padilla was warned that the US attitude would be determined by 
Mexican rhetoric and actions. Should the Mexican delegation seek to displace the blame to 
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US citizens the US delegate would have ‘no recourse but to set the record straight at some 
length, with names, dates, and places’. On the other hand, the US government claimed to be 
sympathetic to Mexican difficulties and was ‘disposed to be cooperative’.561 
 
Relieved, Dr. Padilla promised that he would use ECOSOC to highlight the ‘numerous steps’ 
Mexico was taking stamp out illicit production and that he had no intention of referring to the 
US or US citizens in any way. In response the US promised to withdraw support for the 
resolution and send the issue back to CND to keep ‘under review’. Dr. Padilla agreed, on 
condition that Mexico not be treated as ‘a country on parole’ at CND level. The State 
Department nevertheless reserved the right for their representative on CND to be ‘completely 
free to be insistent in the examination of the progress that Mexico was making in stamping 
out this trade’.562 
 
The US was unwilling to expend broader political leverage on this issue and thereby the 
implications for the CND-ECOSOC relationship became clear. The State Department pulled 
back quickly from any brinksmanship with Mexico over this issue. They would allow CND 
to serve as a bully pulpit from which states could be pressured and criticised over the 
technicalities of their control efforts. Meanwhile ECOSOC would provide a cooling venue 
where diplomatic processes could play out and political resolutions sought. CND could be 
used to hold states’ feet to the fire by sending resolutions to ECOSOC. These could spark 
domestic action, or at least a favourable rhetorical outcome and resolve the issue without 
requiring ECOSOC action. If matters continued at ECOSOC level the State Department and 
other Foreign Offices could work to cool issues and return them to CND without the need for 
a politically damaging Resolution. Most importantly, this provided the State Department a 
veto over all Anslinger’s initiatives. Mexico, for the moment, remained a key agenda item for 
the Third Session of CND and it was the only country singled out for specific attention.563 
 
In March, however, leading Mexican newspapers published excerpts of a statement made by 
Harry Anslinger to the Appropriations Committee of the US House of Representatives in 
which he parroted his claims made at CND. This provoked a furious response from the 
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Ministry of Foreign Relations. They demanded evidence for the assertions and argued that a 
‘spirit of cooperation’ should define Mexico-US relations, not criticism. The State 
Department responded that Anslinger’s statement was made at CND, a forum where ‘any 
country may be called upon publicly to account for’ its control efforts.564  
 
Anslinger initially remained determined to use the Third Session of CND to reiterate his 
complaints but Mexican fury saw him quickly overruled by the State Department. They 
requested a number of paragraphs to be cut from his draft statement and the addition of a 
paragraph highlighting Mexico’s successes in the face of great difficulty. As they pointed out: 
 
There are just at this time other negotiations being carried on between the United 
States and Mexican Governments in several matters of considerable importance, one 
of which is of great importance to us from the viewpoint of hemisphere defense. It is 
therefore the hope of this Division and of our Embassy in Mexico City that the 
statement will be made in such a manner as not to arouse lasting resentment.565 
 
In the end Anslinger’s statement praised Mexico prompting CND to express satisfaction over 
Mexican suppression efforts.566 By the end of the Third Session, the Mexico outcomes had 
significantly weakened Anslinger’s ability to use the UN as a bully pulpit on drug policy. He 
had overplayed his hand in utilising the UN to challenge other states and had witnessed the 
narcotics issue being clearly subsumed to broader US foreign policy goals. 
 
Afghanistan: 
Afghanistan had announced the total prohibition of cultivation in 1945, but its opium 
continued to show up on the global market in 1947. The US remained convinced of Afghan 
sincerity. However, the Afghan Foreign Office informed the British Foreign Office in 1947 
that their Government had never intended to stop cultivation completely, merely restrict it to 
medical and scientific requirements and that cultivation would continue much as before. As 
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Major Coles wrote to Anslinger: ‘This is not unexpected, but it is not often so frankly 
admitted’. Anslinger felt deceived, responding that ‘I could not help but think that this is the 
same story put up by the Iranian Representative’. Seeking UK support, Anslinger warned 
Coles the US and UK should be prepared to ‘confront’ the Afghan delegate to the production 
limitation conference with evidence of their broken promises and head off potential damage 
to production limitation efforts.567  
 
Similar to Iran, Afghanistan’s pursuit of short-term political goals had resulted in their 
government making long-term promises they could not keep. When the hard economic and 
political obstacles became apparent, the goals were merely dropped. The US, UK and UN 
lacked the diplomatic or political leverage to prevent this backsliding. 
 
Part 2: The Protocol on Synthetics: 
Discussions of synthetic drugs loomed large at the First and Second Session of the CND and 
represented one area of relatively clear agreement. As the UK delegation wrote: ‘modern 
chemistry has produced synthetic drugs, capable of producing and maintaining addiction, but 
not susceptible to the control imposed by the earlier Conventions, as they are not products of 
opium or coca leaf’. Anslinger wrote to Malcolm Delevingne in November 1947, ‘we are 
virtually undergoing a drug revolution’: 
 
Little did we think in 1931, in drafting the Limitation Convention, that we would be 
confronted with a whole raft of synthetic drugs, which are coming to the front with 
such lightning speed that we are almost unable to keep track of them. 568 
 
Productions similar to opium alkaloids were increasingly being derived synthetically from 
coal-tar. The two most visible drugs during these early discussions were Demerol and 
Amidone.569 A synthetic form had not replaced the opiate codeine and for countries like 
Britain it was the main opium product. This meant there remained a large demand for opium 
as a raw material. Britain acknowledged, however, ‘if a synthetic coal-tar substitute for 
codeine is invented, opium as a raw material for the legitimate alkaloid trade might virtually 
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disappear’.570 The US similarly viewed that ‘The use of synthetics is growing so rapidly that 
there is a strong possibility of their replacing completely the derivatives of opium’. 571 This 
possibility, that poppy-based medicines could be entirely replaced by synthetics, was to 
become a consistent theme in negotiations over the coming decades. Producer states viewed 
them as a direct economic threat, while control advocates used their spectre to simultaneously 
demand stricter productions controls and lower prices, as we shall see.  
 
Amending existing conventions was viewed as too complicated so states opted for a new 
Protocol covering all synthetic drugs not included in the 1931 Convention. At the 1947 CND, 
Anslinger proposed language and was seconded by Major Coles of the UK, followed by 
unanimous adoption.572 The goal was to expedite passage at the 1948 CND. Anslinger 
optimistically predicted that the proposed protocol would ‘serve the purposes for all time’. 573  
 
The Protocol would supplement, rather than replace, the 1931 Convention and apply its 
system of control to synthetics. The US pushed for ‘a temporary but general limitation’ of 
any new drug pending a definitive decision by WHO on its efficacy and addiction potential. 
This became a core negotiating point heading into the 1948 CND. Anslinger claimed to have 
the support of the WHO, PCOB and DSB. The US were eventually forced, however, to soften 
the language due to a clear lack of support from the UK, USSR and the Netherlands who 
feared stifling innovation. CND could simply recommend to governments, pending a WHO 
decision whether a particular drug was liable to produce addiction, that they apply controls 
provisionally. 574 
 
The overall success of the draft protocol represented the intersection of various factors, 
including the strong normative uniformity underpinning the system at the time. Problems 
with the global regulatory approach to drugs were as yet unclear and states agreed on the core 
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tenets of a control policy based on regulation underpinned by prohibitions. The new Protocol 
would represent an extension of the existing normative and regulatory framework rather than 
an innovation. Further, given the lack of entrenched economic interests around the new drugs, 
carving up the market among existing players ensured minimal opposition. More broadly the 
Protocol offered the international community a beacon of success upon which they could 
point other areas of international cooperation then foundering on the rocks of the early Cold 
War. 
 
Part 3: Third CND Session, 1948: 
Preparing for The Third Session: 
The Third Session would prove pivotal in shaping the direction of international drug policy 
for the coming decades. The mixed results in the first two CND sessions paved the way for a 
major political push. In March 1948 the US began planning for a new ‘single convention’ 
which could consolidate the existing conventions and potentially create a single international 
control body. The US aimed to turn to it once a production limitation agreement had been 
concluded. Major Coles of the UK, meanwhile, retired just prior to the Third Session. This 
would have major implications for Anglo-American drug relations.575 
 
The Indochina Flashpoint: 
In 1948 FBN Agent Tollinger reported from French Indochina about the growing sale of 
opium. Anslinger intended to highlight the issue at CND but was again overruled by the State 
Department. In his extensive draft Anslinger pointed out that their Federal Ordinance of June 
1946 outlawed the sale of opium for smoking, but US intelligence suggested that: 
 
the French Government did not close the opium monopoly dens when it announced 
the adoption of its policy of prohibition, but transformed them into “clinics” where 
addicts could smoke without molestation. The present policy of the French 
Government is strictly that of taking all possible measures to supply the demand for 
opium in order to obtain as much revenue as possible at the expense of the addicts.576 
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Many in the State Department supported the statement ‘in principle’. As Mr. Landon wrote 
privately: 
 
The report of the Treasury agent…reveals a picture of colonial exploitation which 
reads like Radio Moscow at its worst. Approximately one-third…of the…Indochinese 
budget for 1947 was raised through the government opium monopoly.577 
 
They nevertheless argued that ‘the political situation in that part of the world and in France’ 
prevented the US raising the issue. The State Department suggested Anslinger instead take 
‘non-public corrective action’.578 Once again Anslinger had been rolled back on his efforts to 
use the UN as a bully pulpit to advocate for a strengthening of control measures.  
 
Tackling Global Illicit Traffic – The Secretariat Looks to Expand its Role: 
In preparation for the Third Session, Leon Steinig sought to ramp up the UN Secretariat’s 
role in monitoring the global illicit traffic. He privately sought Anslinger’s advice, pointing 
out that only ten governments sent reports in accordance with the 1931 Convention. 
Anslinger suggested the production of a simple table highlighting compliance and passing a 
CND resolution reminding governments to furnish reports. Further, he pushed for the 
Secretariat to make recommendations about improving seizure reporting and for including: 
names of persons arrested; place of birth; origins of drugs seized and the result of the case. 
Anslinger also warned of the ‘great and expensive burden’ and that the Secretariat should aim 
for a ‘simple report in narrative form’. The Secretariat prepared a memorandum on States’ 
compliance with Article 23 of the 1931 Convention, concluding that these reports often 
contained little ‘of value to other governments, and most of the reports contain significant 
omissions‘.579 
 
Overall this represented an attempt to extend the DND’s role and lay the basis for increased 
operations under a future convention framework. DND aimed to become the centre of activity 
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for illicit market reduction. 580 It also represented an effort by the UN machinery to prevent 
the splintering of control efforts into other regional and bilateral frameworks and institutions, 
as we shall see. The genesis of the modern, UN-centred, illicit market enforcement system 
had begun. Nevertheless, with the US forced to tailor its criticisms and enforcement to 
broader geopolitical concerns the question of enforcing the global normative and legal 
framework against the illicit traffic appeared uncertain. 
 
The British Strategy: 
The Third Session of CND represented a relatively unique example of consensus in policy 
and process at CND. One of the only real points of contention from the UK perspective was 
how to incorporate a ‘colonial clause’ accounting for Metropolitan ratification of agreements 
on behalf of their colonies, with particular pushback coming from the Soviet Delegation. 
Another issue arose around renewing membership of the Commission. In this case the only 
question arose over whether Iran would be re-elected. As UK Delegate Thornton wrote: 
 
There are two considerations here. The first that hardened lying on the part of a 
Government contributes nothing and ought to be visited with some consequences, e.g. 
exclusion from the Commission – yet the same could be said in a minor way 
concerning France (Indo China). The other that it is well to have an offending 
country on the Commission where its delegate can…be put “in the dock”. I should 
incline to keep Iran. The U.S.A. delegate is in doubt but I think there are reasons why 
the U.S. Government is inclined to treat Iran tenderly and that may determine the 
matter.581 
 
Regarding opium smoking certain criticisms were aired but not in an overly aggressive 
manner. The Dutch East Indies were criticised for, although seemingly diminishing smoking, 
having ‘not yet gone the whole hog’. Egypt in particular was critical of allowing any 
continuation of licenced opium smoking. Similarly Indochina and Macao were criticised for 
continuing to allow smoking. The British delegate, Thornton, privately acknowledged that for 
Macao ‘the opium traffic remains a large part of the raison d’etre of the colony’.582 
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Overall the US delegation, under a State Department muzzle, held its guns on recalcitrant 
states. Thornton, representing Britain, found Anslinger ‘friendly’ and ‘always helpful’ but 
‘very quiet this meeting’. Privately, he highlighted how Anslinger and Sharman represented 
‘the two countries which par excellence look to international co-operation to mitigate drug 
consumption in their own countries’. Meanwhile, the momentum towards a new production 
control agreement and new Single Convention accelerated. Despite US enthusiasm however, 
Britain remained cautious about rushing headlong into a new production limitation 
convention or a Single Convention. As Thornton wrote: 
 
But for the white drug problem in the U.S.A., and the fact that white drugs were 
exclusively produced from eastern opium…suppression of the production of raw 
materials and their indigenous consumption in a relatively harmless form would have 
been carried as far as it has. So far as indigenous consumption in a relatively 
harmless form would have been carried as far as it has. So far as indigenous 
consumption is concerned there is a fait accompli; but there is a room for caution as 
regards the chewing of the coca leaf, the essential viciousness of which has yet to be 
conclusively established. 583 
 
The UK first wanted to see the 1948 Protocol prove itself effective: 
 
It will be interesting to see what the U.S.A. can do to suppress the illicit manufacture 
of new synthetics. They failed totally to check illicit liquor stills during Prohibition, 
although, of course, public opinion was with the distillers. If they fail here, there 
might even be a reversal of the past, with the East as Accuser and the U.S.A., as the 
producer of the illicit supplies, in the dock.584 
 
He went on, highlighting the new British position: 
 
The whole situation serves to re-emphasise the importance of the United Kingdom. It 
occupies an intermediate position. It has more sympathy with the position of the raw 
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material producing countries than the U.S.A. has; and it has virtually no domestic 
consumption to worry about. 585 
 
But cautioned against ‘being drawn too closely into the orbit of the U.S.A., however friendly 
our relations are’. Instead he suggested the UK ‘redevelop the flow of secret information 
which we used to enjoy instead of leaving it a virtual monopoly of the U.S.A’. In essence 
Thornton sought to carve the UK CND role out as a counterweight to the US. Viewing 
himself as a relative newcomer he took ‘a relatively small part in proceedings except in the 
discussion and drafting of the new protocol’. 586 Thornton’s views set the general tone for UK 
drug diplomacy in the coming years. It saw its role as the moderating force within CND and 
the coalition builder mediating between producer states and strict control advocates such as 
the US. 
 
Siam & Iran: 
Anslinger had not been muzzled over Siam at the 1948 CND. He publicly highlighted their 
opium traffic as being in ‘full swing’ and claimed the northern hill tribes produced 80-110 
tons of raw opium annually. Only thirty per cent was distributed legally and the remainder 
was smuggled into Bangkok, Burma and China. The Chinese Consul General at Bangkok 
claimed in 1947 that there were 200 smoking dens and 30,000 smokers in Bangkok. 
Government estimates meanwhile placed total revenue from opium sales in 1947 at fourteen 
per cent of total government revenue. Anslinger was also furious to learn that in early 1948 
the Deputy Minister of Finance announced that the Siamese Government would make its 
future purchases of opium from Iran.587 
 
The UK were similarly distrustful of Iran’s opium dealings and was quick to paint the opium 
issue as another example of Iran’s duplicitous methods in pursuit of economic gains. Not far 
beneath the UK’s anger lay their on-going difficulties with Iran over the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company and the renewal of Anglo-Iranian oil concessions.588 Thornton wrote that Iran’s 
representative to the 1948 Session, Mr Ardalan: 
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Lies abroad for the good of his country and with astonishing effrontery. Ready to 
multiply or divide Iran statistics by ten to meet criticisms and equally ready to restore 
original figures for the same reason; referred cheerfully to new Iran laws and their 
present and prospective effect as if all believed him, although he knew no one did.589 
 
Nevertheless, in the interest of consensus and stability for the still new CND, criticism was 
generally reserved. The focus of this session remained the Synthetics Protocol and building 
forward momentum towards production limitation and a single convention. Although the 
international commitment to abolishing opium smoking and enforcing the existing 
convention framework was highlighted, Anslinger had been limited to mild criticisms of 
Mexico, Indochina and Iran. He had used his leeway on Siam to fire a warning shot to other 
states about the potential of the US to utilise CND as a forum for criticism. This, however, 
would be contingent on the State Department allowing the narcotics issue to complicate 
relations with Siam. 
 
Control advocates in the US viewed the CND as failing in its enforcement roles. As Helen 
Howell Moorhead wrote: 
 
There has been much accomplished by the technique of the Protocol in bringing the 
old Treaties up to date, but grave weakness has been displayed in handling the illicit 
traffic cases…We need a “Prosecutor for the defense of public interest”, some one 
free to urge forward the main object of the Commission-to control the movement of 
the legal traffic, and to attack un-remittingly the illicit traffic.590 
 
Whether CND could be moulded into this kind of enforcement environment, in-line with 
long-standing ‘inner circle’ goals remained to be seen. The experience of Anslinger thus far 
suggested a resounding ‘no’. 
 
Production Limitation: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 CND: Third Session – Report of the UK Delegate, 2 June 1948, BNA-FO371/72915. 
590 Moorhead to Anslinger, 6 August 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session 
#1 (1947 - 1948). 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
186	  
	  
The 1948 session produced three different resolutions on production limitation. A US 
resolution called for a new Single Convention, which would include a production limitation 
provision.  A Chinese resolution, viewing the Single Convention as a longer-term goal, 
pushed for an ‘interim commodity agreement’ to control the opium until the Single 
Convention could be agreed. Finally, the Soviet delegation proposed to control the global 
production of hashish.591 
 
The British delegate, Thornton, viewed opium limitation as extremely complex, particularly 
with the proliferation of synthetic narcotics. Regarding coca leaf, he privately highlighted the 
uncertainties over its danger and the enormity of socio-economic obstacles to control in Latin 
America. He pointed out that ‘Columbia found this when after a year of attempted prohibition 
of cultivation, they had to rescind their decrees’. More formidable, he argued, would be 
efforts to control ‘Indian Hemp’ which grew wild over vast areas of India, Africa and 
elsewhere. He pointed out that ‘an onslaught on the growth of this plant would be an 
undertaking of the first magnitude’ and would prove ‘nearly impracticable’.592  
 
The UK Delegation was deeply sceptical of the US proposal. Consolidating past treaties was 
seen as ‘a minor affair’ compared to production limitation, which may never be attained and 
at a minimum would require years of work. Further, until this was overcome, a Single 
Convention would prove premature and unnecessary. They sought to postpone discussions 
through extensive studies. Thornton also doubted the utility of the Chinese proposal and 
abstained - not wanting to be seen as opposing it. Again he supported further study to have 
‘something specific to discuss’ at the next session of CND.593 The Russian proposal was 
‘meaningless’ but since ‘it only involved studies…which will disclose its absurdity, no harm 
was done by its adoption’. 594  
 
The secretariat would undertake a study of coca chewing in Peru. Initially no other Latin 
American country sought involvement and Bolivia remained actively hostile to controlling 
the coca leaf. The UK remained deeply sceptical but again figured little harm would result 
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from further study. 595 Also Thornton wished to support the ‘brilliant young psychiatrist’ 
representing Peru with whom he had ‘established excellent personal relations, which have 
already proved useful‘. Further the UK concluded that: 
 
The Peruvian Government is, overtly at least, “showing willing”, whereas the 
Government of Bolivia, where the habit is equally prevalent, is indifferent to the point 
of intransigence. It would be unfortunate if Peru’s forthcomingness were met by a 
niggardly response.596 
 
Outcomes: 
Overall there was a general view that the Third Session was relatively amicable. The UK 
delegation wrote that it was ‘up to best standards for business and atmosphere’. Further CND 
was highlighted as a venue ‘almost clear of ideologies; and as such an enduring example of 
what can be done internationally if goodwill can be achieved’.597 It also represented the 
solidification of the post-war coalitions and alignments. India, concerned with broader issues 
of international legitimacy and highlighting the ‘new era’ domestically, played a far less 
obstructionist role on the Commission than previously; France sought to play a quietly 
assertive role while deflecting attention from the issue of opium smoking in Indochina; Egypt 
remained the standard bearer for anti-trafficking efforts in the Middle East, despite the 
personal weaknesses, and reputation for inebriety, of its delegate Mr. Zaky; China retained an 
ideological uniformity on drugs, aligning closely with strict control advocates, despite the 
weakness and lack of knowledge of its delegate Mr. Hsia and the worsening domestic 
situation; Turkey focused on defending its interests rather than seeking to engage in broader 
system politics; Russia, remained erratic, unpredictable and yet relatively quiescent in the 
Third Session. Their delegate Mr. Zakusov was a drug professional with little understanding 
of international affairs and a lack of interest in the rival international ideologies. This, 
coupled with his ‘pleasant and courteous’ nature proved a tremendous boost to the 1948 
session fuelled the narrative of CND being a UN framework where broader geopolitical 
issues were checked at the door. 598 
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CND recommended that ECOSOC authorise the Secretariat begin to draft a Single 
Convention to replace all the existing conventions including a new production limitation 
convention. In the meantime the Secretariat would study an interim production limitation 
convention and the Commission of Inquiry on Coca would undertake its study. Then, in a 
coup for the old ‘inner circle’, Col. Sharman was elected as a new member of the DSB, 
following his nomination by Anslinger. Lastly, of particular long-term significance was the 
creation of a UN periodical on narcotic drugs – eventually to be called the Bulletin on 
Narcotics.599 
 
Looking to its immediate future, CND outlined three core priorities. First to implement and 
apply the existing international conventions; second, to finalise the Protocol bringing drugs 
outside the scope of the 1931 Convention under control; third, limiting the production of raw 
materials and the eventual drafting of a single convention encompassing this. This latter goal 
was to be fulfilled through an interim agreement and the negotiation of the Single 
Conventions, to be pursued concurrently.600 
 
ECOSOC quickly passed all measures suggested by CND and an official signing ceremony 
for the 1948 Synthetics Protocol took place on the 19th of November 1948 at the Palais de 
Chailliot.601 Meanwhile, In July 1948 it was announced that the PCOB and DSB would be 
moving to the United Nations Office at Geneva. One of the most consensual periods in 
international drug control had brought significant forward political movement. Whether the 
momentum could be sustained into future years remained an open question, but the direction 
of travel was clear and the political end point of a ‘single convention’ lay on the horizon. 
Navigating to this end point remained the key question of international drug policy for the 
next two decades. 
 
Conclusion: 
The 1946-8 period was highly consensual when viewed against the backdrop of the previous 
four decades. It nevertheless produced mixed outcomes. The League system had been fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
599 US Position Paper: Third Session CND, 29 April 1948; Report on the Third Session of CND May 
3-22, 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48). 
600 Report on the Third Session of CND May 3-22, 1948, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, 
UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48). 
601 Steinig to Anslinger, 19 August 1948; Steinig to Anslinger, 25 November 1948, FBNA/ACC170-
74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 3rd Session #1 (1947-48). 
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salvaged and given a stronger institutional footing within the UN. Once again it was 
manufacturing states, which took the political lead, which accounted for the success of the 
1948 Synthetics Protocol. However, the UN had not emerged along the lines the ‘inner circle’ 
had hoped for. It remained largely toothless, and members like the USSR pushed back against 
any efforts to give it the power of interference in national controls. Attempts by the US and 
its allies to utilise the system as an enforcement mechanism fell flat in the face of practical 
difficulties in recalcitrant states, and the necessity of deferring to broader geopolitical goals. 
The US continued to place its hope in an ever-strengthened PCOB as an enforcement body 
and looked towards a unified convention as a means to toughen controls and build a stringent 
production limitation framework. As US influence in the world grew, along with the 
necessities to accommodate local concerns, the American willingness to endlessly push an 
uncompromising control agenda became undermined. Similar to the British government in 
decades previous, the expansion of US power meant that the US had to compromise its anti-
opium principles in pursuit of broader political and foreign policy objectives. 
 
The UK remained self-consciously pragmatic, steering towards the middle ground. The 
colonial question appeared largely resolved, and the British only expended political capital on 
core interests – for example when questions touched on issues of international law and 
colonial governments or Britain’s drug manufacturing interests. The UN framework had been 
established and member states began to settle into a set of coherent interest-related voting 
blocs. What was yet to emerge was a coherent producer nation voting bloc. This, as we shall 
see in the coming chapters, was to emerge under Turkish leadership.  
 
Meanwhile, the importance of individual diplomats continued to manifest itself. The extent to 
which core representatives worked towards achieving their agendas remained a key 
determinant of outcomes. This would be particularly apparent as Anslinger was muzzled by 
the State Department resulting in more consensual negotiations. Meanwhile, the change in 
leadership for the UK away from the old hand Coles towards the new leadership of Thornton 
would have significant implication for British and Anglo-American drug diplomacy. Lastly, 
the relative lack of desire of the Soviet Delegate in fighting the broader ideological battles of 
the emerging Cold War within the confines of CND facilitated consensual negotiations and 
contributed to the narrative of CND as a successful example of international cooperation 
during this period.  
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As Anslinger fought to enshrine the ‘inner circle’ conception within the new CND, through a 
mixture of normative framework building and enforcement via US diplomatic leverage, his 
strength would be determined by State Department support. By 1948 the latter had made 
clear the secondary importance of this issue relative to broader US diplomatic interests. The 
division of power within the UN framework, CND serving as a venue for highlighting 
‘technical’ concerns and ECOSOC serving as a venue determining political outcomes under 
State Department control, came into view over the period 1946-48. Meanwhile, as FBN 
efforts in CND were seen to influence broader diplomatic relations, the State Department 
took an expanded role in blunting ‘technical’ criticisms of states like Mexico and French 
Indochina.  Nevertheless, the ‘inner circle’, under US, Canadian and UN Secretariat 
leadership, had begun to enshrine a strongly repressive approach to domestic consumption 
and addiction within the international normative framework. 
 
The shape of the post-war system cleavages had emerged. Britain and the US represented the 
two core threads in a polarised system. On the one side remained the US with a commitment 
to prohibitionist policies and an ostensible desire to utilise available diplomatic leverage to 
advance them. On the other side remained producer states which bucked against excessive 
interference, a diminished market and new burdensome regulations. For the UK, in the 
middle, regulation and respect for middle ground policies remained predominant. The success 
of the US in driving through its prohibitionist and strict enforcement vision or the success of 
the UK in moderating US demands and coalescing states around a moderate regulatory vision 
would determine the direction of international controls over the coming decades. 
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Chapter 6: Dividing up the Global Licit Market, 1948-1953: 
 
Introduction: 
By 1948 the trajectory of drug control was by no means clear. Iran and Afghanistan rolled 
back their commitments; colonial administrations struggled to implement prohibitions; and 
the general international security situation deteriorated. Meanwhile multilateral efforts 
became almost entirely side-tracked by efforts to create an interim production limitation 
agreement that would serve until the Single Convention could be agreed. On this latter front 
the US remained far more optimistic than states like the UK who saw only roadblocks. 
 
The ‘serene atmosphere’ of the 1947 and 1948 CND Sessions quickly slipped into the rear-
view mirror.602 As the 1940s came to a close the UK had assumed a conservative and 
defensive posture. Its delegation actively shied from controversial issues and was deeply 
reticent to provide any sort of expansion of powers for CND, the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), PCOB or other bodies. The UK maintained a strong vigilance against anything 
which could damage its vital narcotics trade and further worsen its economic situation. 
Similarly, anything potentially complicating colonial matters was to be strenuously avoided.  
 
The UK policy was to run CND silent and deep as broader geopolitical conflagrations pushed 
drug policy down the international agenda. In certain areas, functional relationships were 
carved out – for example Anglo-American cooperation over Germany. In other areas 
unspoken accords emerged, such as the US going lightly on British colonial possessions and 
overlooking issues regarding opium smoking or smuggling activities. The UK politely dug in 
its heels and sought to slow the US-generated momentum towards new accords, while 
maintaining amicable relations with the US delegation. 
 
Anslinger, successfully avoided a domestic reorganisation attempt, and soon aimed to secure 
an international accord that would reaffirm the independent position of his agency under 
treaty law. In so doing he worked to lessen the State Department’s grip of the strategic tiller 
and reassert his influence over international processes. He eventually saw the 1953 Opium 
Protocol as an, admittedly imperfect, means to effect forward momentum on production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 Quote: ‘Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs’, 21 February 1947, BNA-IOC (47)52, 
BNA-CAB134/381. 
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control. Further by declaring victory on the ‘interim agreement’ he dug multilateral processes 
out of the mud and enabled attention to be switched back to his pet project, the Single 
Convention.  
 
The UK, on the other hand, seeing the Home Office reins of policy change hands a number of 
times, maintained a pragmatic but essentially conservative approach. The issues around 
medicinal heroin use and outside criticism of UK prison sentences heightened London’s 
awareness that the UN drug framework, despite initially circumscribed goals, had a tendency 
towards ‘mission creep’ and regulatory capture by states advocating the most repressive and 
control-oriented approaches. Eventually, as states like the US and France pushed ahead with 
accords in the face of doubts, irrationalities and hard economic logic, the UK approach 
became characterised by stern opposition. This resulted in the UK pushing back against the 
1953 Protocol and its drafts in an occasionally incoherent but resolute manner. 
 
The UK initially sat quietly on the side-lines, not appearing to obstruct negotiations but 
confidently expecting production limitation to collapse under the weight of its own 
contradictions. This approach became untenable when France, under the determined 
leadership and vision of its CND delegate Charles Vaille, assumed the lead negotiator role 
and became a key Anslinger ally. 1950 marked the beginning of a new Franco-US drug 
diplomacy, with the strident and abrasive Vaille making a strong and positive impression on 
Anslinger.603 Both Anslinger and Vaille worked to hammer through a negotiated outcome 
even if it alienated many states and was unlikely to achieve consensus and adoption. This 
Franco-US drug alliance became all the more important as the US-Canadian relationship lost 
its core strength when Col. Sharman was pushed out of the Canadian policy process and his 
successors moderated their approach sharply. They moved to ally with Britain viewing the 
British regulatory approach as more conducive to protecting their economic interests as a 
consumer state (see Chapter Seven).604  
 
The period 1948 to 1953 was underpinned by a general lack of bilateral enforcement efforts. 
Certain states received the occasional ire of and dressing down by the US via the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
603 Anslinger to Vaille, 4 January 1951, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #4 
(1950-1); The importance of Vaille to the Franco-US alliance would be demonstrated later when his 
removal from CND in 1958 saw France quickly shake off its leadership role and work to deprecate the 
importance of international drug control efforts. 
604 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, p. 178. 
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framework but these were generally reserved. By 1952, however, Anslinger had found the 
issue that would help him retake the initiative on US drug diplomacy. Just as he had done a 
decade previously with Japan, he launched a full frontal assault on the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), painting them as the source of an enormous conspiracy to flood the West with 
illicit opium to earn foreign exchange and sap the US will to fight wars.  
 
As the international security situation worsened, the drug control framework began to strain 
at the seams. States moved towards quiet bilateral cooperation on issues of overlap, such as 
Western Germany. Meanwhile on complex issues crossing deep geopolitical fissures, states 
were careful to avoid publicly stressing drug policy issues for fear of a rupture pulling the 
system apart. This became harder as the supply framework of the system began to break 
down in the face of a spike in wartime demand and pre-emptive stockpiling. The market 
which control advocates had been working to shrink and restrict suddenly became a suppliers 
market with consumer countries vying for stocks of opium. Claims that synthetics were doing 
away with the need for opium became harder to sustain and producer states sought to cash in 
on their position. As CND continued to push towards a production limitation agreement states 
like Turkey and Iran became more confident and vocal in the defence of their interests, but 
also increasingly willing to draw outside the lines of the ‘licit’ system when it suited their 
economic interests.  
 
Against this background CND’s secretariat, the Division on Narcotic Drugs (DND) became 
bogged down in efforts by its head, Leon Steinig, to push through an international opium 
monopoly against all diplomatic and economic barriers, to the detriment of all other work, 
such as the Coca Leaf Commission and the draft ‘single convention’. Eventually Secretariat 
overreach alienated key Member States and created a breakdown in relations between CND 
and its secretariat. Messy discussions around the Opium Monopoly became an 
embarrassment to the entire UN and all were keen to salvage some agreement. 
 
Part 1: Anslinger’s Domestic Threat - Reorganisation: 
In 1949 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
began advocating that the FBN be transferred from the Treasury Department to the 
Department of Justice and consolidated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  They 
argued that the FBN was now more concerned with the enforcement of regulations to prevent 
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illegal sale and use rather than with the collection of revenue. Anslinger quickly mobilised 
his political base to generate opposition at all levels of the US government. The drug industry 
was quick to throw its weight behind Anslinger. Senators received letters from angry State 
regulators. The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union sent letters to the Secretary of the 
Treasury urging that the FBN ‘remain a separate Bureau’ within the Treasury Department.605 
Eventually the threat was defused, leaving Anslinger once again safe for the foreseeable 
future and free to refocus on national and international efforts. In the meantime issues of 
international control had taken a backseat to the overarching concern for his bureaucratic 
survival. 
 
Part 2: Control in Germany: 
At the 1947 CND, the US delegation called the situation in Germany ‘unsatisfactory’. Soviet 
intransigence had postponed unified control indefinitely. Within the US Zone, a strong policy 
transfer had been effected via US officials working with the German Government and 
police.606 The US trumpeted this in UN forums, but the British Zone soon attracted negative 
attention. The Netherlands, bordering the British Zone, raised serious concerns about 
smuggling. London acted quickly and by 1949 had appointed a Zone Narcotics Officer 
mandated to establish ‘close liaison’ with his US & French counterparts, as well as with 
authorities in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands. Further, specified Dutch officers could 
pass freely into the zone to co-operate with British authorities. The Netherlands professed 
themselves satisfied and the situation was defused. Meanwhile, the British Government 
pushed blame onto the East German authorities. They claimed all Western efforts to establish 
cooperation were ignored, along with all police enquiries into illicit trafficking cases.607  
 
Work on a tri-zonal approach continued and negotiations began on a Western Germany 
Narcotics Bureau.608 In early 1950 the US recommended creating a German Central Narcotics 
Office covering the Federal Republic. Further, they suggested integrating the Allied 
Narcotics Officers into one Allied Narcotics Board to supervise the work of the Central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 For example: ‘Hoover Group Asks Shift of Narcotics Unit’, Drug Trade News, 18 April 1949; 
‘Now What? From Washington’, American Druggist, April 1949; Foley (Under Secretary of 
Treasury) to Dickerson, 9 June 1949, FBNA/ACC 170-74-4/Box49/File0280-3, The Commission on 
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government #1 (1949). 
606 Giuliani to Anslinger, 20 May 1947; Statement by Anslinger to UN CND, July 1947, 
FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947). 
607 German Political Department to Cadogan, 19 May 1950, BNA-FO371/88824. 
608 Draft Brief for UK Rep, 4 Session CND, May 1949, IOC (49)84, BNA-CAB134/397. 
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Narcotics Office.609 A West German response to narcotics control was emerging which would 
take pressure off occupying governments. 
 
Part 3: Limitation of Coca Leaf: 
Coca control was given an initial impetus when the Government of Peru advocated 
independent expert reviews of the impact of coca chewing.610 The UN Commission of Inquiry 
on the Coca Leaf conducted its field research in Peru and Bolivia over the period September 
to December 1949. Its controversial report concluded that the practice of coca chewing was 
harmful and should be suppressed. Militating against immediate prohibition it claimed there 
was a general need to improve socioeconomic conditions in areas where it was prevalent and 
that Governments should work to prohibit the practice within fifteen years.611 The march 
towards the global prohibition of the coca leaf had begun. 
 
In the meantime the Peruvian CND delegate, Dr. Jorge A. Lazarte, with whom many 
delegations including the US and Canada had formed extremely close relations, had fallen out 
of favour with his home government for domestic political reasons. Peru then sided with 
Bolivia to strongly challenge the Coca Commission’s findings. CND sought to defuse 
tensions by encouraging dialogue.612 Sharman and Anslinger were impatient with the 15-year 
timeline and Sharman hoped they would ‘cut the Gordian knot immediately’.613 The UK 
sought ‘a solution which disposes of the matter as soon as possible with the least possible 
conflict, complication and expense’.614 By 1951 Bolivia and Peru hardened their stance and 
sought to bury the report in UN processes.615 The Secretariat, having spent UN resources on 
the Commission, was keen to see some conclusion reached.616 Control advocates maintained 
their original strategy that the Coca Commission should serve as the springboard to 
incorporating coca production limitation into the ‘single convention’. 
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610 Boomstra memo, ‘Coca Production and Trade – Peru’, 10 June 1947, FBNA/ACC170-74-
5/Box121/File1230-1, UN CND 2nd Session (1947). 
611 ECOSOC 12th Session Position Paper, 1949, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th 
Session #1 (1949-50). 
612 Ibid. 
613 Sharman to Anslinger, 21 July 1950, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 5th Session #2 
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614 Draft Brief for UK Rep, 7th Session CND, 29 March 1952, IOC (52)12, BNA-CAB134/944. 
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Part 4: Suppressing Opium Smoking - Colonial Territories: 
The 1948 CND referred, after a UK amendment, to ‘some Far Eastern Territories’ failing to 
meet their obligations around suppressing opium smoking. The UK interpreted this as making 
a clear distinction between their colonies and others, namely Indo-China, Macao and the 
Dutch East Indies. The UK was extremely vigilant against any reports which reflected poorly 
on their colonies. In 1949, Malaya struggled to enforce a prohibition on opium smoking due 
to political unrest. Singapore, with its estimated 14,000 habitual smokers, reported that the 
opium situation was ‘disturbing’ but they avoided enforcing anti-opium laws until the 
security situation had stabilised. In the meantime the UK sought to displace part of the blame 
to producer countries like China, Siam and Iran for their lack of control.617 
 
In August 1950 Mr. Thornton of the Home Office requested that Consular Officers in South 
East Asia send secret reports on the opium smoking situation. The Foreign Office torpedoed 
the idea concluding that if the CND delegate divulged the information he could prove ‘a 
liability’ given ‘the present inflammable state of the Far East’. They argued that the UK 
should trust that setting a good example of convention compliance would encourage stricter 
adherence by other signatories.618 Far from satisfied, Thornton responded that he hoped this 
‘trust…may prove not to be misplaced’.619 
 
As the political situation in Burma worsened it fell entirely off the opium radar as states 
struggled to find a political resolution. With the shift of nationalist Chinese (KMT) troops 
into the mountain regions the seeds of an invigorated illicit opium industry were laid. The UK 
was concerned to protect their relationship with Burma while the US aimed to stabilise the 
security situation in the region. Neither had an interest in kicking the Hornets' nest of regional 
opium policy. Meanwhile, the KMT forces began to utilise the ungoverned spaces and opium 
trade to fund anti-communist insurgency efforts.620 The KMT quickly gained control of the 
opium trade in the Shan States, shipping rapidly increasing supplies via Thailand.621 
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Opium began to take a particular prominence in the Indochina conflict by 1953. As the UK 
Legation to Saigon wrote in 1953: 
 
Opium is the most important product of the regions of Laos through which the 
Vietminh launched their offensive last April and May, and it is in terms of this 
commodity that the offensive is now being explained on every side. …If the Sam Neua 
region remains in their hands they will retain an assured source of income and 
further sallies southwards at harvest time, even if no major offensive is launched, will 
have obvious attractions.622  
 
British intelligence also suggested that ‘the Vietminh are using some of the raw opium 
captured in the Laotian campaign’ to fund their activities.623 
 
Part 5: The Emergence of the Red China Conspiracy: 
The emergence of the PRC regime had enormous implications for the international system. 
Control advocates quickly lost their traditional CND ally to increasing irrelevance. Initial 
political difficulties centred on having a nationalist Chinese delegate represent China at CND, 
something the Soviet and Polish delegates raised every year. Soon, a much larger issue arose. 
 
In 1950 the Chinese communist regime appeared to re-enter the global export market offering 
500 tons of raw opium to a British firm in Hong Kong. Initially little was known about the 
opium but eventually the UK privately concluded it was collected and warehoused under the 
previous regime. The PRC appeared to be trying to offload existing stocks and earn some 
foreign currency in the process.624 
 
CND, at the 1950 Session, urged caution against China rushing back into production given its 
troublesome history with opium. Control advocates feared it would upend a production 
limitation agreement.625 The Board of Trade in the UK concluded that the opium was 
unsuitable given that it was double the price of Indian opium. The UK hoped this economic 
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argument would ‘avoid any suggestion of political bias’ but feared the entire crop would be 
diverted into the illicit market.626  
 
The UK was walking a fine line. It feared a larger spotlight being thrown on Hong Kong, 
thereby fuelling anti-colonial sentiments. On the other hand they were concerned not to 
further weaken relations with the PRC Government.  Although it was their ‘duty’ to inform 
CND, the UK delegates were instructed to ‘discourage any unnecessary publicity’.627 As one 
member of the Foreign Office wrote: ‘[t]he U.S. Press will be only too pleased to take full 
advantage of this’.628  The issue caused the Foreign Office to refocus their sights on drug 
diplomacy after years of deferring to the Home Office. They highlighted wider ‘political 
repercussions’ of unchecked Home Office reports on opium in the Far East and therefore 
requested greater oversight.629 The Home Office agreed to forward anything ‘liable to have 
potentially serious political repercussions’.630  
 
The US and Anslinger in particular (fresh from the domestic reorganisation battle) seized on 
these reports to castigate the communists and highlight a new international conspiracy that 
his agency, through the UN, could help thwart. He drew heavily and uncritically on 
Nationalist propaganda, with one report claiming that: 
 
Opium production and trade have formed an essential part of the Chinese 
Communists economic program. Thus during the early 30’s…poppy cultivation and 
opium smoking were encouraged…On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalist 
Government made strenuous efforts for the suppression of opium traffic and 
smoking.631 
 
Anslinger used the 1952 CND Session to castigate the PRC, prompting a furious response 
from the Soviet Delegate, who described Anslinger’s statement as ‘a planned slander and 
completely unfounded’. The Soviet Delegate then raised US ‘aggression’ in Korea. Anslinger 
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threatening to call a ‘point of order’ and the session descended into bickering.632 Afterwards 
the USSR delegate circulated a PRC statement refuting Anslinger’s claims and arguing the 
PRC had pursued strict prohibition. Infuriated, Anslinger spent the next ten months planning 
a detailed rebuttal for the 1953 CND Session (see below).  
 
By 1953 the spectre of a Chinese opium conspiracy loomed largest in US drug diplomacy 
circles, much as the Japanese spectre had in the 1930s and 40s. Anslinger utilized it once 
again to raise the drug issue as a national security issue. He testified to the US Congress that 
‘efforts to control addiction within Communist China have been feeble and ineffectual’ and 
that they had been carrying on ‘Heroin Warfare’ against the US. He claimed their goals were 
‘monetary gain, financing political activities in various countries, and sabotage’. Further, 
raising the opium danger to US troops in Korea, he told the Senate: ‘the communists have 
planned well and know a well trained soldier becomes a liability and a security risk from the 
moment he takes a shot of heroin’.633 The UK remained deeply sceptical of Anslinger’s 
claims and wanted the issue to die quietly. However, they said little to contest the US claims 
and instead sought to keep their heads as far below the parapet as possible.634  
 
Part 6: The CND and Multilateralism - ‘Steady as She Goes’: 
At the 1949 CND session the US pursued a policy of ‘steady as she goes’ with the aim of 
ensuring a speedy passage of the Single Convention later. It sought to tee up the 1950 session 
for extensive ‘study and action’ and in 1951 ‘the Commission could whip the draft 
convention into its final form’ and begin its passage to ECOSOC and the General Assembly. 
In the meantime Anslinger was allowed some leeway to criticise recalcitrant states. He was 
‘not to criticize publicly…French Indochina’ despite ‘retrograde measures’ and the re-
establishment of the opium monopoly and shops where opium was openly sold to registered 
‘addicts’. He was, however, allowed to draw attention to the situations in Siam, where ‘little 
improvement’ had occurred, and Yunnan as well as to Iran ‘where approximately 1,300,000 
persons are smoking opium daily’.635 
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The UK Delegate, Thornton, enjoyed a relatively subdued 1949 session and focused on 
alliance building. He found relations with the US and Anslinger ‘remained altogether 
friendly’ but ‘as before’ he found Sharman ‘rather a handful’. Thornton expressed concerns 
that ‘Anslinger and Sharman…and others, including the Egyptian, are heads of…narcotics 
police forces and see all questions in a single minded way’. This, he noted, was translating 
into efforts to control all precursors to narcotics: ‘it is almost already a struggle to make them 
keep their clutches off coal tar’.636 
 
The UK was also angry that it continued to be criticised for the supposed lack of severity of 
domestic penalties, by Sharman in particular. Nevertheless Thornton expected that British 
public opinion, ‘little excited by a drugs menace, would not favour extravagant local 
penalties to meet a world problem’.637 This issue pointed to a broader problem which the UK 
had recognised on several fronts: CND was being used by control advocates to criticise states 
pursuing different approaches. On the issue of criminal penalties the UK could handily ignore 
the complaints of Sharman. In the areas of synthetic drugs and heroin, which touched on 
strong economic interests, ignoring the pressure was more difficult.  
 
Synthetic Drugs: 
The US and its allies continued to push for strengthening pre-emptive controls on new 
synthetic drugs. The precedents established around Amidone and Dolatin assisted them, The 
Expert Committee on Habit-forming drugs of the WHO recommended that any future 
convention should elaborate pre-emptive controls for compounds similar to Amidone and 
Dolantin. The US then passed a CND resolution suggesting all members apply pre-emptive 
controls on drugs suggested by the Expert Committee.638 
 
The UK was deeply suspicious of these efforts. They viewed the 1948 Protocol provisions as 
sufficient and maintained ‘strong reserve’ against placing pre-emptive WHO controls in the 
new ‘single convention’. UK legislation only allowed control of drugs likely to produce ill 
effects and British law was ‘strongly suspicious’ of a presumption of guilt. UK ‘realism’ 
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sought to balance the danger of an influx of new synthetic drugs ‘mostly of American 
proprietary’, fuelling addiction against the administrative ‘nightmare’ of scheduling these 
drugs through Orders in Council.639 
 
Highlighting the balancing act the UK faced, Thornton wrote: 
 
If new drugs, devised by our chemical manufacturers, and exported, prove later to be 
powerful drugs of addiction – as heroin proved to be, although called “God’s own 
medicine”, when invented – our reputation would suffer greatly. 640 
 
Mitigating against this: 
 
It is a valuable export trade and if we are to cease exports until ample time has been 
allowed for a drug to display its vicious characteristics the trade would suffer.641 
 
The UK sought to generate an informal response to head-off this issue by working directly 
with the Association of British Chemical Manufacturers. Under this approach, scepticism of 
international interference would remain central.642 
 
Heroin: 
A similar scepticism around international interference arose regarding heroin. Following a 
supplementary recommendation to the 1931 Convention, every government was requested to 
examine the possibility of abolishing or restricting its heroin use. After the War the PCOB 
prioritised this, much to the dismay of the UK and others who argued it was ‘irreplaceable’ 
for certain uses. By 1949, the UK wrote: 
 
The [PCOB] made in its this year’s report to E.C.O.S.O.C. a considerable song and 
dance over the countries which had not abolished its use, and notably over two, 
Finland and Italy, which have greatly increased it.643 
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The UK maintained that the recommendations were ‘based on little reality’, although 
acknowledging that over 90 per cent of the heroin in UK was used for cough mixtures and 
that it could be replaced, therefore their position was ‘not invulnerable’. Their response was 
to work with ‘non-suppressing countries’ including France, Canada and Australia to maintain 
that Heroin was ‘irreplaceable’. They were further ill disposed to accept a visit from a WHO 
expert: ‘the United Kingdom Government has made its enquiry and is not in the habit of 
having its word questioned’.644 Further, as Thornton wrote, ‘I should not anticipate a very 
hearty welcome from medical authorities in this country’. 645 
 
By 1951 the UK had concluded that the PCOB and WHO desired heroin ‘dispensed with 
altogether’. At CND opinions remained divided with the UK, Canada and France on the one 
side and the US on the other leading the charge to eradicate it.646 The heroin issue highlighted 
the tendency towards mission creep within CND and made the UK increasingly sceptical of 
accepting any new commitments under the interim protocol and eventual Single Convention 
negotiations. 
 
Part 7: Interim Production Control: 
An ad hoc committee was created in 1949 to study an interim production control agreement. 
It was composed of representatives of the principal opium producing countries, India, Iran, 
Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia. The USSR refused to take part while work on the Single 
Convention was in progress.647 Key questions for Producing Countries were: how to carve up 
the export market; whether to establish complete government monopolies; and the 
advisability of creating an international purchasing and selling agency.648 If these could be 
agreed, control advocates believed that tackling global overproduction was possible, thereby 
choking off the illicit market. As Anslinger highlighted to CND in 1949: 
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For this year the Iranian Government figures the production will be about 1,500 tons. 
In Turkey the estimate is 439 tons. In one year two countries have approximately 
between four and five times the medical needs of the world. 649 
 
Iran and India expressed early support. Turkey quickly set about establishing itself as the heir 
apparent of the licit global market. They compiled extensive statistics for the previous fifteen 
years and recommended all attendees do likewise, fully aware most would struggle. 
Yugoslavia professed an interest in the equitable distribution of the market based on ‘a long-
term annual average of production’.650  
 
Producer states had an economic incentive to try to lock in current market conditions via a 
global agreement. New synthetics, although vastly oversold by Anslinger, did represent a 
competitive threat.651 Similarly production from poppy straw meant that manufacturers would 
potentially become far less reliant on traditional producers for raw opium. Lastly, the 
deterioration of international security had led to opium stockpiling and a spike in demand. 
This had combined with a number of bad harvests to drive the price up to artificially high 
levels. A restrictive trade agreement would potentially maintain these high prices and protect 
against the new threats.  
 
Meanwhile, recalcitrant states like Iran became increasingly dependent on the US for 
economic aid, which would be jeopardised by continued leakages of their opium into the 
illicit market. With the death of the Far East monopoly system Iran had three options: try to 
lock in a share of the licit market; allow their opium to pile up in warehouses and farmers 
turn to the illicit market; ignore the trade and watch a deterioration of international relations 
as they were castigated as a global narcostate. Their initial effort was towards the first 
approach. 
 
The impetus came from the DND and Leon Steinig who viewed this as his legacy issue. The 
US was unable to formulate a coherent position. Anslinger doubted a successful outcome was 
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possible but could not afford to be seen to interfere with the process given his domestic 
weakness arising from the reorganisation effort. The State Department supported the overall 
process while avoiding damaging relations with any of the producer states by exerting 
pressure or tipping the scales in favour of one over the other. This incoherence between the 
FBN and State Department, lack of official role for the US in negotiations and State 
Department desire to allow the process to play out independently saw the US assume the 
position of interested observer. It offered encouragement when possible and in general 
professed willingness to accept the economic costs a successful agreement would bring if it 
ensured global supply reductions.  
 
The UK immediately took a reticent stance. Doubting an agreement could even be reached, in 
the event that one was, the British expected it to run aground on the rocks of Iranian 
overproduction. Feasibility aside, the UK’s core focus was on economic self-interest. They 
firstly wanted to protect their role as world's leading exporter of opium products. Secondly 
they wanted to protect their interest as a major consumer through sustaining low prices for 
NHS medicines. Seeing a restrictive trade agreement as retrograde to their interests, British 
officials, from the outset, adopted a negative attitude. Mitigating this, they did not want to be 
seen as subverting the international good out of deference to their economic interests. They 
maintained a low profile and assumed that the agreement would be torn apart by the 
traditional fault lines underpinning it.  
 
The Ankara Meeting: 
The Committee met in Ankara from 21 November to 7 December 1949. Turkish officials 
immediately argued that past good performance and the quality of their opium entitled them 
to the bulk of the licit market. Opium was an important cash crop for their balance of 
payments with the US and they intended to yield little except to avoid antagonising Iran if 
possible as they sought better broader relations.652 Iran maintained government budgets would 
be difficult to sustain without opium revenue and was unwilling to cede the bulk of the global 
market to Turkey. They demanded a 40 per cent global market share and to offload all 
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existing stocks - multiples of annual global requirements - preferably to the US for dollars. 
They also warned of peasant push back and the need for economic assistance.653 
 
The Indian delegate defended Indian sovereignty and ‘quasi-medical’ use. An 
accommodation with India was reached to count only medical and scientific exports.654 
Yugoslavia was represented by their CND delegate Mr. Krasevec who went out of his way to 
be cooperative. They sought to maintain their market share at sixty-three tons per year and 
publicly support Turkey as part of broader foreign policy to improve relations. Steinig and 
US observer Mr. Merrill concluded early that the producers did not really want to hammer 
out an agreement, but instead a means to shift blame to consumers by agreeing unsatisfactory 
provisions. Steinig used ‘every club in the bag’ to pressure states and warned of dangers of 
failure. Merrill despite not having an official role, wielded quiet US leverage, writing: ‘I 
think they were always watching me out of the corner of their eyes, thoroughly aware which 
side of their bread their opium is spread on’.655 
 
States quickly agreed on establishing an international purchasing and selling agency and 
negotiations turned on the division of market. In the end the percentage division for the first 
450 tons was: Turkey, 54 per cent; Iran, 26 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; India, 7 per 
cent; others (i.e. the USSR) 4%. An additional excess of 5 per cent would be divided 
equitably and be used for the stocks of the international agency. For amounts in excess of the 
450 tons, Turkey would receive a quota of 59 per cent; Iran would receive 30 per cent; India, 
7 per cent; others 4 per cent and none for Yugoslavia which relinquished its claim as a 
gesture to Turkey.656 
 
With this outcome the conference exceeded all expectations. Merrill attributed this to the 
work of Leon Steinig. He suggested the US quickly throw its weight behind the agreement to 
prevent backsliding. Problems remained however. It was unlikely the Soviet Union would 
join, despite provisions made for them. Further, the global licit market was in turmoil 
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following a series of bad harvests. As Merrill pointed out, ‘The [Yugoslavians] are now 
trying to buy opium (!) and the Turks have only stocks of 152 tons and an estimated 
production for 1949 of 20 or 25 tons! That’s only 172’.657 Nevertheless, member states and 
Leon Steinig in particular, pressed on. 
 
The Purchasing and Selling Agency – The International Monopoly: 
Under the agreement Government Monopolies would sell their opium to the international 
Purchasing and Selling Agency operated by the UN – effectively creating an international 
monopoly. Steinig adamantly maintained the indispensability of this agency, but also its role 
as a ‘precedent’ for other dangerous commodities. It was meant as ‘an experiment in 
economic planning’ and would be incorporated in the ‘single convention’ if successful and 
potentially other fields.658 
 
A Mood of Quiet Scepticism: 
Major obstacles remained and Steinig risked overstepping his Secretariat role and even 
overreaching CND’s role relative to ECOSOC. Anslinger remained privately cool to the 
monopoly idea. The State Department was open to it but suggested that the commercial work 
of the authority be handled by a ‘corporation’, with interested governments buying shares, 
and the appointment of a Board of Directors which could then be tied in to the UN via a 
coordinating authority. Sharman hated the idea, joking at one point that the quota aggregated 
to ‘only 107%’.659  
 
The UK openly questioned the ‘reality’ of the agreement, given the unpredictable impact of 
synthetics but also the unreliability of producers’ statistical returns.660 After the Ankara 
meeting, UK CND delegate, Mr. Hutson, quoted Bismarck’s question: ‘who is being cheated 
here?’ He went on: ‘I approach a subject, on which there has been so much hard lying, with 
caution’. He wanted to make sure there was no ‘hocus-pocus’, pointed out it implied 
economic assistance to Iran but with no authority to do so and reiterated that the Iranian 
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situation could ‘blow the whole thing’. Lastly, he remained unconvinced that the impact of 
manufacturing from poppy straw had been taken into account. Britain was ‘experimenting’ 
with it, and although initially unsuccessful, it could potentially erase a large demand for raw 
opium. He wrote to Steinig they would need ‘to face the difficulties’ head on. Steinig claimed 
Hutson’s criticisms not at all ‘discouraging, but rather a helpful criticism and commentary’ 
but tried to refute each one. Meanwhile, the principal manufacturing and producing countries 
would meet in Geneva in August 1950 to agree next steps.661  
 
The UK Position: 
In 1950 the UK underwent another change in leadership at the Home Office. Mr. Hutson, 
who had replaced Thornton, left the scene and Mr. Samuel Hoare took his place as the lead 
CND delegate. Sharman wrote to Anslinger: 
 
Even if Hoare knows little…he is likely to eventually prove a valuable addition to the 
Commission—a probability which one could never associate with his predecessor. 
 
By mid-1950 Hoare had concluded that the Monopoly could be a good idea in theory, but that 
its machinery did not seem to have been worked out in detail. He maintained he would wait 
until the Geneva meetings in August before passing judgment.662 
 
The hard economic realities for the UK were that it: 
 
imports about a quarter of the world requirements of opium, [and] exports about half 
of this in the form of drugs. This is a valuable export trade, amounting to about 
£5,000,000 per annum, of which some £50,000 to £70,000 is estimated to be dollar-
earning. This trade is conducted not only in competition with other European 
countries which manufacture drugs from opium, but also…with countries such as 
Hungary, and to some extent Poland, which manufacture drugs, not from opium, but 
from poppy straw, and can do at far less cost (estimated at 54% less).663 
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Any increase in the price of opium would place British manufacturers at a further 
disadvantage. Meanwhile, ‘A rise of 1% in the cost of raw opium is estimated to increase the 
cost of the National Health Service [NHS] by $5,000’. The NHS had already witnessed 
‘unexpectedly high’ costs from drugs and the Treasury had instituted spending controls. 
There would have to be very compelling reasons for accepting a rise in costs and a clear 
sense (not believed justifiable given past failures of Iran) that it would achieve the desired 
objective of controlling illicit supply. Further under the system the UK would become more 
dependent on Iranian opium despite its significantly higher cost relative to Indian opium. The 
UK position quickly hardened on this point and although they acknowledged ‘re-opening of 
the Ankara quotas would completely wreck’ the agreement, they would attempt it.664 
 
A further disincentive was that manufacturers would potentially be forced to cover a 10 per 
cent monopoly overhead cost. They believed that France and the US had more ability to 
absorb cost increases and might press the UK to sacrifice its commercial interests through 
appeals to ‘the general interests of humanity’. The UK concluded they: 
 
cannot afford, at a time when it is still engaged in the effort to bring about a balance 
between its exports and the imports…to agree anything which might imperil, over the 
next five years, a substantial element in that trade, as well as increase the already 
heavy cost of the National Health Service.665 
 
The Monopoly Wheels Come off: 
At the Geneva meetings major obstacles became apparent. States agreed that inspections by 
the international Agency would be required, but there was no agreement on their form. More 
importantly, there was no consensus on how to fix prices. Producers wanted averages of 
1947-9, while manufacturers wanted 1937 prices, indexed to staple commodities. The logic 
was that opium prices in 1947-9 were irregularly high. Other questions on which there was no 
agreement were: currency options; how to cover operating costs; how to assess the opium; 
how to manage the export of alkaloids by producing countries and how to manage 
competition from poppy straw.  
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The Geneva meetings wrapped up unsuccessfully, and one member of the US delegation, 
Charles Dyer, promised ‘Never again!’ to attend one. The Committee would meet in 
November 1950 for another attempt at overcoming these obstacles. Despite the deadlock and 
Leon Steinig ‘trying to proceed with this whole scheme in a very stubborn manner’ Anslinger 
warned Sharman not to ‘go too far in raising objections, as we do not wish to give the 
producing countries a way out now that they have agreed on quotas’. Anslinger wanted to 
appear supportive in principle and was conscious of the State Department policy to keep the 
US position ‘reserved’.666  
 
The Joint Committee of Producers and Manufacturers met again in November 1950. Price 
remained the key dividing question. To resolve it a subcommittee consisting of Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, the US and UK was formed, but quickly became deadlocked. The British 
delegate wrote: ‘The rest of the session was devoted to putting the best face possible upon the 
failure to agree about anything’. With the Joint Committee having once again failed CND 
was forced to take up the matter directly  but there appeared little hope for a changed 
outcome.667 
 
The 1951 CND Session and the Alkaloid Monopoly Proposal: 
The US entered the 1951 Session of CND conservatively. They produced a backup plan in 
case the Monopoly negotiations failed, ignored issues around opium smoking in South East 
Asia and generally sought to avoid controversy.668 Privately they were working to augment 
their opium stockpiles to cope with the wartime situation. The UK commented that US 
stockpiling ‘has left the other manufacturing countries unable to obtain’ supplies and ‘sent 
the prices of Iranian opium, the only source left, rocketing’.669 The French, meanwhile, 
proposed a global alkaloid monopoly which would divide up the market along current shares. 
The UK noted that was a ‘transparent’ effort to establish a cartel of manufacturers and 
exclude poppy straw alkaloids, to the detriment of consumers facing higher prices and 
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countries like Hungary, which would have to abandon production or turn to the illicit 
market.670 
 
Despite an ‘exceptionally long’ Sixth Session, CND failed to break the deadlock and the 
monopoly idea was abandoned. To salvage something, States agreed to a French proposal 
that the principles of the 1931 Convention be applied to opium production as an interim 
agreement.671 Steinig, who had been distracted by his role as Acting Secretary General, re-
joined discussions and fought back. Steinig’s effort: 
 
to bring the Commission back to a proposal which it had dropped infuriated those 
delegates who wanted to get on with the French scheme, of whom the most vocal were 
the French representative, M. Vaille, and the representative of the United States.672 
 
The situation escalated to the point where a rupture between the Commission and the 
Secretariat seemed likely ‘unless there is a change either in the representation of certain 
countries (notably, France, Canada and the United States) or in the directorate of the 
Division’. The issue was put to a vote and eight members voted to end discussion of the 
monopoly. Iran and India voted to resume discussions, while three members abstained. 
Meanwhile, consumer states largely opposed it out of price concerns, with Canada remaining 
the most militant exponent of free trade.673  
 
Peru had fretted over the extension of controls to coca production. Mexico opposed any 
notion of international inspection as an incursion on national sovereignty. So too did the 
Soviet and Polish delegates who also opposed this out of deference to a ‘single convention’ 
first policy as well as opposition to the UN undertaking a commercial activity. The UK 
delegate wrote that US lack of support was ‘all important’. The State Department had been 
largely in favour while Anslinger had remained personally opposed and had brought them 
around to his view.674 
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The Draft Protocol and UK Dissent: 
The UK viewed the Draft French proposal as containing ‘many inconsistences and 
unworkable provisions’ and successfully worked to water it down. The UK pointed out it was 
not more than a step towards limiting production to medical-scientific needs, ‘since the 
maintenance of free competition in the opium trade must involve over-production’. They 
argued that: 
 
The system of estimates and statistics of the 1931 Convention cannot be applied to the 
production of opium…drug manufacture can readily be adjusted to meet…changes in 
demand, whereas production of opium is inelastic; it depends on harvest and cannot 
be adjusted after sowing…675 
 
Recognising this distinction, limitation of production was to be achieved by an ‘indirect 
method of limitation of stocks’. A maximum limit of stocks would be set. If a country 
produced a quantity greater than its export demand, the excess would go into stocks until the 
maximum was reached. At this point, the PCOB could impose an embargo on exports to deter 
further overproduction. Even with this compromise, the UK raised objections. Control would 
merely be a ‘statistical control’ with the PCOB having no way of determining actual stocks. 
If a country was accumulating excessive stocks, it could give false statistics, or simply cease 
buying up domestic opium, thereby leaving it for farmers to ‘dispose of’ through illicit 
channels, thus inadvertently fuelling the illicit trade. Further, the UK warned that imposing an 
embargo on a major producer could have ‘disastrous effects’ on importers via price spikes 
and supply shortages.676  
 
A ‘further objectionable feature’ for the UK was that limiting the trade to the four producers 
risked the formation of cartels. The UK pushed for an even more watered down agreement of 
statistical reporting, with no attempt to set maximum stocks or provision for an embargo. 
This received no support ‘no doubt because it would not have had even the appearance of a 
scheme for limiting production’: 
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The Commission preferred a scheme which has that appearance, even though no one 
believes that it will in fact have any important effect upon the present over-production 
of opium.677 
 
The UK delegate abstained from the provisions relating to stocks, the embargo and the four 
producers, but supported the proposal ‘in general’. It passed eight to two, with strong US and 
French support. 678  
 
Determining Global Supply and Demand: 
As 1952 progressed the global market became even more confused but remained a seller’s 
one. The UK believed the Iranian Government were purposely understating their stocks in 
order to keep global prices high. This perception was fuelled by wider UK-Iranian tensions 
following the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Prime Minister 
Mossadegh in May 1951. This had major implications for Britain’s economic position, 
causing severe disruptions to their balance of payments in 1951 and highlighting deeper 
structural weakness in Britain’s international position.679 
 
Iran was increasingly desperate for foreign currency and sought to offload supplies at the 
highest price possible. The US government was in the process of stockpiling and was openly 
willing to purchase all available opium.680 The UK were furious that the Iranians had reneged 
on an agreement to sell opium to a UK firm, Bellairs Atkinson the previous Autumn, 
presumably, they guessed, out of a desire to sell the opium to the US ‘for dollars’.681 
 
As matters progressed Iranian Monopoly’s duplicity caused major headaches for the US in 
particular and led to an array of unfulfilled arrangements entangling the US Government, 
British firms, courts and even Swiss Banks. The UK wrote that Iran had shown its 
‘opportunism and disdain of contractual obligations’, as they sought to exploit high 
international demand for their opium they promised it to numerous buyers: 
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The next move in this ridiculous, but very Persian game was that the Americans tried 
to get delivery of the opium they had purchased.682 
 
The monopoly began to prevaricate. The UK wrote that ‘[a]nyone with experience of this 
country would have expected such tactics from the Monopoly, but the Americans seem 
determined to learn the hard way’. As for the opium situation in Iran one UK official wrote: 
‘It is almost impossible to obtain reliable information’. Moreover Government crops were not 
believed to represent more than half of the total production – the excess seemed destined for 
the illicit market for smoking opium either at home or abroad. 683 
 
For the US and UK, the Iranian saga in 1952 highlighted the continued market volatility. The 
UN system sought to expand its control of the market at a time when states were struggling to 
ensure that supply met demand for the licit market, made only worse by the distortions of 
geopolitics. Bluff as they may regarding the impending take-over of synthetics, 
manufacturing and consumer countries remained dependent on producer countries. This was 
apparent to all involved as states moved towards an interim agreement and would help delay 
of the Single Convention for another decade. 
 
Part 8: The 1953 CND Session: 
The UK delegation found the 1953 CND Session ‘much more peaceful and good-humoured 
than in 1952’. Steinig’s political self-immolation and ignominious removal as head of DND 
following the collapse of the Monopoly negotiations drastically improved Secretariat-CND 
relations. Gilbert Yates, a former member of the UK Civil Service, had replaced him. 
Although the CND committed itself at this session to moving forward with the Single 
Convention, a Joint UK - French memorandum confined the session to ‘questions of principle 
and [to] not get involved in detailed drafting’. 684 
 
The US viewed as ‘a very surprising development’ the addition of a new Canadian Delegate, 
Mr. Kenneth Hossick, ‘who was not too well regarded in narcotic circles’. It seemed that 
Sharman would be replaced at the next Session, to the great dismay of Anslinger and old 
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control advocates. The US warned that Sharman was a vital link given his dual role on the 
CND and DSB and his loss to the Commission would ‘break the continuity’ in relations 
between the two bodies. Nevertheless, domestic bureaucratic politics in Canada indicated 
Sharman’s days were numbered.685 
 
Discussions on illicit traffic were the highlight of the Session, and as the UK described it: ‘as 
usual…largely sterile'. Anslinger’s goals were bilateral. He wanted to defuse tensions with 
Mexico following ‘unkind things said in California…by highly placed officials’ and ‘show 
that our relations with Mexico are still on a high level’. He also maintained pressure on 
Italy’s illicit trade, but his real focus was ‘to take a very healthy swing at Red China’.686 The 
nationalist Chinese delegate produced a report that infuriated the USSR delegate who 
demanded it and reports from Hong Kong and Japan be stricken from the record. The UK 
sought to mediate, particularly as the Chinese report ‘contained many inaccurate statements 
about Hong Kong and Singapore’. They criticised the Chinese delegate for inaccurate 
reporting and assured the CND that the Hong Kong report did not in any way reflect on the 
PRC.687 Mollified the USSR withdrew its complaint and tensions ‘deflated’. Then Anslinger 
stepped in, as the UK Delegate described it, repeating ‘in a desultory and wholly 
unconvincing manner’ the nationalist allegations. Much to Britain’s relief, he took pains to 
praise British Authorities in Hong Kong as ‘making diligent efforts’ to suppress the traffic 
from the Chinese mainland.  Anslinger labelled the PRC statement of the previous year ‘a 
diatribe of abuse’ and claimed: 
 
the United States is a target of Communist China to be regularly supplied with dollar-
earning, health and morale-devastating heroin…According to reliable 
information…financial and economic organs of Red China’s Central Regime met 
behind closed doors in Peiping in early December and decided to expand sales 
activities abroad this year, primarily in Japan, Southeast countries and the United 
States. 688 
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The UK delegate pointed out that the claims were badly undermined by a recent London 
Times article ‘alleging that Chinese Nationalist troops are escorting opium 
caravans…estimated to carry 500 kilograms of illicit opium into Thailand every week’. The 
UK Delegate claimed Anslinger’s speech was ‘answered temperately and effectively’ by the 
USSR delegate and no further action was taken.  Meanwhile, Britain was relieved when fears 
that the Egyptian delegate would utilise CND to accuse their forces of impeding narcotics 
control in the Suez Canal zone proved unfounded.689 All of these issues merely served to 
highlight the encroachment of geopolitics into illicit traffic discussions and undermine 
CND’s image as a technical and apolitical forum.  
 
Part 9: The 1953 Opium Protocol: 
The Anglo–US Split: 
Anslinger received word that certain sections, including members of the PCOB and DSB 
were advocating that the protocol idea be dropped and relevant parts be folded into the Single 
Convention. He worked quickly to shore up support and ensure the protocol conference went 
ahead on time. He found the draft protocol ‘on the whole acceptable’ and ‘a realistic 
approach to an urgent problem’. With the Monopoly idea dead, the Protocol would be based 
on a ‘free order system’ allowing market forces to determine prices and manufacturers to 
choose their opium source. As the UK had pointed out, this would result in continued 
oversupply, but the US argued the protocol would finally determine annual global opium 
requirements, and allow some coordination (albeit imperfect) between supply and demand. 
The PCOB would be key to giving it teeth, by requesting explanations for excessive stocks 
and imposing embargoes.690 
 
Samuel Hoare made clear to Anslinger the UK ‘never had much enthusiasm’ for the protocol 
and in a number of key areas the UK and US remained ‘at variance’. The US favoured 
limiting the number of exporters to four, thereby halting poppy proliferation in the future.691 
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The UK, strongly supported by Canada, feared a ‘trade monopoly’ and demanded an open 
list. The US suggested a compromise of allowing the PCOB to alter the list in response to 
market changes but the UK rejected giving the Board such ‘unprecedented power’. 692 
 
The UK further opposed limiting government stocks as ‘a question of principle’ and argued it 
would have no effect on global overproduction. Instead it would place unnecessary limits on 
the sovereign right of governments to determine necessary stocks (‘e.g. for national 
defence’). Further he reiterated UK concerns that utilising the embargo provision could 
produce supply shortfalls and price spikes. Anslinger became exasperated and pushed the UK 
to offer ‘suggestions’ rather than broad criticisms. Hoare responded that ‘I very much wish 
that we could be more constructive’ but ‘I have no useful suggestions to make’. He argued 
setting maximum stocks was ‘fallacious, and the fact that we have not been able to suggest a 
better method does not render us any the less critical of this one’.693 
 
The UK delegation entered the 1953 Conference hoping to obtain US and French support to 
remove the maximum stocks framework. They recognised this would leave the draft Protocol 
looking ‘even more bare’ and that some replacement provisions would be needed. The UK 
suggested improving controls within producer countries by ‘international inspections’. 
Countries in Latin America objected to these on grounds of sovereignty. The UK did not 
expect producer countries to go beyond inspection with consent but this would be ‘better than 
nothing’.694 The US sought to draw a red line, demanding that denial of a PCOB request 
would begin an automatic embargo process.695 
 
The US Turns to France: 
Morlock in the State Department concluded ‘that the British Government desires to save its 
opium and opium alkaloids trade and will use the protocol to that end’. He and Anslinger 
agreed the US should avoid a preliminary conference with the British and instead turn to 
France and Charles Vaille. Vaille and Anslinger did not believe that the maximum stocks 
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proposal would solve global overproduction, but their goal was to institute systems of 
national monitoring and control in producer countries and then springboard from this towards 
reducing production. The key was to ‘give power to’ the PCOB ‘and allow it also to certify 
(verify) the adequacy of national control’. Vaille agreed that ‘the British government will not 
be of much help to us with this protocol’ and would simply throw up new complaints ‘ad 
infinitum’. They decided to forcibly override UK concerns and push through an agreement.696 
 
The Divisive Protocol: 
The Opium Protocol Conference met in May 1953 in New York. Following Vaille’s lead, the 
US and its allies drove through a divisive agreement over all opposition from key 
manufacturing and producing states.697 Despite softening many of the provisions they 
disliked, the UK maintained that the agreement provided no ‘means by which any substantial 
limitation of production can be effected’. It also retained a closed list of producers. Instead of 
four, seven specific countries – Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, the Soviet Union, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia – would have the right to export opium. A generous maximum stocks provision 
set at two years’ worth of supplies was included. The UK maintained it was an unnecessary 
infringement on national sovereignty and that the PCOB would be unable to uncover 
excesses. 698 
 
Producers were mandated to submit estimates of areas to be cultivated and the amount of 
opium harvested, as well as all other relevant statistics around opium produced, traded and 
seized. The DSB provided oversight of these estimates and could amend them with the 
consent of governments concerned, and in the case of non-provision, generating estimates. 
The Board had a right to request an inspection, but only with the consent and collaboration of 
the government concerned. It could also impose either recommended embargoes or 
mandatory embargoes on the import and export of opium for countries to implement. These 
embargoes could be imposed on states not parties to the protocol. In the case of embargos, 
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states could appeal to an Appeals Committee appointed by the President of the International 
Court of Justice. 699  
 
The Protocol included provisions for international inspection. The UK regarded these as the 
aspect with the most impact but producers and other states had already rejected them in the 
form outlined by the Protocol, and they featured in the final draft only thanks to Vaille’s 
political railroading. The UK argued that altering them to ‘any form in which they would 
meet the objections which have been raised by these countries’ would mean losing ‘their 
effectiveness’. The Protocol was acknowledged as an ‘interim agreement’, administered by 
the PCOB until the Single Convention’ could be agreed. Anslinger was quick to highlight 
that the Protocol finally mandated states to limit all opium use to ‘exclusively medical and 
scientific purposes’, which he portrayed as a seismic shift in international control and, as the 
President of the Conference called it, ‘the culmination of 44 years of international effort’.  
Temporary reservations for ‘quasi-medical’ use for up to fifteen years were made by India 
and Pakistan. Producers committed to establishing government monopolies and strictly 
controlling areas of production. The Protocol also extended controls to the ‘inflammatory’ 
issue of poppy straw, mandating that states control production and supply statistics for the 
first time.700 
 
Initially it received nineteen signatories but required twenty-five ratifications, including three 
producers and three manufacturers. The Soviet Bloc boycotted the conference and refused to 
sign out of deference to the Single Convention. This was spun in the US press as being 
motivated by deference to the PRC. Whether it would be ratified by a sufficient number of 
states remained an open question. The key would be securing ratification by producing states 
and Anslinger quickly turned to the State Department to pressure Turkey and Iran to sign as 
we shall see in the next chapter.701 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
699 US Study of Provision of 1953 Protocol requiring amendment to domestic legislation, undated, 
FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box125/File0355, Loose Files 1953 Opium Conference (1953). 
700 UN Opium Conference, Protocol and Final Act, 23 June 1953; Statement by Conference President, 
18 June 1953; Anslinger Statement to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 17 July 1954; US 
Study of Provision of 1953 Protocol requiring amendment to domestic legislation, undated, 
FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box125/File0355, Loose Files 1953 Opium Conference (1953). 
701 See press clippings; Anslinger to Morlock, 29 October 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-
5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session #1 (1953-4). 
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Conclusion: 
The rocky road to the 1953 Opium Protocol highlighted the underlying economic and 
political forces preventing accord. The US and France had expended enormous political 
capital pushing the agreement through and had alienated many states, many of whom seemed 
set to reject it. The UK had successfully sat on the side-lines and watched early iterations 
collapse under their own weight, before becoming a gradually more active opponent of the 
Protocol. The US and France would now be forced into the background in the coming decade 
while the UK took a new invigorated lead as the chief moderate state, pushing through a 
consensus agreement for the Single Convention as a replacement and successor to the 
divisive 1953 Opium Protocol. 
 
The Steinig affair had a long lasting impact on the UN and ushered a ‘coming of age’ in 
CND-Secretariat relations. The naturalised US citizen of Jewish Austrian origins who, with 
the help of Anslinger and the ‘inner circle’, had escaped Nazi occupied Europe and 
contributed to the survival of the PCOB and DSB in Washington, had drastically overreached 
in his position as DND Director and destroyed his career. Member states would remain 
vigilant against future technocratic overreach and to ensure that CND remained the driver of 
policy, not its secretariat. 
 
The UK and US had worked well to quietly kill the monopoly idea. However, the 
unsupportive attitude of the UK towards the Protocol convinced the State Department to turn 
away from the UK and towards France in order to salvage some international agreement. This 
coincided with the return of Anslinger to the helm of international control after his focus on 
domestic survival. The moderate approach taken by the State Department towards the 
monopoly soon gave way to a re-assertive approach by Anslinger. In a repeat of the 1930s, 
the US took an increasingly aggressive role at CND and was willing to alienate other states to 
ensure the 1953 Protocol prevailed. This, however, was contingent on maintaining their core 
ally in France, something which, as we shall see, was unsustainable.  
 
The UK, always distrustful of Vaille’s goals and diplomatic methods, were happy to place 
themselves in opposition to his work. Nevertheless, had the UK taken a less obscure position 
regarding the Protocol, resulting in the US concluding they were thwarting any agreement out 
of deference to pure economic interest, the two may have formed a governing coalition 
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within CND which could have replaced the old Anslinger-Sharman alliance. With Sharman 
out of the picture and the UK carving out a pragmatic self-interested role, the US turned to 
Vaille and continued to press ahead with its own prerogatives, ignoring consensus opinion. 
The opportunity for continued Anglo-US cooperation on this issue was apparent during this 
time. The eventual failure to realise it would mark a split in relations between the two that 
would continue over the coming decade culminating in the US rejecting its own brainchild, 
the Single Convention, and going to diplomatic war with the UK. 
 
Ultimately the 1953 Protocol would rise and fall on Anglo-American support. The US as the 
single largest market for opium had killed the opium monopoly by withdrawing its support. 
Similarly the 1953 Protocol made it through the conference on the back of the US and guided 
by French diplomatic manoeuvring. Whether the Protocol would achieve international assent 
remained an open question. Producers hated the document, moderate states disliked the 
process that resulted in its creation and the world’s largest exporter of opium products, the 
UK, remained fundamentally unsupportive. Whether states would unify behind the Protocol 
or let it die in lieu of the Single Convention would largely be determined by the actions of 
Britain and America above all else. It is towards the Single Convention we now turn. 
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Chapter 7: From the 1953 Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention, 1953-64: 
 
Introduction: 
1953-64 represented a period when the international drug system became more polarised.702 It 
was also a time when Britain’s loss of great power status became increasingly clear.703 Efforts 
around the 1961 Single Convention ran alongside continuing issues in Anglo-American 
relations including: Sino-US relations in the aftermath of the Korean War; the changing 
relationship between the British Empire and South-East Asian opium producers; and Anglo-
US concerns over the Middle East, particularly Britain’s relationship with opium producers in 
the Baghdad pact before and after the Suez crisis. These issues did not play out in isolation 
from drug diplomacy, instead saw much overlap. Furthermore the role of agency and intra-
bureaucratic interaction continued to be a significant determinant of outcomes.  
 
It was also a time when one can discern clear signs of close US-UK co-operation in fields of 
nuclear deterrence and intelligence.704 Such co-operation, however, was not to be replicated 
in drug diplomacy. Minor cooperation in the aftermath of the 1953 Opium Conference gave 
way to divisions leading to an eventual rupture over the Single Convention. This breakdown 
was ultimately the result of failures of US leadership but also deep divisions of policy and 
economic interests around the international control system.  
 
There is no overarching economic systemic case for why a 'pax-manufacturica' or a ‘pax-
anti-producerica' did not arise. London certainly would have welcomed it as would many in 
the US foreign policy establishment. The explanation, nevertheless lies with US-UK policy 
differences – the US pursuing a highly restrictive commodity control agreement underpinned 
by expansive prohibitionist provisions; the UK pursuing a consensual and mildly restrictive 
agreement. Further, the breakdown of the US domestic drug consensus and fracturing into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 William McAllister’s classification of states into: manufacturers, producers, control advocates and 
neutrals will be utilised in this study. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, p. xv – 3. 
703 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, 
(Edinburgh: Pearson, 2002). 
704 These two areas formed what John Dumbrell termed ‘the essence and beating heart of the Cold 
War ‘special relationship’’, quoted in John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American 
Relations from the Cold War to Iraq, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) p. 160. 
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different power centres further weakened Anslinger’s leadership, while he struggled against a 
backdrop of collapsing personal circumstances and caring for his dying wife. 
 
The US found itself increasingly alone in negotiations. State Department leadership saw a 
more conciliatory approach towards producers like Iran and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, with 
Anslinger absent and a lack of institutional knowledge on the issue the State Department 
struggled to understand US grand strategy in this field; elaborate their own strategy or 
enforce anything resembling a coherent set of policies. Anslinger did not help them. He 
refused to relinquish control and worked to ensure divided US delegations. Often Anslinger 
quietly worked to circumvent the State Department through allies, particularly France’s 
Charles Vaille. Nevertheless, Anslinger’s own hand was weakened by the new DND Director 
Gilbert Yates who drove his own vision for the UN system away from the traditionalist 
power centre around Anslinger, the soon to be absent Sharman, and the highly divisive 
Charles Vaille. The UK, continuing to carve out a role of quiet, consensual and self-interested 
diplomacy, found the new environment more conducive to their style of diplomacy and 
became increasingly assertive over the period.  
 
All of this was cemented by the personal decline of Anslinger. His domestic position within 
the US government never recovered fully from the 1951 reorganisation attempt. The Customs 
bureau worked assiduously to highlight the flaws in his communist China bashing and repair 
relations with Britain and other counterparts. The US domestic addiction terrain shifted 
beneath his feet also. His traditional constituencies withered, while new, critical, public 
health constituencies emerged and relished any opportunity to challenge the FBN, its chief 
and their repressive approach to addiction. A new Executive Committee would force new 
levels of oversight of his agency and the UN process became so fractured and complex that 
he could no longer simply run events via back channel levers. Absent Anslinger, and 
eventually Vaille, control advocates had no one capable to act as a counterweight to the loud, 
relentless and disruptive Turkish delegate Dr. Majhar Ozkol.705 In this environment, 
moderates and consensus-based policy reigned supreme. The real alternate to US leadership 
remained the UK. London worked with shifting coalitions as required, but building a 
moderate bloc of manufacturing states in Europe to help protect domestic interests.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 Quote: Giordano to Anslinger, 13 May 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14th 
Session (1959). 
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Part 1: Beyond the 1953 Protocol: 
The tumultuous 1953 Conference left drug diplomacy in mild disarray. The US, fearing 
backsliding, continued to push for signatures of the 1953 Protocol. Their Embassies in 
Tehran and Ankara were asked to pressure the Iranian and Turkish governments there to sign 
it.706 The UK were unhappy with the Opium Protocol and saw it as a product of Vaille’s 
bullying and noted in the 1954 that ‘some delegations had neither forgotten nor forgiven his 
performance at the Opium conference.’707 Others viewed the process as dead in the water. 
Sharman privately remarked that if the Single Convention was not discussed at all during the 
1954 CND session his ‘heart would not be broken’. Sharman also thought memories of 
Vaille’s involvement in railroading through the 1953 Protocol could undermine their efforts, 
and hoping ‘that Vaille demotes himself from Sergeant Major to Corporal…in his arbitrary 
manner of running things as happened at the Opium Conference.’ 708 
 
Further, the goals for the Single Convention remained unclear. Members of the PCOB and 
DSB had mixed feelings. They admitted complexity was a downside to the system, but 
doubted the timing given uncertainties over the impact of synthetic drugs.709 It was agreed the 
PCOB and DSB should be merged into one body - the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) – but there was no consensus on functions. Most expected that its role and powers 
would not be greatly enlarged.710 Herbert May also pushed back against expansive controls. 
He warned the  ‘mandatory embargo as applied to opium in the 1953 Protocol would be 
likely to reduce rather than strengthen the Board's real power, by investing it with an 
authority which it is unlikely to be able to use effectively’. Regarding production control he 
advocated for flexibility, rather than formulae, in determining 'where it considers stocks 
excessive’ and that in ‘twenty-six years of the existence of the Board, this power has never 
been abused’.711 The INCB secretariat remained a controversial issue. The UN DND pushed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 US Del Position Paper, 9th Session CND, undated; Secretary of State to American Embassy, 
Tehran, 12 November 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session #1 (1953). 
707 IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958. 
708 Sharman to Anslinger, 19 February 1954, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th 
Session #1 (1955). 
709 Memo by the Secretariat, ‘Unified Convention on Narcotic Drugs’, 2 March 1949, 
FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box121/File1230-1, UN 4th Session #2 (1949). 
710 Report by UK Rep, 7th Session CND, 28 June 1952, IOC (52)88, BNA-CAB134/945. 
711 ‘The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs; Comments and Possibilities’, Herbert May, UN 
Bulletin on Narcotics, January-April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th 
Session #1 (1955). 
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for control, but some member states, with the monopoly debacle still fresh, demanded 
absolute independence.712  
 
The US had clear goals for the Single Convention: incorporate the 1953 Protocol provisions 
around opium; extend strong production controls to coca and cannabis; expand the mandate 
of the proposed INCB and to advocate for a strict ‘closed institutional’ model for treating 
drug addiction. 713 The UK wanted none of those things and doubted the feasibility of the 
entire Single Convention project. However, faced with the 1953 Protocol as their alternative 
the UK threw its weight behind driving the Single Convention forward in a manner 
commensurate with their interests and goals.  
 
The US maintained their push for a quick drive towards coca control and the prohibition of 
coca chewing. On this latter point they met a continued absence of interest  from the Peruvian 
delegate who failed to show up for the entire 1953 Session.714 Neither Peru nor Bolivia 
submitted any statistics to PCOB regarding coca production in 1952.715 Late in 1953, 
however, the Government of Peru signalled it could ‘revise’ its position on the Coca 
Commission report.716 By 1955 both Bolivia and Peru accepted the Coca Commission’s 
findings that coca chewing was injurious to health and were willing to gradually suppress 
production and consumption. As states approached the 1955 CND session, the US over-
optimistically noted that ‘astonishing progress’ had been made over the previous few session 
with ‘no deadlock’ on key issues.717 This statement highlighted the increasing tin ear within 
US policy circles around actual events in CND. 
 
Part 2: Shifting Power & The New Producers Bloc: 
In 1954 the Turkish CND Delegation underwent a change in leadership with the death of the 
moderate Dr. Cemalettin Or.718 Soon producing states emerged in a more forceful and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712 Report by UK Rep, 5th Session of CND, 6 February 1951, IOC (51)13, BNA-CAB134/410. 
713 US Del Position Paper, 9th Session CND, undated, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 
9th Session #1 (1953). 
714 Report by UK Rep, 8th Session CND, 29 May 1953, IOC (53)67, BNA-CAB134/950. 
715 Draft Brief for UK Del, ECOSOC 16th Session, 16 June 1953, IOC (53)90, BNA-CAB134/950. 
716 Yates to Fonda, 24 September 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session #1 
(1953). 
717 US Del Position Paper, 10th Session CND, 15 April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-
1, UN 10th Session #2 (1955). 
718 Memo for US Delegate, undated, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 9th Session 
Agenda (1954). 
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coherent bloc led by the outspoken Turkish Delegate Dr. Ozkol who the UK described as a 
‘singularly tenacious nuisance’. He hounded manufacturing states about the dangers of 
synthetic narcotics, and pushed for strict controls. Manufacturer bloc disunity increasingly 
worried the UK delegation which argued in 1954 that it was ‘uncomfortably easy’ for 
producer states to gain a majority through a reliable nucleus of India, Iran, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, and on occasion Egypt and France (The manufacture of all synthetic drugs was 
prohibited in France with the exception of pethadine).719  
 
UK overtures to the US centred on precursor chemicals. Previous US CND policy was for 
strong pre-emptive controls of precursors. But the US increasingly sought to block controls 
due to global licit opium shortages, increased military demand and pressure from domestic 
manufacturers not to stifle innovation.720 London similarly feared pre-emptive controls would 
stifle innovation, new markets, and even the prospect of a more controllable form of pain 
medicine replacing opium.  The Home Office sought Anslinger’s support: 
 
we think that the time has come to take a firm stand against the opium producers’ 
campaign against synthetic drugs and to make it clear that we will not tolerate 
attempts to draw distinctions which have no medical or scientific foundation.721 
 
The Home Office also pointed out that Turkey and Yugoslavia would not have been able to 
cause such ‘mischief’ without the support of Vaille. They suggested Anslinger approach 
Vaille and highlight the dangers to success of the Single Convention if manufacturing 
countries became alienated by anti-synthetic provisions, noting Vaille was ‘far more likely to 
listen to you than to us’.722 
 
Anslinger professed to being ‘unalterably opposed’ to ‘discrimination’ in favour of natural 
opium. He also rolled back on US calls for precursor chemical control, questioning the 
practicability of available proposals, ‘including our own’. The UK concurred, arguing they 
‘would be wholly impractical and we could not accept it’. Anslinger sought to maintain UK 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 IOC (54)84, 19 June 1954, BNA-CAB134/958. 
720 US Del Position Paper, 10th Session CND, 15 April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-
1, UN 10th Session #2 (1955). 
721 Walker to Anslinger, 2 March 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #2 
(1955). 
722 Ibid. 
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support and keep his ally Vaille out of discussions. He promised the UK ‘we are substantially 
in accord with your position on synthetics’ and privately remarked that the US should ‘go 
along with [the UK] as far as possible’.723  
 
Eventually the issue lost steam. The Commission became desensitised to the Turkish 
sensationalism, particularly as evidence suggested synthetics made up only a fraction of the 
illicit trade. As the UK delegate put it, ‘the heat which this subject used to generate gradually 
seems to be dying down.’724 
 
The Decline of Anslinger’s Alliances: 
Soon after the 1953 Conference Anslinger’s decades-long alliance with Sharman ended. 
Sharman retired following a steady decline in his domestic position and was replaced by 
Kenneth Hossick, a less substantive delegate who appeared more interested in his personal 
prestige leading Anslinger to refer to him to as ‘That silly Hossick’.725 Few in the UK would 
miss Sharman. One UK delegate described him as having ‘the biased rigidity of a closed 
mind obsessed with the purely police aspect of the problem’.726 His ousting was a significant 
blow to Anslinger, who wrote in 1954 that US efforts were ‘injured...deeply by your decision 
to retire’.727 With the full decline of Sharman, Canadian policies moderated sharply and 
Ottawa quickly moved towards the UK’s moderate bloc.728 Anslinger would continue to work 
with Vaille to push a strict control framework and maintain their ‘good custom of being in 
agreement on everything’.729 The UK saw Vaille as ‘brilliant, dynamic and utterly 
unscrupulous’ due to his diplomatic ability and deviousness in driving unpopular provisions 
through CND. 730 Worsening domestic positions undermined both Anslinger and Vaille’s 
freedom of action at the UN and bilateral levels and would eventually knock Vaille out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
723 Walker to Anslinger, 2 March 1955, Anslinger to Walker, 21 March 1955; Note Attached to 
Anslinger to Walker, 21 March 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #2 
(1955). 
724 IOC (59)47, 2 June 1959, BNA-CAB134/2073. 
725 Anslinger to Tennyson, 13 May 1958, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 13th Session 
#2 (1958-9); McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History, 178. 
726 IOC (54)84, 19 June, BNA-CAB134/958. 
727Anslinger to Sharman, Dec 14th, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Transfer of 
Narcotic Commission to Geneva, 1954. 
728 McAllister, “A Limited Enterprise: The History of International Efforts to Control Drugs in the 
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729 Vaille to Anslinger, 5 April 1955, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box122/File1230-1, UN 10th Session #2 
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altogether. Nevertheless a more nuanced picture of co-operation emerges when we look to the 
interactions between the UK and the US in other areas of geopolitics that overlapped with 
drug diplomacy. It is towards some of these areas which we shall now turn. 
 
Part 3: Control in Asia: 
China Continues: 
After a positive domestic response to his speech at CND in 1953 Anslinger decided to use the 
issue again at the 1954 CND. He outlined details of  ‘a 20-year plan to finance political 
activities and spread addiction among free peoples.’ The speech was repeated on the floor of 
the House of Representatives by James E. Van Zandt of Pennsylvania. FBI Director John 
Edgar Hoover privately dismissed Anslinger’s claims saying ‘no evidence has been found to 
confirm them’.” Anslinger nevertheless sought Japanese support. FBN agent Wayland Speer 
criticised Japan’s 1953 report for failing to sufficiently highlight communist China as the 
source of heroin which ‘has literally flooded Japan’. The US offered to support Japan’s 
Narcotics Section sending an observer to the CND session in 1954, but only ‘if he will blast 
communist China’. Speer had other reasons for the invitation. He wanted to protect the FBN 
linkage to the Ministry of welfare and ‘prevent other Ministries from gaining a tight hold on 
narcotics control and narcotic reporting in Japan—as they had before World War II’. 
Simultaneously, policy transfer from the US continued as the Japanese Narcotic Section 
sought to emulate US domestic enforcement techniques and judicial practices around drug 
law enforcement.731 
 
Many of the seizures that Anslinger attributed to the PRC transhipped through Hong Kong. 
The UK was anxious to deflect attention from this. Prior to the 1954 Session the UK’s 
Washington embassy asked if Anslinger would refer to US-Hong Kong cooperation in 
suppressing the illicit traffic. Anslinger obliged and in his 1954 statement praised Hong Kong 
authorities for having ‘acted vigorously’ resulting in ‘a noticeable trend towards bypassing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
731 Statement by US Rep, 9th Session CND, 19 April to 14 May 1954; Extension of Remarks by Rep. 
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Speer to Nagahama, 6 April 1954; Nagahama to Speer, 12 June 1953, FBNA/ACC170-74-
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this area whenever possible with shipments to other free countries’.732 The UK was grateful 
particularly as a recent Interpol report had been critical of Hong Kong. Furthermore, there 
had been chatter on the Commission about the ‘large number of British ships involved’ in 
recent seizures.733 The delegate speculated that the ‘friendly support’ from Anslinger who 
was ‘more cooperative than previously’ was ‘no doubt because of our [own] co-operation.’734 
 
UK concerns over this time centred on Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya primarily, while 
Burma remained in their field of vision. Relations with the nationalist Chinese delegation 
were strained as they continued to draw unwanted attention to Hong Kong. The nationalists’ 
1954 report was described as ‘mischief-making’ by the UK briefing which instructed 
delegates that it be ‘sharply refuted’735 The UK steered clear of the conspiracy debate where 
possible, stating: ‘we have no information on the question of complicity of the People’s 
Republic in traffic which is known to be large, though we know that Nationalist forces were 
engaged in it some time ago.’736 
 
The PRC maintained Anslinger’s claims were ‘slanderous’ and ‘a fabrication from start to 
finish’. The State Department became increasingly uneasy. Initially many ‘assumed that he 
has the necessary evidence’ but soon internal opposition strengthened. Many questioned 
whether it would serve ‘any constructive purpose’ or merely cause ‘offense to certain friendly 
governments’, particularly when there was ‘no corrobatory information available’. They left it 
to Anslinger’s discretion and at the 1955 session he reiterated claims that communist Chinese 
was the ‘uncontrolled reservoir supplying the world-wide illicit narcotics traffic’. 737 
 
At the 1956 CND session the State Department rolled back support for the Republic of China. 
They recognised Formosa’s report was ‘propagandistic in tone and contains assertions which 
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[are] obviously untrue’. Even Anslinger was critical. The US delegate was authorised to 
publicly query its factual basis, while maintaining the assertion that the centre of the global 
illicit traffic remained communist China and ensuring not ‘discredit’ past US statements. The 
UK believed the principle source of smuggling to be the Chinese nationalists, particularly the 
remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek’s army around Siam. The US noted that the UK, Canada and 
others were clearly ‘relieved’ that the US only gave ‘perfunctory support ‘ to the nationalist 
Chinese in the 1956 session. Further he recognised a growing sympathy for inviting a Peking 
government official as an Observer to the CND.738 The rollback of US support for the 
nationalist delegation at CND saw a reciprocal cooling of nationalist support for US interests 
and thereby weakened another pillar of Anslinger’s support at CND. Another key component 
of Anslinger’s control advocate alliance was spinning away from his orbit and the Soviet 
Union was quickly becoming the swing vote on the Commission. 
 
UK Interests: 
The UK had significant intelligence on the illicit traffic in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand and 
Laos but was unwilling to share it with the UN Illicit Traffic Committee for fear of 
compromising their sources.739 This traffic passed through Thailand and on to Hong Kong, 
Malaya and Singapore, causing considerable embarrassment for authorities. Worse, the UK’s 
own intelligence confirmed Thai assertions that the significant portion originated in the 
Burmese Shan States.740 These, the UK admitted privately, might ‘be the largest source of 
illicit opium in the world.’741  
 
Despite the evidence the UK maintained strong sympathy for the Burmese authorities.742 
Burma, offered no co-operation to CND, refusing even to send an observer until 1960 when 
one ‘put in an appearance’ in what the UK regarded as an ‘encouraging sign’.743 Nevertheless, 
the UK representatives protected them from criticism. For example, even as cannabis seizures 
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on British vessels (originating in Rangoon) began to throw unwanted light on British 
shipping interests, the UK remained concerned with deflecting some of Thailand’s 
accusations against Burma.744 Luckily for the UK, the US was caught up in a broader 
narrative of a PRC conspiracy. This left Britain quite free to plead ignorance as to the origin 
but to displace blame onto Thailand as a transhipment point, while the US pointed to 
communist China as the origin.745 The UK repeatedly castigated Thailand as endemically 
corrupt and incapable of living up to its obligations.746 
 
Due to reports of large illicit smuggling activities in Thailand they were requested to send an 
observer to the 1956 session. The UK sought US support for its criticisms of Thailand but the 
US refused. The US delegate was authorised to ask questions but was warned: 
 
However serious the opium situation in Thailand appears to be…the U.S. 
Representative should bear in mind that Thailand is friendly to the United States. It is 
desirable to avoid unduly strong charges of laxness on the part of the Thai 
Government…which might affect that friendly relationship.747 
 
Nevertheless, the UK and US had something of a functional relationship over East and South-
East Asia in the early half of the 1950s. The US would help overlook the difficulties Britain 
faced in some of its territories and ex-colonies while the British acquiesced to a degree in the 
US propaganda campaign.  
 
Part 4: Anglo-American drug diplomacy and the Middle East: 
Iran & Technical Assistance: 
In 1955 Iran adopted legislation completely banning opium cultivation and member states 
viewed questions of economic and technical assistance questions as ‘certain to arise’ in the 
1956 CND. The US tried to be supportive noting that the FBN and spent roughly $130,000 a 
year on overseas illicit traffic operations giving the US a ‘direct financial interest’ in efforts 
to ban production.748 The issue raised broader complications for US policy but also embarked 
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the UN on a new trajectory of technical assistance in the field. Many delegations were 
sceptical, but the US argued Iran was serious this time and that the Shah supported the 
efforts. Further, they warned that an absence of support would ‘play into the hands’ of 
economic beneficiaries of the opium trade in Iran.749 The US had frequently pushed back 
against the idea that countries should be paid to follow their commitments, but on other 
occasions proved willing to dangle technical assistance as a potential reward for policy 
changes. Now, the State Department saw it as a means to increase influence and encourage 
control in Iran, but also potentially Thailand and other areas. Balancing against this they 
wished to avoid creating new technical assistance programs within the UN and pushed 
instead for earmarked drug funding within existing programs.  
 
To postpone and deflate the issue in 1956 the US ensured CND pushed it up to ECOSOC. 
ECOSOC then advocated that assistance be extended from existing UN technical assistance 
programs. The US hoped this would place them on record in support and avoid alienating 
governments concerned with additional expense and the proliferation of UN activities, such 
as the UK. The US delegate noted after the 1956 CND session that: ‘These efforts to bring 
United Nations technical assistance concepts to bear in the field of narcotics control 
constituted perhaps the most useful work’ of the session.750 
 
Enter Afghanistan: 
As we have seen, the UK strongly resisted attempts to limit the number of recognised opium 
producers at the 1953 Opium Conference. They feared medical supplies could become 
subject to monopoly power by a small number of producer states.751 The US, and particularly 
Anslinger, was strongly in favour of a small closed list. The ‘compromise’ expanded the list 
from four to seven but maintained a cap: it included Yugoslavia, Iran, Turkey, India, 
Bulgaria, Greece and the USSR.  
 
The Iranian prohibition decree coincided with an Afghan policy shift. By 1954 Afghanistan 
was looking to expand its role in the global licit opium market. The US Embassy in Kabul 
reported the government encouraging cultivation and successfully marketed crops to 
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Germany and Italy, along with ‘reports of substantial shipments to Russia’.752 In 1955 
Afghanistan asked to join the 1953 Protocol as an official producer - despite having ignored 
the 1953 Opium Conference and not being a party to the 1925 Opium Convention. Anslinger 
informed the Afghan delegate that it was too late but that they should join the Protocol, look 
towards eventual addition to the list and seek technical assistance in the meantime.753 
 
The UK foresaw major political complications and hoped to thwart a vote on procedural 
grounds – there was no way to amend the list before 1953 protocol before it came into force. 
Should they fail Mr. Green (the UK CND delegate and Home Office bureaucrat) felt the UK 
should abstain in order to maintain consistency of policy and a sense of equity. The UK had, 
after all, railed against the closed list and Afghanistan had ‘at least as good a claim to be 
included in the list...as Greece.’754 The Foreign Office took a sharply broader perspective and 
sought ‘the cavalry’ (ministerial assistance) in reining in the intransigent Mr. Green.755 
 
Iran was increasingly acknowledged to be making a serious and expensive effort to eradicate 
the opium trade.756 Afghan opium ‘flooding’ in would undermine these efforts.757 For the UK 
Foreign Office, the consequences of anything less than full throated support for Iran became 
clear in the aftermath of the 1956 CND session when the US and UK were viewed to have 
voted in favour of Afghanistan. The US delegation had brokered a compromise resolution, 
with UK support and French abstention, recognising the justice of the Afghan claim and 
looking towards including Afghanistan in the list of recognised producers in the Single 
Convention.758 Iranian fury soon came to the attention of the UK’s Secretary of State who 
instructed the UK’s ECOSOC delegation to try to rehabilitate UK Iranian relation.759 
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The Foreign Office now worried that a UK abstention would be interpreted as ‘support for 
Afghanistan and her friends...the Soviet Union’.760 Above all the Foreign Office feared that it 
would cause embarrassment to the Secretary of State at the upcoming Baghdad Pact Council 
and ‘might even have a generally adverse effect on the proceedings’.761 The Baghdad Pact 
represented the foundation of the UK’s Middle East strategy at the time and anything which 
threatened it was to be avoided.762 Furthermore, they thought it ‘most important, particularly 
at the present time [emphasis added], to stand loyally by one of our associates in the Bagdad 
Pact’.763 This, however, did not sway the Home Office which refused to change the 
instructions to Mr. Green.764 They were concerned that a loss of UK credibility would weaken 
their ability to withstand efforts by France and others to impose stricter controls on synthetic 
narcotics.765 
 
The episode highlighted the importance of UK-Iranian relations. Further, with the context of 
Suez in the background, some of their statements suggest a sense of UK vulnerability in the 
region. It also serves to highlight some of continued tensions between maintaining 
consistency on narcotics control and broader foreign policies for the UK. As with the opium 
monopolies issue, the Home Office determined policy on an issue with international 
ramifications, and as this issue highlighted, cause occasional blow-ups between the two 
departments. 
 
Towards an Anglo-US Response: 
Anslinger was implacably opposed to Afghanistan’s claim, arguing that there was no need for 
another producer given global overproduction. Further he pointed to Afghanistan’s non-
compliance with past agreements and the potential impact on the Iranian illicit market. The 
State Department sought a middle ground: Afghanistan was free to produce opium under the 
current system and could continue ‘so long as the 1953 Protocol is not operative’. They 
offered five reasons for US support: to prevent the adverse effects of prohibition on 
Afghanistan’s economy; the amount produced in Afghanistan was limited and viewed as high 
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quality; the absence of evidence that it was leaking into the illicit traffic; Afghanistan’s right 
to equal treatment; and crop substitution in Afghanistan was ‘not immediately practicable’.766  
 
The State Department overruled Anslinger and maintained US policy was to support 
Afghanistan, but would reconsider if evidence ‘demonstrated incontrovertibly’ negative 
impacts on Iran.767 Anslinger set to work uncovering the evidence and raising it at CND. 
Charles Vaille was similarly opposed, although was unable to throw full French diplomatic 
weight behind the opposition. He wrote Anslinger that he was ‘desolated by the lamentable 
attitude’ of the State Department and argued it could ‘torpedo Iranian resolve’ and was 
capable of ‘destroying all that we have difficultly obtained’. He and Anslinger postponed 
work on the Single Convention and redoubled ratification efforts around the 1953 Protocol by 
Turkey, Iran and Greece.768 
 
Anslinger privately encouraged Vaille to challenge US policy at the 1956 CND session. The 
session took place in Geneva and Anslinger failed to attend, attempting instead to control 
events via proxies. Vaille led arguments against Afghanistan’s admission, while India – 
seeking a wedge issue between Pakistan and its neighbour - led arguments in favour. Vaille 
launched a tirade against the US delegation, accusing them of working to increase global 
overproduction. The US delegate concluded that Vaille and Iran ‘had come to some tacit 
agreement’. When Vaille left, the US delegate demanded correction of the summary record 
and the remaining French delegate, apparently embarrassed by Vaille’s behaviour, quickly 
agreed.769 
 
In the meantime, the UK Foreign Office had gained the upper hand on Green and the Home 
Office. They discovered the US delegation remained ambivalent into the 1957 session and 
contacted the State Department to express the hope that ‘in no circumstances’ should the US 
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vote against Iran.770 The latter agreed to follow the UK’s lead in postponing the issue until the 
1958 session.771 In the end they were helped by a counterproductive lobbying effort by the 
Afghan observer to CND which alienated a number of delegations.772 Anslinger, meanwhile, 
had ensured new information on the Afghan illicit trade to Iran emerged, causing many to 
question the accuracy of the Afghan delegate’s information.773 
 
By 1958 the Afghan issue was resolved through US and DND actions. The head of UN DND, 
Gilbert Yates, made a visit to the country prior to the 1958 CND session and was expected to 
recommend technical assistance. Afghanistan had agreed to withdraw its request to be 
considered a producer and the US agreed to introduce a CND resolution favouring UN 
technical assistance. Further, if the 1953 Protocol went into effect, the US promised to give 
careful consideration to an application by Afghanistan to be included.774 With this key 
stumbling block out of the way, forward momentum on the Single Convention once against 
became possible. The episode nevertheless highlighted the volatility around the ‘closed list’ 
of producers issue and the danger that the 1953 Protocol and Single Convention could 
collapse in the face of national interests. 
 
Part 5: Anglo-American Fault Lines: 
As suggested by the early co-operation over Asia an Anglo-US alliance was possible during 
this period, even if it would require substantial negotiation, compromise and coordination. As 
time progressed it became less likely as the UK lost faith in the US CND delegation’s 
competence. Fault lines that had opened up between the two states at CND only exacerbated 
this. Ultimately these divisions were to widen as the erratic US performances at the 1957 and 
1958 conferences marked a dividing point in the Anglo-US post-war drug diplomacy 
relationship. 
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The DND Issue: 
One of the most noticeable divisions between the US and UK delegations was over the 
relocation of the UN drugs secretariat, DND. A broad UN decentralisation program planned 
to move DND to Geneva where the secretariat of the DSB and PCOB was already set up.775 
Part of the impetus came from DND efforts to absorb the DSB and PCOB secretariats.776 
Anslinger had opposed it but the program received the unanimous consent from the General 
Assembly, where the US delegation had remained silent, believing the arguments provided by 
Anslinger against the move were too weak.777  In 1955 the UK sensed ‘agitation’ by US 
domestic groups against the move.778 They UK entered the 1955 CND prepared to reverse 
their support should the US raise objections. The US delegation appeared ‘divided amongst 
themselves’ and Anslinger failed to raise the matter.779 Consequently the move was accepted 
and the UK considered the issue settled. Further, the UK sought a reputation for thrift at CND 
and became extremely supportive of the measure once adopted.780 
 
Anslinger remained deeply opposed. He feared it would lead to the integration of the 
secretariats under DND and remove drug control from the New York media spotlight. He 
mobilised his traditional domestic constituencies and the issue quickly assumed a narrative of 
international communist conspiracy. Soon the British labour party became implicated. 
Clement Atlee’s visit to China was portrayed as part of a joint British and French ‘plot’ to 
encourage Turkey to introduce a resolution recognising communist China into the UN 
General Assembly. Soon newspapers reported a conspiracy to remove ‘Red China’s depravity 
and its dope running’ from the watchful eyes of US politicians and press in New York. The 
ultimate goal, they argued, was ‘a psychological build-up for the recognition and entry of 
China to the UN.’ Anslinger bragged that the New York Press had hammered away at the 
communist Chinese ‘to the point where Chou-En-Lai found it necessary to discuss the 
situation with Mr. Atlee’. Britain had introduced a resolution to transfer the UN Narcotics 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775 Memorandum of conversation between Anslinger and Secretary General Hammarskjold, 30 March, 
NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Transfer of Narcotic Commission to Geneva, 1955. 
776 McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, p. 189. 
777 State Department Memorandum, Jan 25th, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: 
Transfer of Narcotic Commission to Geneva, 1955. 
778 IOC (55)26, 30 March, BNA-CAB134/964. 
779 IOC (55)88, 30 June, BNA-CAB134/965. 
780 Interim report on happenings of Commission, May 16th, UNS1815/32, BNA-FO371/129981. 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
237	  
	  
Laboratory to Geneva soon after Atlee had come out of that meeting, claiming ‘China had 
clean hands in the narcotic trade’. This played right into Anslinger’s narrative.781 
 
Ultimately the State Department refused to push the matter at ECOSOC or the General 
Assembly, believing that it was not ‘important enough to involve US prestige in’ either body. 
Anslinger then failed in his last ditch appeal to the UN Secretary General in 1955 to stop the 
move.782 Anslinger maintained his anti-Geneva stance. In 1956 he failed to show up to CND 
session in Geneva. The UK privately lamented the loss of the ‘firmness’ he brought to 
debates. The State Department told a Foreign Office delegate that the administration was 
under strong pressure from domestic groups to host the CND in New York in 1957 and they 
had a ‘very real need of UK help on this question.’783 Anslinger got his way and served as 
Chairman for the session but appalled the UK delegation with an incompetent and aggressive 
performance. He then failed to turn up in Geneva in 1958 where he should have served his 
second year as Chairman. This time, however, his absence was not lamented.784 
 
The US then shocked the British by tabling a resolution to hold the 1959 Commission in New 
York. Their justification was a loophole allowing for ‘exceptional circumstances.’ London 
called the US resolution ‘outrageous’ and instructing that it ‘be opposed vigorously.’ Other 
CND delegations, however, did not share UK cost concerns and they voted for New York.785 
ECOSOC ultimately rejected the recommendation and the 1959 Commission met in Geneva. 
Anslinger failed to attend and the US again tabled a resolution which saw the UK as the sole 
dissenter and went on to fail in ECOSOC.786 By 1960 the matter appeared to have been 
dropped. However, by this stage it had become one of a number of divisions that had 
emerged between the UK and the US delegations. The issue of addiction treatment was 
another. 
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The British System vs. Anslinger: 
As the 1950s progressed, Anslinger’s ‘closed institution’ approach to addiction came under 
increasing domestic attack. Mounting evidence pointed to the failure of the federal narcotic 
farms in Lexington and Fort Worth.787 A new understanding of addiction was emerging 
among mental health professionals in the US. Many had served in the narcotic farms and 
watched with dismay as supposed treatment centres were effectively transformed into 
prisons.788  His domestic ‘enemies’ looked overseas for counterexamples to the US model. 
Front and centre was the ‘British system’.789 Continually prodded by US sources on this 
approach Anslinger sent a furious letter to his UK counterpart at the Home Office. He 
chastised the UK for sending encouraging letters to ‘eggheads and crackpots in the United 
States’: 
 
I have tried a number of times to get your people to restrain their remarks to our 
enemies, and I hope you will see that, in the future, visiting Americans will not be 
given information which encourages them to attack my Government.790 
 
Other Anslinger allies in the US called discussions around the ‘British system’ ‘reminiscent 
of the Hitler “Big-Lie”’. It was claimed that the British System was not different from the 
US, except that the UK law allowed for ambulatory maintenance in exceptional cases.791 The 
culmination of pushback against Anslinger in the 1950s came with the publication of an 
interim report by the Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American 
Medical Association. The report called for ‘ambulatory treatment’. Anslinger waged a 
domestic war with its authors and findings.792 Further, Anslinger sought to muster treaty law 
to the defence of the ‘closed institution’ model by enshrining it in the new Single Convention.  
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The UK viewed themselves as having no real ‘addiction problem’ and sought to avoid 
internationally imposed responsibilities which would be ‘unpalatable’ to UK medical 
professionals.793 Sometimes this involved the UK just acting uninterested. On one day off 
from the 1957 Commission, Anslinger organised a trip to an institution for juvenile drug 
addicts. Instead of attending, UK delegate, Mr. Green spent the day letter writing.794 By 1959 
the US and UK remained divided and the issue was to come to a head at the Single 
Convention plenipotentiary conference as we shall see. 795 
 
Part 6: Towards the Single Convention: 
As the US entered the 1956 session some in the State Department believed the Single 
Convention drafting process was ‘approaching completion’. By the end of the session, it had 
ground to a ‘snail’s pace’ and became ‘so hopelessly snarled in draft’ that deferring to a 
plenipotentiary conference seemed the only way forward. Anslinger felt the session became 
‘badly tangled’ in his absence and sought to repair some of the damage. He and Vaille agreed 
to stall the Single Convention in order to resolve issues around Afghanistan and push for 
ratification of the 1953 Protocol, writing: ‘the Afghan and other situations dictate postponing 
the Single Convention to a more propitious time. Politics and narcotics should not mix’. He 
argued against holding an extended CND session in 1957 in New York, Anslinger argued 
against it on grounds of cost and because ‘special consideration of the Single Convention at 
this time is useless’.796 
 
Realignments: 
The US traditional CND alliance structure had largely collapsed. The UK attributed the 
weakness of the manufacturer bloc to the absence of Anslinger, when in reality changes 
within the system had created the need for a strategic realignment. The system, by the late 
1950s was working against manufacturer interests, a situation never envisaged by Anslinger 
and other post-war framers. Pragmatic states would now fall in behind UK leadership. 
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Canada had aligned away from the US towards a pragmatic self-interested position, which 
placed them as a firm ally of the UK. Vaille continued to buttress Anslinger through French 
support and Brazil emerged as a regional pillar for Anslinger and the FBN. However, the US 
State Department rolled back support for the nationalist Chinese delegation and sought to 
repair relations with the UK over Hong Kong. In 1956 they wrote to the Consulate General in 
Hong Kong offering ‘regrets that erroneous reporting of the United States position at the 
Commission may have caused embarrassment to Hong Kong Enforcement authorities’.797 
This alienated the nationalist delegation and weakened their previously unquestioned support 
for US positions. 
 
Anslinger based the core of his strategy on a strong alignment with Vaille, while 
simultaneously working with the UK to undermine Vaille’s efforts on synthetics. However, 
with Anslinger largely absent from CND sessions during the 1950s moderate states were 
increasingly happy to let the 1953 Protocol languish and look towards a watered-down Single 
Convention. Entering the 1957 session both the UK and Canada sought to radically change 
track. Hossick suggested s UK-Canadian idea to Anslinger that the Secretariat should prepare 
a ‘simplified Draft’ of principles which could then be refined by a small drafting committee. 
Anslinger sharply refused, claiming it involved ‘a completely new start under a new theory’ 
and would ‘lose the value of discussion and decisions on principles of control, over the past 
several years’.798 
 
The DSB and the End of the US-French Alliance: 
DSB elections were set for 1957. The State Department hoped for Herbert May to be re-
elected, with indications that Canada would nominate him and the UK would second him.799 
Anslinger had other ideas and quietly worked to secure Vaille’s appointment. Anslinger later 
claimed Herbert May had privately stepped aside at his request, but ‘the stupid Canadians put 
forward his name much to his embarrassment’.800 
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The action triggered an enormous diplomatic ruckus and talk of high-level resignations.801 
The UK noted angrily that the US delegation stayed silent during the CND discussions ‘no 
doubt due to the influence of Anslinger who [was] known to be personally in favour of 
Vaille’s election’.802 Tensions continued into ECOSOC. The UK and Canada sought an 
ECOSOC resolution of censure directed at CND. The US State Department agreed with the 
UK that it was in ‘disregard of [an] ECOSOC recommendation’ and privately intimated they 
were ‘upset’ by the outcome.803  Brazil’s delegate Mr. Pentaedo, secretly prompted by 
Anslinger, made a strong speech in support of Vaille and CND more broadly.804 The UK 
concluded that the speech must have ‘been written for him by Mr. Anslinger’.805 Anslinger’s 
involvement with the scheme, coupled with the increasing incoherence of US policy, 
contributed significantly to the UK losing faith in the US during 1957 to 1958. After this 
point, they lost interest in working with the US at CND. 
 
 Anslinger later wrote to Pentaedo: 
 
It was evident to us that the Ottawa-London axis would try to pull others into its orbit 
to attack the Narcotic Commission for the election of Vaille…I want you to know that 
the members of the Commission are grateful for the statement that you made.806  
 
The victory was short lived as Vaille was soon removed from the French CND delegation, 
thereby removing Anslinger’s last key CND ally.807 Ostensibly Vaille’s removal was the 
result of a promotion to Inspector General for Health following the collapse of the Fourth 
Republic in 1958. Some have suggested it was partly a rebuke for his role in international 
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drug policies and particularly his support of the 1953 Protocol.808 Thereafter, despite vigorous 
efforts to steer French drug diplomacy Vaille failed to convince his superiors or CND 
replacement of its importance. The French delegation began to deprecate the problem of 
addiction in France as an issue of ‘secondary importance’. For example, they claimed that 
there were only 295 ‘addicts’, 252 of which used cannabis and were of Algerian-Moroccan 
descent.809 
 
Anglo-American Relations Collapse: 
The UK continued to hope for a closer relationship with the US right up to 1957 when they 
made a final overture to Anslinger. The 1954 Session had provided hope, proving ‘the best of 
the three attended by the present UK representative’. Vaille’s chairmanship ‘although marred 
by dishonesty...was extremely competent’ and ‘relations with Mr. Anslinger, which have 
always been friendly at the personal level, were much improved as regards practical co-
operation’.810 The 1955 session turned ‘disastrous’ for the UK. It was characterised by the 
emergence of Dr. Ozkol of Turkey as ‘as the energetic, ruthless, unscrupulous and triumphant 
leader of the opium bloc’. The session ‘could have been much worse’ but for the UK rallying 
a moderate bloc which avoided more objectionable proposals. Increasingly the UK viewed 
CND as being ‘heavily weighted with an unscrupulous commercial bloc supported by 
doctrinaire extremists’. 811 The 1956 session was ‘appallingly wearisome’ for the UK and the 
absence of Anslinger resulting in a ‘weak and ineffective’ US delegation meaning that attacks 
by producers often went unanswered.812 The UK ended with a ‘bad row’ with Ozkol. India, 
meanwhile, emerged as a potent moderating force, sponsoring watered-down resolutions on 
synthetics despite resistance from Vaille. The Soviet delegate spoke only Russian and ‘took 
little part in the debates’. The US pointed out that Ozkol fought, ‘sometimes to the point of 
absurdity’ and appeared to throw his weight behind the Single Convention as a means to 
deflect attention from illicit traffic leakages from Turkey.813 
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UK Delegate, Mr. Walker, lamented Anslinger’s absence from the 1956 CND, while 
Canada’s representative, Kenneth Hossick, was furious, interpreting it as an overt protest at 
the removal of CND from New York to Geneva.814 The UK still held out hopes for closer 
Anglo-American co-operation but these were thoroughly dashed during 1957 and 1958. In 
1957 the UK Foreign Office sent an overture, forwarding comments on the Draft Single 
Convention to remind the State Department and Anslinger that US and UK interests ‘should 
be fairly close’ on synthetics, despite UK views that the US had ‘wobbled in the past’. They 
hoped the letter would help keep Anslinger ‘on the straight path’ with the moderate coalition 
centred on the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and Canada. Anslinger was 
‘always very much a law unto himself and...the State Department either cannot, or does not 
attempt to keep control of him’ but London hoped he could be reined in.815 
 
The initial response claimed US positions were being re-examined and London concluded it 
did ‘not seem to have been a complete waste of time’.816 The optimism proved short lived as 
the 1957 CND assembled in New York under Anslinger’s Chairmanship. The UK delegation 
viewed his performance as erratic and incompetent: he ‘could never refrain from commenting 
on the remarks of each speaker’ and ‘invariably omitted to say whether he was speaking as 
Chairman or as the US representative.’ Furthermore he made it clear he had not read certain 
important documents, or grasped important issues and ‘frequently disregarded the rules of 
procedure.’ The result was ‘superficial’ and ‘confused’ discussions topped by his inexplicable 
disruption of Canadian attempts to forward work on the Second Draft Single Convention.817 
 
Concluding the Final Draft: 
With the Afghan issue resolved by 1958 and a keen desire for a new international agreement 
to strengthen the constitutional basis for the ‘closed institution’ model in the US, Anslinger 
worked to put the Single Convention back on track. Further, Iran had acceded to the 1953 
Protocol. Vaille and Anslinger now sought to bring in Greece next and had the expectation 
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that Yugoslavia would follow.818 It looked as if a final draft of the Single Convention could 
be completed at the 1958 session, ready for a Plenipotentiary Conference. Anslinger hoped to 
secure the ratification of the 1953 Protocol in time to be followed by the ratification of a 
more extensive and similarly strict Single Convention. 
 
The moderate bloc thwarted these goals at the 1958 session. His wife’s deteriorating health, 
coupled with numerous domestic challenges, and an unwillingness to lend credibility to the 
Geneva home for CND meant Anslinger was again absent.819 The US delegation proved 
disorganised and erratic. The UK described it as a ‘heterogeneous’ bunch of FBN bureaucrats 
and State department officials who were ‘clearly under [his] remote control’. The delegation 
‘seldom spoke unless it had to’ and was at a loss when voting on unforeseen matters. Each 
delegate was ‘watching the others and...no one dares do anything constructive lest 
[they]...incur the wrath of Mr. Anslinger.’ The result was that it ‘took little or no part in 
helping frustrate moves clearly contrary to its interests, and several times abstained or even 
voted on the wrong side’. Mr. Green of the UK initially feared it was ‘likely to go down in 
history as one of the worst sessions on record’ if the Americans did not ‘get off their fat 
bottoms and face their responsibilities’. At one point, France passed a resolution (7-5) to 
censure West Germany for not controlling the synthetic narcotic normethadone. Worse: ‘the 
USA abstained!’ - the State Department representative later apologised privately for their 
error.820 The Foreign Office labelled it ‘something of a shambles’ and sought contact with the 
State Department to see if anything could be done before the session ended.821  
 
Anslinger attributed tensions at the session to Mr. Green being ‘new and sticky’ and a ’31 
year old, uncured ham’ who did not belong in the CND. As Anslinger wrote: ‘Green (UK), 
the green delegate who has been giving us trouble throughout the meeting, picking up little 
details and pieces of lint’. The head of the US delegation Mr. Tennyson reported back that the 
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Canadians and British were giving him a rough time and Anslinger set to work ‘preparing 
some counter measures in cooperation with the Department of State’.822 
 
A ‘battle’ developed over the inclusion of a ‘closed institution’ provision in the draft Single 
Convention. The US argued that it was not binding but merely ‘a principle’. The UK and 
Canada pushed back strongly. UK opposition was expected, but the US delegation was 
‘astonished’ with the change in Canadian attitude, which had traditionally ‘been similar to 
ours, that no drug addict could be cured by the ambulatory treatment’. Hossick highlighted 
sources ‘emanating’ from the US, suggesting alternatives to the ‘closed institution’ approach. 
The US managed to sustain the inclusion of a weak provision when it came to a vote, but the 
issue appeared set to be re-addressed in the Plenipotentiary Conference.823 
 
The US were also furious about the UK being the only objector to an including a provision 
from the 1912 Convention to cater to other US constitutional concerns.  Indicative of the 
worsening relations, the US delegation held a lunch and dinner for friendly delegations, 
including France, India, Yugoslavia and Turkey. The US delegation refused to invite the UK 
or Canadian delegations claiming Anslinger ‘would not have approved any invitation to these 
groups who had certainly not been helpful to us in any way’. 824 
 
A ‘relatively clean’ draft of the Single Convention was finally agreed at the 1958 session, by 
including many unresolved minority opinions in footnotes. Deep divisions were merely 
postponed until the Plenipotentiary Conference. The core disagreements remained between 
producer and transit countries and ‘between different juridical systems’. Whether these issues 
could be ironed out remained an open question.825 
 
The 1959 Session: 
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The 1959 session proved ‘shorter and less eventful’ and Anslinger was again absent.826 The 
UK noted that the US delegation was led by a State Department official and proved more 
competent but ‘still failed to show any signs of giving leadership’.827 Meanwhile, presaging a 
key feature of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the US delegation noted that on issues pitting 
manufacturing states against producing states, the Soviet delegation ‘usually voted with the 
latter…to curry their favour’.828 
 
Vaille, now removed from the process, professed himself ‘extremely pessimistic’ and worried 
that the UK-led bloc, believing ‘that the Commerce is too constricted’ would push to water 
down the draft. Anslinger similarly worried ‘the old European block will get together and we 
may lose many of our gains’. Anslinger was infuriated by the outcomes of the 1959 session. 
Without himself or Vaille present to steer the ‘rudder’ he viewed it as descending into 
backslapping and lowest common denominator agreements. The US delegation was ‘anything 
but satisfactory’ and played an increasingly ‘defensive’ role. He was outraged by a 
Resolution providing implicit support to ambulatory treatment and labelled it ‘one of the 
most unfortunate statements’ by CND. He claimed the US delegation ‘must have been absent 
on that day’ and that he would ‘be unable to distribute it in this country because it provides a 
lever for those people who want to create free drug areas’. Anslinger determined to reignite 
his alliance with Vaille and looked to ‘brighter days ahead’.829  
 
The 1960 Session: 
The 1960 session proved wholly uneventful. The UK had no expectations from the US and 
their preparation for the 1961 Plenipotentiaries Conference was based on a desire to 
fundamentally re-examine the third draft of the Single Convention. They were determined to 
achieve broad consensus, weaken control provisions and remove elements they found 
objectionable. The UK were not discriminatory in means, and were willing to rely on 
Western European, Asiatic and even Soviet support on areas of overlapping interest. They 
were even open to reaching out to the Latin American countries which they had previously 
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828 Tennyson to Anslinger, 14 April 1959, FBNA/ACC170-74-5/Box123/File1230-1, UN 14th Session 
(1959). 
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avoided out of deference to the US sphere of interest. The UK had given up on an Anglo-US 
cooperative effort and were instead focused on making ‘every effort to secure a treaty that the 
great majority of countries’ could accept.830 
 
 
Illicit Traffic: 
Seeking to regain some initiative at CND Anslinger and his agent Siragusa planned to make 
an extensive statement on the illicit traffic. The UK, continued to downplay it, particularly in 
the Far East, lest it cause further complications for their colonies. Anslinger wished to be 
invited to send FBN agents to assist the UK in policing the illicit traffic in Hong Kong.831 
Anslinger’s chief CND informant, Siragusa, who again served on the Illicit Traffic 
Committee, felt that UK representative Green (Chair of the Committee) was ‘avoiding him’. 
He believed Green, ‘a real, sly one’ apparently knew Siragusa wanted ‘to button-hole him 
about Hong Kong’. Green focused on the State Department side of the US delegation. 
Siragusa believed that the was ‘a conspiracy to foul’ the US statement on Hong Kong up and 
that there was a ‘Secretariat-Green-Hossick effort designed to suppress my truthful but 
perhaps offensive remarks against certain countries – my spotlighting of Hong Kong 
situation’. Siragusa was determined to try to include the remarks regardless of the conspiracy, 
but felt he lacked State Department support, writing to Anslinger:  
 
I work only for you and the Bureau and I couldn’t care less about these State 
Department men but I am afraid that if I try to double-cross Meyer and slip in some 
remarks…I am certain Chase and Rowell would hit the ceiling and blast you and the 
Bureau.832 
 
When this became apparent, Anslinger and his agents began to look to japan as a base of 
operations in the region, claiming ‘The UK’s attitude contradicted their obligations under 
international treaties respecting the question of cooperation…they talk out of both sides of 
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their mouth’.833 The US, however, remained concerned to deflect attention from potential 
nationalist involvement in the illicit trade. It avoided criticism of France given the US 
‘promise not to put them on the spot’.834 
 
Similar outcomes occurred for the Middle East, where Syria and Turkey came to blows over 
the allocation of blame on the origins of the illicit traffic in the region, while the US 
described continued Iranian suppression efforts as ‘heroic’.835 It was representative of the 
session which became a musical chairs of states shifting blame around for the source and 
transit points of the illicit traffic and no real outcomes produced. Anslinger failed to regain 
the initiative at CND and instead had to look towards Single Convention negotiations. 
 
Part 7: The Single Convention: 
The 1961 Plenipotentiaries Conference took place from January 24th to March 26th. It 
received representatives from seventy countries but meaningful participation was largely 
restricted to CND members. Novice delegations were surprised to find CND countries 
appeared to spend their time tearing up the third draft which had been the culmination of ten 
years of their own work.836 The UK noted the US delegation was ‘very indifferently 
represented’ while still under the ‘remote control’ of Anslinger. He himself was putting in 
only brief appearances as his wife’s terminal illness meant that he had to commute daily from 
Washington DC.837 In the end, the UK saw this as the reason for the US’ failure to get the 
modifications they desired or retain provisions they hoped for. Had they ‘been able to adopt a 
more flexible attitude’ they ‘might at least have succeeded in salvaging something from the 
wreckage’. Despite this the US signed the convention. The UK, on the other hand, saw it as 
the consolidation they had hoped for with the ‘more controversial elements watered down 
into a generally acceptable form’. They had, further, successfully removed article 32 dealing 
with the closed list of producers which had also proved widely unacceptable to other 
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delegates.838 They seemed to have achieved a kind of broad consensus with their interests 
remaining secure. Vaille, meanwhile, had been unable to rally French delegation support for 
the 1953 Protocol.839 Anslinger, however, was far from finished with the Single Convention. 
 
 
The Single Convention – Key Provisions: 
The producer bloc entered the Single Convention Plenipotentiary Conference in January 1961 
as the main revisionist force, hoping to weaken many of the main control provisions.840 Led 
by the Soviets and facilitated by the moderate bloc, states picked apart the Single Convention. 
The issue of Cannabis produced mixed results. There was unanimous agreement to prohibit 
cultivation except for industrial purposes, as well as an acknowledgement that small amounts 
would be allowed for scientific purposes. Given that the plant grew wild and many nations 
relied on it for industrial purposes, these were to be explicitly exempted from prohibition. 
Hungary and other nations pushed back strongly against control of poppy straw, arguing it 
was an agricultural waste product and ‘cannot be regarded as a narcotic’.841 In the end 
however, producer states won passage of control thereby diminishing its economic threat to 
traditional opium cultivation.842 
 
The Soviet bloc worked with manufacturing states, including Switzerland, Canada and the 
UK, to remove the ‘closed list’ amendment.843 The new INCB was expanded to eleven 
members and some move towards fusing the CND and INCB secretariats was made, although 
it remained purposely vague. INCB maintained the right to recommend an embargo which 
the US pointed out was ‘considerably weaker’ than the mandatory embargo provision in the 
1953 Opium Protocol. Parties were required to furnish estimates for requirements and 
exports, and remain within these estimates. INCB could establish estimates for any state 
which failed to supply them, including non-parties. The US noted that the provisions around 
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estimates and statistics were ‘virtually the same as the requirements in the existing treaties’ 
although wide reservation provisions threatened to undermine these (see below). The 
scheduling system, initially running to two schedules under the 1931 Convention, was 
expanded to four. These attempted to link degrees of control to ‘varying degree of addicting 
liability’. 844 
 
Parties were permitted reservations around maintaining existing opium smokers in their 
territories, with no new registration allowed after 1964. Opium eating, or quasi-medical use, 
was to be abolished within fifteen years of the Convention coming into force. Parties were to 
establish national agencies to collect the opium crop and cultivation would be restricted to 
those licensed by the agency. All countries which produced opium for 10 years prior to 
January 1961 could continue to produce opium. Further, any country could produce and 
export up to 5 tons annually simply by notifying the Board. A country wishing to export more 
than five tons had to notify ECOSOC which could either approve or simply recommend 
against it. The US pointed out that this was a ‘an entirely different concept’ of production 
limitation than in the 1953 Protocol but was: 
 
a compromise provision resulting from the insistence of the Soviet Bloc, countries in 
the British Commonwealth, and some African countries that the new countries be 
permitted to produce and export opium if they so desire.845 
 
The Convention stipulated that parties prohibit cultivation if they considered it the most 
adequate method to prevent diversions into the illicit traffic. The US viewed this as providing 
a ‘constitutional basis’ for the Opium Poppy Control Act enacted by the US Congress in 
1942.846 The 1936 Convention which dealt with the illicit traffic, but which was poorly 
subscribed, was the only Convention not incorporated into the Single Convention. Instead, 
weak and a ‘tenuous recommendatory type provision’ regarding penalties for traffickers and 
extradition was included. It was due to the weakness of this provision, that many states 
already parties to the 1936 Convention demanded the convention be kept in force. 847 
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Coca cultivation was to be controlled under the same mechanisms as opium cultivation, while 
a special provision to protect the Coca Cola Company’s access to non-alkaloid coca leaves 
for flavouring was included. Meanwhile, those states permitting chewing of coca leaf agreed 
to abolish the practice within twenty-five years of the Convention coming into force. 
Virtually identical provisions applied to Cannabis, with the exception of cannabis for 
industrial purposes (fiber and seed) or horticultural purposes. 848 
 
Driven by Soviet demands, reservations were permitted to specified articles around the 
application of the system of estimates and statistics. Reservations to other articles could be 
made with the support of two-thirds of ratified states. The US noted that no reservations were 
permitted to the 1953 Protocol, barring provisional reservations around opium smoking and 
eating as well as coca leaf chewing.849 
 
The US had squeezed language around compulsory treatment in a ‘closed institution’ into the 
third draft. In negotiations this was strongly watered down to recommend, for those with 
serious problems, to provide adequate treatment facilities, if they had the economic means to 
do so. The US viewed this as having ‘no value’. In particular they blamed the Holy See, 
which raised objection to the words ‘civil commitment’. 850 As Anslinger commented, it was 
‘due to their fears that this would be used against the Cardinals and Bishops in the Iron 
Curtain countries’. He continued: ‘I don’t think the Communist need anything like this if they 
want to throw somebody in jail’. He was also furious that the ‘Holy See Delegation sat there 
for nine weeks not uttering a word and when they had something to say didn’t have the 
common decency to consult us’.851 
 
Anslinger wrote to Vaille on March 3rd, ‘the Soviet bloc has just about destroyed the Single 
Convention. They have won on nearly every point’. The closed list would be supplanted by 
an amendment, ‘peddled by Canada’, allowing any country to export up to five tons without 
notifying the Board. Vaille described it as a ‘disaster’. Both argued the open list of producers 
would create an open global market, drive up supplies, down prices and potentially flood the 
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illicit market. Overall they believed it ‘set back international control of narcotics fifty 
years’.852 
 
 
 
 
US Opposition: 
Gilbert Yates and the DND secretariat argued that ‘”something” is better than “nothing”’. 
Anslinger argued that ‘The something may even be worse than the nothing’.853 As the 
Conference drew to a close the US dug in its heels around reservations, but had not yet come 
to the point of open intransigence. Anslinger publicly professed willingness to allow some 
reservations, to satisfy the Soviets, provided they did not ‘open the floodgates’. He even 
professed some propaganda benefit in having the Soviets on record as opposing certain 
provisions via reservations. By the 18th of March Anslinger left the plenipotentiary 
conference giving the impression he would push the US towards signature. He argued he 
needed to place the final document before the President’s Committee on Narcotics and secure 
their ascent before it could be sent on to Congress.854 In reality Anslinger had already turned 
on the convention: 
 
We worked twelve years to consolidate all the treaties and protocols. Unfortunately 
the political situation was not such as to create an atmosphere for objective 
negotiation.  Consequently, the Single Convention, although adopted, was in my 
opinion laid to rest by the Soviet bloc, the British Commonwealth, and the Holy 
See.855 
 
The US gave two key reasons for opposition: the provisions around the limitation of the 
production and raw opium and the permissible reservations around the system of estimates.856 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 Anslinger to Vaille, 8 March 1961; Vaille to Anslinger, 15 March 1961, FBNA/ACC170-74-
12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #3 (1961).  
853 Anslinger to Flue, 26 May 1961, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #4 
(1961). 
854 Memo, 18 March 1961, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #3 (1961). 
855 Anslinger to Kennedy, 29 March 1961, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single 
Convention #3 (1961). 
856 William McAllister speculates that a key reason for Anslinger’s rejection of the Single Convention 
was the absence of a provision similar to that in the 1931 Convention mandating a separate 
John	  Collins	  
The	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  
	  
253	  
	  
The US argued the reservations, if applied to various aspects of the new Board’s work, would 
result in the Board not having any authority to regulate the market.857 They went on, ‘the 
estimates and statistics system of the 1931 Convention had been destroyed. Any party…could 
by reservation prevent examination of its statistics’. 858 
 
Anslinger set to work securing the support of Senators and pharmaceutical interests. Senator 
Homer Copehart agreed with Anslinger’s reading and promised to reject it if Anslinger 
signed it and offered it to the Senate for confirmation: 
 
far from strengthening international control…[it] could become the means of flooding 
countries…with large amounts of addicting drugs. I am particularly 
concerned…because I am informed that it was at the insistence of the Soviet 
bloc…that certain fundamental controls…have been weakened and can be 
destroyed…[A]s is well recognized, traffic in addicting drugs has been an insidious 
tool in the cold war for weakening the moral fiber and physical well-being of people 
throughout the world.859 
 
The pharmaceutical sector warned the new INCB ‘could be ignored and flouted with 
impunity’. Despite his domestic lobbying efforts, Anslinger found the US ECOSOC 
delegation ‘solidly against me and want the treaty’.860 Holding the domestic line while caring 
for his dying wife his efforts received a major boost when Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee member Senator Alexander Wiley pushed the State Department to pressure 
Turkey and Greece and ensure no encouragement was given to the Single Convention.861 
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The State Department proved hard to keep in line with US policy. As one Treasury Official 
wrote, despite a clear US position ‘the Department of State people at the working level were 
not cooperating in the maintenance of that position’. The State department responded that the 
Treasury wanted to play the policy in ‘high key’ while the State Department wanted to play it 
in ‘low key’ on the assumption that the Single Convention would fail on its own. Further the 
State Department criticised the handling of the 1961 Plenipotentiary Conference, 
complaining that the US delegation had ‘completely lost control of the situation’ and ‘failed 
to line up the necessary votes’. Further, they made clear that the matter would not receive 
major attention at the General Assembly level where they privileged ‘political’ over 
‘technical’ issues. 862  
 
The UK Embassy in Washington had gained the impression that the State Department agreed 
with the UK but that it had been side-lined by the FBN.863 The UK could not understand how 
Anslinger expected the Protocol to function given the widespread disapproval. Even if he 
succeeded it would simply become a ‘lame duck’ and they could not understand why 
Anslinger would want to ‘bring discredit’ on the international machinery ‘which up to now 
had worked very well.’864 They soon viewed their role as not only salvaging the Single 
Convention but also the international control system itself. 
 
Of key importance to Anslinger was the recognition that he could receive significant 
blowback from his traditional domestic constituencies. Even before the Conference had 
closed Hearst Papers wrote editorials blasting the outcome as a Soviet plot to flood the world 
with opium and pointing out that the lead Soviet delegate had a history of espionage.865 Other 
constituencies, such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement, would soon follow 
suit. Anslinger had lost control of the international negotiating process. He was now unhappy 
with the provisions of the agreement and felt he had little choice but to try to torpedo it. 
Green for the UK, with the US views now clearly elaborated found little to be gained by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 Memo of Conversation, 21 September, 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single 
Convention #6 (1962). 
863 British Embassy Washington to horn, 19 September 1962, UNS18112/68, BNA-FO371/161050. 
864 Green to Key, 6 September 1962, UNS18112/66, BNA-FO371/161050. 
865 See clippings FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, Single Convention #4 (1961). 
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further arguing.866 He sought to downplay US dismay as far as possible to allow time for the 
Convention to come into force. 
 
The Rushes to Ratify: 
Anslinger gambled that ratification by another producer would bring the 1953 Protocol into 
force and indefinitely postpone the Single Convention process. He began to secretly lobby the 
Greek and Turkish governments, sending a mission to both countries in 1962.867 In 1962 the 
US finally made public their opposition and asking that the 1953 Protocol should be given ‘at 
least five years’ to prove itself effective. They were willing to make some amendments, for 
example eliminating local inquiry and mandatory embargo provisions but maintained the 
‘closed list’ was ‘the very essence of the Protocol’ despite criticisms. They admitted that only 
one country might become the sole source of exportable opium, but this ‘might not be a bad 
thing’ or that no opium might be available at all and therefore steps should be made available 
to ensure a supply in such a situation.868  
 
Turkey and traditional US ‘stumbling block’ Dr. Ozkol sought to delay US action on pushing 
ratification of the 1953 Protocol until after the next CND meeting. The US ignored this and 
turned to Greece for ‘possible quicker action’.869 Greece was sternly reminded that the 
international community had included them in the 1953 Protocol ‘closed list’ yet Greece did 
nothing to ratify. Confronted with direct US pressure Greece professed displeasure with the 
Single Convention and promised to look again at ratifying the 1953 Protocol. As one US team 
member wrote of the new Greek representative: 
 
Prof. Tsatsas, in our opinion, represents a breaking up of the so-called “Balkan 
Bloc.”… Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia have worked closely together over the past 
few years. We have seen undue influence exerted by Mr. Ozkol of Turkey…and to a 
lesser extent, Nicolic of Yugoslavia.870 
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File 1230, Folder: Single Convention. 
868 For use in discussion with Curran, 1962, NA, RG 170-74-12, Box 170, File 1230, Folder: Single 
Convention. 
869 Flues to Secretary of the Treasury, 3 May 1962, FBNA/ACC170-74-12/Box170/File1230, UN 
Single Convention. 
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Soon after leaving Greece the US team were ‘confident’ of a quick ratification despite the 
political difficulties which had ‘paralyzed’ the Greek Parliament.871 Soon thereafter they 
received word the Greek government had taken action to ratify the 1953 Protocol. One of the 
members signed off: ‘Even if the Greek Parliament has not yet acted, I believe I can 
say…“Mission Accomplished”’.872  
 
At the 1962 CND Greece announced its intention to ratify the 1953 Opium Protocol. The US 
delegation reported that the UK and Canada responded with ‘an angry and unremitting 
attack’ on Greece. With only the US and Egypt offering support, the Greek delegate buckled 
under the Anglo-Canadian onslaught and also vaguely committed to eventual ratification of 
the Single Convention. Soon after Greece asked for US support in becoming a member of 
ECOSOC, something ‘obviously asked as a return favour for ratification of the [Opium 
Protocol]’. Anslinger immediately began work to secure US support in favour of Greece’s 
request.873 The US continued a massive diplomatic offensive through 1962 with extensive 
shuttle diplomacy and utilising embassies to advocate their position on the Single 
Convention. Many professed sympathy but few expressed willingness to change their 
position and the US seemed unlikely to arrest the trend. India summed up the views of many, 
claiming support for stricter provisions in the 1961 Convention, but attaching greater 
importance to securing universal adherence.874 
 
The 1953 Opium Protocol came into force on March 8th 1963. Anslinger recognised this 
would force Turkey into ratification  ‘as they have enormous stocks and the only 
manufacturing customer able to buy will be the UK’.875 Soon after Turkey moved towards 
ratification citing ‘disappointing’ opium sales as the main driver and the hope that it would 
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result in preferential access of exports to the US market.876 On July 15th Turkey ratified the 
Protocol.877 Nevertheless, the Greek announcement had accelerated efforts to bring the Single 
Convention into force. It became apparent that if the 1953 Protocol coming into force, India 
would enjoy a monopoly on licit opium production to parties of the Protocol. The UK and 
Canada both stated their intent to ratify the Singe Convention as soon as requisite domestic 
legislation could be passed. The Netherland, Yugoslavia, India, Switzerland, Morocco and 
Poland all spoke in favour of the agreement and the Afghan observer described it as an 
achievement for the broader United Nations. CND passed a resolution urging ECOSOC to 
invite governments to ratify the Single Convention.878 On November 13th 1964 Kenya became 
the fortieth signatory to accede thereby bringing it into force one month later.879  
 
Conclusion: 
Anslinger’s strategy had failed. The 1953 Protocol came into force but had failed to stop the 
Single Convention. The US would continue to boycott the Convention for several years – 
eventually ratifying in 1967. A decade since the 1953 Opium Conference the US was 
strongly isolated in the field of international narcotics control. The UK on the other hand was 
firmly nestled within the new system while the Anglo-US drug relationship was, by this 
stage, severely weakened, tense and distant.  
 
The UK was hoping for broad accord and to protect their interests. They initially looked 
towards an American led anti-producer front. When this failed to emerge, the UK began 
building its own coalition, encompassing Western European states but also the moderate 
Indian delegation. The UK and India eventually worked closely to find a middle ground 
between hard line producers, manufacturers and stringent control advocates. 
 
Anslinger was hoping to sustain US hard-line goals in the face of collapsing alliances and 
shifting systemic power structures. His leadership undermined the formulation of a coherent 
US policy, prevented a moderation in the face of changed circumstances and stopped the 
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emergence of a new level of cooperation with the malleable UK delegation on this issue, 
much to the dismay of the State Department. US and UK interests diverged somewhat but 
some degree of negotiation and nurturing could have potentially produced a governing 
alliance, instead of a breakdown in relations between the two. As a result, Anslinger failed to 
utilise the potential for co-operation that existed and consigned the US to a unilateral 
approach followed by a period of isolation. Further, Anslinger failed to achieve most of his 
goals during this period. 
 
The battle between the 1953 Protocol and the 1961 Single Convention became a proxy for 
Anglo-American relations in the field. On the one side was the US, using all diplomatic 
levers possible and advocating for a strict document which would squeeze licit supplies while 
furthering a prohibitionist model internationally. On the other side were producer states, 
whose economic interests were tied to avoiding new domestic control obligations, levelling 
the international regulatory structure, maintaining relatively open markets and shifting the 
regulatory burden towards synthetics and poppy straw manufacturing processes. They allied 
with hard-line non-interventionist states such as the Soviet Bloc and Latin American 
countries such as Mexico, and postcolonial states in Africa which desired the freedom to 
pursue self-sufficiency in pain medicines and potentially develop export markets later. The 
UK remained in the middle, conducting a quiet diplomatic campaign based on national 
political and economic self-interest for a moderate international agreement, broader goals of 
international accord and avoiding any negative spill-over into other areas of international 
relations. The UK vision eventually won given the relatively easy sell of the Single 
Convention over the 1953 Protocol to the vast majority of states.  
 
The battle highlighted the internal rifts within the US government between pragmatists in the 
State Department and hard-line control advocates in the Treasury Department. The latter 
were able to mobilise powerful congressional actors and arouse strong public opinion and 
force the State Department to take an active stand against a consensus international approach. 
The State Department reluctantly acquiesced; provided it did not seep into General Assembly 
politics. Driving the US hard-liners was a variety of interests, including bureaucratic self-
interest, a desire to maintain prohibitionist domestic constituencies, a genuine belief in the 
importance of their efforts. Further, personal and diplomatic prestige played an important 
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part, particularly in the case of Harry Anslinger. Coming to the end of his career Anslinger 
had no desire to see control efforts fizzle out on his watch.  
 
However, none of these factors could mitigate against the fact that Anslinger had lost control 
of domestic and international processes. He proved unable to dictate the direction of 
negotiations. When they failed to progress according to his wishes, he spent the last of his 
political capital in a last ditch effort to railroad through a tough agreement. His failure 
reflected a broader shift in international drug diplomacy. The ‘Gentlemen’s club’ of old had 
been replaced by a complex international framework with multiple power centres and an 
array of national interests expressed in a more complex manner. Traditional actors had lost 
the initiative, and the British approach, based on consensus documents and a belief in 
relatively light-touch global regulation won the day.  
 
As throughout the previous five decades the US and UK took different approaches to 
international drug control. The UK represented a pragmatic strand that sought to make 
accommodations with local conditions and hurdles to control. The US maintained an 
aggressive diplomatic stance based on a firm believe in prohibition surmounting all obstacles. 
Increasingly, local and regional accommodations showed the US consistently willing to 
subvert the narcotics control agenda when national interests demanded, but the outward 
expression of US policy never deviated. The US favoured prohibition as a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
global policy. The UK sought a regulatory compromise that maintained this issue below the 
radar, highlighted the UK as a good global citizen and prevented an unchecked drug 
commodity market. Within these approaches there was much overlap. When the two worked 
to exploit these overlaps, namely around the creation of international regulations, forward 
political progress was possible. When the two focused on their differences, namely around 
the severity of regulation and the inculcation of the prohibitionist model at the international 
level, competition and political breakdown often ensued. The battle over the Single 
Convention was the clearest example of this. 
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Conclusion:  
 
Anglo-American Drug Diplomacy: 
The core of the Anglo-American drug relationship saw overlap and division. The overlap was 
around the pursuit of a global regulatory framework for ‘dangerous drugs’ internationally. 
The division was around the frontier and peripheral aspects of this: namely, where to draw 
the line between licit and illicit consumption; how tightly to restrict, regulate and prohibit 
global supplies; how much interference in national affairs to allow international 
organisations; and how to deal with existing drug consuming populations. In a broader sense, 
however, it was a question of expectations.  
 
The UK viewed the end point of the international control system as facilitating better 
international management of drugs but also serving as a beacon towards broader international 
cooperation. It would inevitably provide an imperfect response to an insoluble issue. 
Nevertheless, it could help states mitigate the problems associated with drugs; minimise cross 
border disagreements as states dealt with licit and illicit commodity flows; breed new areas of 
international cooperation; and minimise the risks for their own bilateral and colonial relations 
deriving from the drug issue. More broadly, it allowed for discussion and action around the 
most poignant drug issues while establishing a normative framework and international 
direction of travel towards a world without drug ‘abuse’. In this latter sense Britain had 
minimal expectations that the international community would ever reach that destination, but 
it was the defusing of potential international tensions that was key. John Strang and Michael 
Gossop’s description of the ‘British System’ of domestic control seems apt for British 
international drug policy: ‘the quintessential characteristic...[is] its lack of rigid form and 
hence its potentially greater capacity to be intuitively reactive to changed circumstances.’880  
 
For the US the system appeared to represent a possible framework for genuinely achieving a 
world without drug ‘abuse’. Time and again public expressions and policy formulations were 
based on this principle. Whether it was speeches in the Houses of Congress highlighting that 
the struggle for drug control was akin to the efforts to end slavery, or the State Department 
repeatedly stating in public that a solution to the global drug problem was within reach. 
Under the US approach, the problem was soluble if all states pursued the US formula of strict 
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regulations, prohibitions and repression. What was required was political will, a mechanism 
to chastise recalcitrant or failing states and a forum to disseminate their one-size-fits-all 
model based on policing, enforcement and the ‘closed institution’ approach to addiction. 
 
Where the Anglo-American visions overlapped, cooperation and forward political progress 
for the international system was possible. When the two were unable to overcome their 
divisions, competition and international political breakdowns emerged. The battle over the 
Single Convention represented the greatest example of this and highlighted the core interests 
underpinning their drug diplomatic endeavours but also the role of agency, social forces, and 
deeper economic and political interests in sustaining cooperation. The breakdown arose from 
a divergence of interests that had their origins in the two countries’ historical approach to 
narcotics control. This, however, was fatally worsened by poor US leadership under Harry 
Anslinger.  
 
The historical approaches of the UK and US to narcotics control solidified and developed 
around the turn of the twentieth century. The US was driven by a moralistic and self-
interested belief in prohibition and ‘control at the source’. This was, under the US 
conception, to be effected by suppression at all points on the supply chain via regulation of 
medical and scientific usage, strict prohibitions around non-medical and non-scientific 
consumption enforced by the diffusion of uniform legislation and police enforcement 
globally, and the mandatory ‘closed institution’ approach to drug ‘addiction’.  
 
The UK on the other hand was driven by more practical and similarly self-interested 
concerns. Initially they walked a balancing act between protecting their colonial interests by 
maintaining the opium monopolies and avoiding the imposition of strict prohibition in these 
colonies given the practical and monetary difficulties this would raise. Militating against this 
was the desire to encourage US interest in international cooperation around drugs. The UK 
believed that the US involvement with the League of Nations drug control system could spill 
over into other areas of international cooperation. The convergence of these goals with US 
moderation in the 1930s witnessed the creation of international manufacturing regulations via 
the system of estimates.  
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The divergence between the US and UK over the continuation of opium smoking and the 
opium monopolies sustained a bilateral rift which fuelled serious tensions within the League 
system and helped prevent the emergence of a production limitation agreement. World War II 
undermined this previous obstacle. Further it highlighted the central role of agency in driving 
the drug issue forward. Without Anslinger’s leadership the change in UK policy outlined in 
Chapter One was unforeseeable. With the shift, the UK furthered its commitment to end the 
opium monopolies, albeit imperfectly, and the move towards decolonisation removed this as 
an issue of division with the Anglo-American division.  
 
The post-war period offered the prospect of a new Anglo-American drug alliance. The UK 
toughened its supply-centric stance against certain Asian powers, notably Thailand, and 
sought to demonstrate its commitment to regulatory control efforts via cooperation with the 
US over Germany. Nevertheless both cases further demonstrated that the UK was willing to 
support US control interventionism only when it gelled with broader geopolitical interests. 
Further, with its domestic economic and balance of payments situation worsening, the UK 
was increasingly vigilant against regulations and prohibitions that might adversely affect its 
domestic drug manufacturing sector or raise costs for the National Health Service. 
Meanwhile, witnessing the tendency towards mission creep within the UN CND, as 
seemingly innocuous and intangible commitments generated new international criticisms of 
domestic policies, the UK tried to dig in its heels and prevent CND, PCOB, WHO or other 
bodies appropriating new powers of oversight over national policies.  
 
The US, meanwhile, emerging from the war with a new international leadership role was 
forced to temper some of its drug policy goals to broader geopolitical interests. Nevertheless 
their public narrative, driven by Anslinger but increasingly softened by the State Department, 
remained one of strict global drug controls via the diffusions of political will, uniform 
legislation, police enforcement and a desire to strengthen CND’s oversight of national policy 
implementation. The drug control lobby in the US, represented by prohibitionist groups such 
as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, retained an extremely important role in policy 
formulation and a formidable ‘army’ for Anslinger as demonstrated by the failed 
reorganisation efforts against the FBN in the 1940s and 50s. No such lobby emerged in the 
UK and policy remained fundamentally driven by technocratic concerns, bureaucratic turf 
battles and tempered by some domestic medical and economic constituencies.  
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The relationship between the FBN and the State Department would ultimately determine the 
shape of US post-war drug diplomacy. Anslinger’s relatively close relationship with George 
Morlock, the State Department’s lead on narcotics and core ‘inner circle’ ally, resulted in a 
relatively harmonious federal policy process. Nevertheless, the State Department after 
expending significant leverage pursuing the Judd Resolution pushed drug control down their 
priority list in the immediate post-war UNO agenda, cutting Anslinger out of the process and 
trying to outsource diplomatic heavy lifting on the issue to the UK and China. This facilitated 
a relatively consensual multilateral period beginning with the creation of CND and 
culminating in the rapid passage of the 1948 Protocol. The loss of Morlock in the 1950s 
resulted in the State Department losing institutional knowledge and interest. Anslinger 
initially utilised this to place the narcotics issue within the ‘red-bating’ of the McCarthy Era 
by portraying the opium trade as a global conspiracy by Communist China to destroy the 
west with opium and earn foreign exchange. The State Department soon tired of this narrative 
and pushed back on Anslinger’s efforts to use UN institutions as a forum to criticise foreign 
governments, even communist ones.  
 
Anslinger’s overreach laid bare his failure to make CND an enforcement body where 
Member States would be openly chastised. The State Department, initially reliant on 
ECOSOC to defuse CND-generated tensions, withdrew support at CND the moment US 
statements were seen to impede broader US foreign relations. Anslinger had used Iran, 
Mexico, Indochina, Thailand, India and China among others at various times as test cases for 
the interventionist capability of CND. The State Department torpedoed each of these in turn.  
 
CND had become far more activist and interventionist than may have been the case without 
Anslinger’s sustained leadership efforts. Ultimately, however, reticence of key member states 
such as the UK and a lack of State Department support prevented it attaining the enforcement 
body status Anslinger and US drug control lobbyists desired. By the end of the 1950s it 
appeared to have adopted the previous League OAC tendency towards backslapping and 
serving as a talking shop. The State Department eventually supported the Single Convention 
as a moderate international agreement which would prevent a weakening of relations in other 
fields. They were overruled, however, as Anslinger secured the support of his traditional 
constituencies and from key US Senators in opposing the document. 
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In the 1950s and 1960s the US and UK had differing visions for international production 
limitation and the expansion of prohibitionist obligations. US CND delegations, when led by 
Anslinger, continued the World War II ‘inner circle’ agenda and generally sought to 
strengthen CND into the 1950s. They continued to push for mandatory inspections; trade 
embargo provisions; internationally driven decisions around which drugs would be permitted 
and prohibited (most notably around heroin) and mandating exactly how states should deal 
with addiction (the ‘closed institution’ model) and drug traffickers (severe sentences). At the 
other end of the spectrum were Soviet Bloc states which tended towards a strong framework 
of non-interference. Many Latin American and newly emergent nations agreed and sought to 
prevent excessive interference in their affairs. Further, new states were unwilling to lock in an 
agreement that forever barred them from involvement in the licit trade and make them 
dependent on a small number of producer and manufacturing countries for their medicines.  
 
By the 1950s the UK was on alert against further encroachment on national sovereignty, 
whether commercial or criminal. Further they wished to maintain good relations with soon-
to-be or already former colonies and professed sympathy with demands for equality of 
national opportunity in the field around opium production and even manufacture. Further, 
allowing an open list of producer states meshed extremely well with the UK’s economic 
interests of ensuring cheap opium supplies for their manufacturing sector and thereby helping 
the overall UK balance of payments position. It would have further positive fiscal effects by 
ensuring continued cheap supplies for the NHS. They continued to flatly reject US calls for a 
‘closed institutional’ model of treatment. On the other hand the UK sought a moderate 
accommodation with interventionism. They were willing to subsume certain national 
prerogatives and interests to produce some international controls and were willing to play 
down their differences with the US over their national approaches to addiction and prevent 
coverage of the ‘British System’ in the US press.  
 
The two nevertheless had important overlapping interests, namely their large pharmaceutical 
sectors and a desire to ensure equality of treatment of synthetic narcotics relative to natural 
opiates. Had the US and UK worked to overcome their differences via close cooperation and 
discussion a more harmonious diplomatic process might have ensued. Ultimately this was 
made impossible by the leadership of Harry Anslinger. His attempt to retain control of 
international processes, despite absenteeism, a weakened domestic position and personal 
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complications, ensured divided and incompetent US delegations which failed to elaborate and 
advocate for US interests. Ultimately the UK would not accept an agreement which risked 
raising costs for their National Health Service and domestic drug manufacturers or impose 
obligations which would prove unpopular with domestic medical constituencies. The US 
ultimately failed to secure a strict agreement and sought to roll control efforts back to the 
1953 Protocol, something completely undesirable to the majority of states including the UK.  
 
This highlights that the breakdown was ultimately the result of interests and leadership. It is 
not the first study to highlight the large foreign policy impacts of Harry Anslinger’s 
leadership but in doing so it highlights the broader role of agency in creating and sustaining 
Anglo-American co-operation in specific issue areas.881 Had a more effective leadership 
reigned within the FBN during the 1950s or had policy been more clearly in the hands of the 
State Department, the outcome around the Single Convention might have been significantly 
different. On the other hand, without the US pushing the envelope on the issue over the 
previous six decades it is unlikely that the CND would have emerged in the form that it did, 
even if that did not reflect ultimate US desires for an international enforcement body with 
strong oversight of national policies. The US would spend the next half-century utilising and 
evolving CND into an enforcement body via treaty reforms, funding initiatives and 
aggressive bilateral diplomacy, but this was a far from inevitable outgrowth of the 1961 
Convention. 
 
The 1961 Convention created a mixed system, based on strong normative goals and 
trajectories but underpinned by relatively weak enforcement mechanisms and production 
controls. The US had sought an agreement to squeeze the global opium market. The UK 
sought one to regulate it. In the end the UK won and this victory became enshrined in the 
Single Convention. Ultimately the UK had relied on various coalitions of states to achieve 
this, highlighting their central role as pragmatist-in-chief within the system, which can be 
traced back to its origins at the turn of the twentieth century. The UK consistently charted a 
middle course between the hard-line prohibitionism and control advocacy of the US on the 
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one hand and the economic self-interest of producer states and non-interventionist impulses 
of other groups such as the Soviet bloc on the other hand. 
 
Had Anslinger, at times been able to adopt a more moderate and engaged approach the US 
would not have become isolated to the extent that it did, nor perhaps would it have failed so 
extensively to achieve its desired ends around the 1961 Convention. Part of this 
unwillingness, this thesis has argued, derived from his fear of alienating his core domestic 
constituencies and Congressional support base in Washington by advocating for a retrograde 
document. When he failed to secure his desired ends in the Single Convention he ultimately 
chose to sacrifice it, portraying it as part communist conspiracy and part economic self-
interest in the face of US control efforts. Ultimately he felt that the 1953 Protocol would 
serve as a better opium control arrangement which could then be extended to cannabis and 
coca controls.  
 
The UK had by the mid-1950s given up on accommodating the erratic, often incompetent and 
unpredictable US delegations and sought, quite successfully, to protect its own interests. It 
had been reticent to see the production limitation agreement reach fruition under the 1953 
Opium Protocol given the opium market fluctuations and other economic concerns during 
that period. When faced with that unsatisfactory document and producer states’ efforts to 
undermine synthetic narcotics, the UK forged ahead with the Single Convention, driving it in 
a more moderate and acceptable direction with the aim of replacing the 1953 Protocol. 
Initially they sought US support with this vision, but ultimately turned to a coalition of 
moderate states. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the US’ own State Department retained 
a closer affinity to the UK’s approach than to Anslinger’s, but ultimately, through a mixture 
of bureaucratic outmanoeuvring and a need to placate domestic anti-opium concerns, were 
forced to tow Anslinger’s line, albeit reluctantly. 
 
Overview: 
At the outbreak of war in 1939 the survival of international drug control efforts were by no 
means assured. Through a mixture of Anglo-American cooperation, underpinned by US 
leadership, the technical aspects of the system survived by shifting the Washington, ready to 
be co-opted into a post-war framework. The shape of this framework would be determined by 
a continuation of the normative, economic and political battles that had frequently stalled 
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control efforts over the previous decades. These battles, placed control advocate states on the 
one side and producer states on the other. In the middle were manufacturing and, to a lesser 
degree, consuming states. The US epitomised the control advocate perspective, seeking to 
create a strong international framework for shrinking global drug markets, both licit and 
illicit. The UK represented the regulatory strand which sought to protect economic and 
political interests while supporting international cooperative efforts around the core 
normative goals of the system: reducing the ‘abuse’ of ‘dangerous drugs’. This thesis has 
argued, that the system which emerged under the 1961 Single Convention was ultimately an 
accommodation between the US and UK approaches: a relatively weak regulatory system, 
underpinned by prohibitionist aspects. How these prohibitionist aspects would be 
implemented would be a key question for the control system over the coming decades. 
 
Through extensive archival research this thesis postulates a revised perspective on the role of 
Anglo-American relations in the development of the international drug control system. It is 
by no means an attempt to offer a conclusive explanation for international control efforts, 
merely an attempt to stimulate new debate and discussion of the role of Anglo-American 
relations in their development. It draws out overarching themes for British and US drug 
diplomacy and argues that, due to both states’ centrality to the control system, these forces 
represented the key determinants of international control. It may, in time and as further 
archives are opened, become apparent that the British and even American role in control 
efforts has been overstated by the existing literature being so heavily derived from archives in 
the US and UK.  
 
This thesis also hopes to move beyond simplistic renderings of international control system 
which read history backwards from current policies. This thesis begins that work by 
consciously avoiding a teleological approach to the topic and instead following the archives 
in building a detailed picture of decision-making as it evolved in its contemporary context. 
The ‘war on drugs’ was not a creation of any UN framework or treaty. It was certainly 
facilitated by the UN and the international drug control system but it represented a far more 
complex phenomenon, driven by a mixture of national, bilateral, regional and international 
efforts. Rolling them back will be far more complex than reforming a treaty framework. This 
thesis contributes to current debates by highlighting the role of competing strategic visions in 
driving international efforts and the evolution of Member States’ engagement with and 
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understanding of the system’s mission. It demonstrates that interpretation and implementation 
of the system’s mission, goals, metrics and outcomes have shifted in the past, within the same 
treaty framework. Meanwhile, this thesis highlights routes to effecting these changes by 
pointing to the role of individual agency, economic interests, political narrative and social 
forces in driving the international control system and shaping its sense of mission and, 
eventually, reforms. 
 
Epilogue: Commodity Control and Loose Ends: 
The Single Convention essentially created an economic regulatory framework for a global 
licit commodity market in certain essential pain medicines. To enforce this market it 
mandated certain action around controlling and prohibiting non-medical production and 
manufacturing. Key questions around dealing with ‘addiction’ and suppressing non-medical 
consumption were left largely unanswered out of deference to political difficulties. It was 
believed that effective regulation of the licit market would squeeze out illicit supplies leaving 
a minimal role for prohibitionist aspects and police enforcement. Time would prove this 
belief misjudged. When the failures of the regulatory approach to quell the illicit market 
became apparent international policy path determinacy fuelled an exponential growth in 
enforcement efforts, thereby creating the modern ‘war on drugs’. 
 
The US may have lost the battle around the Single Convention and control of the system in 
the 1960s but they would enter the 1970s ready to refight many of these battles, beginning 
with the declaration of the ‘war of drugs’ and an aggressive new round of bilateral drug 
diplomacy. Ultimately the ‘war on drugs’ was not an inevitable outgrowth of these 
documents, but instead represented a specific set of interpretations, bureaucratic and 
normative trajectories and Member State implementations. For example, there was no strict 
legal basis for the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) assuming a highly 
politicised and at times militant pursuit of repressive and prohibitionist policies as it did in 
the coming decades. At many times architects of control pushed back strongly against the 
idea that its predecessors (the PCOB and DSB) should do anything but collect and organise 
statistics. It is through the flexible evolution and interpretation of such terms as ‘quasi-
judicial’ (something originally meant to highlight its independence from the League of 
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Nations and particularly highlighted during World War II to ensure its survival) that the 
modern INCB self-conception as the ‘guardian’ of the international conventions emerged.882 
 
International control was as much a battle fought at the local, national and regional levels.883 
While battles over sense of ‘mission’ and other grand narratives of control were shaped in the 
halls of the UN, member states pursued wildly differing implementations. Some, such as the 
US, sought to export their visions to other states. Others, such as Britain, had blamed their 
inability to institute effective commodity controls in their colonies on weaknesses in 
neighbouring territories. Others still, saw the international system as a mechanism to 
outsource control efforts to producer and transit countries. The effective pursuit of this latter 
strategy in Latin America by the United States would have major implications for regional 
hemispheric security and development.884 The inability of control advocates to secure 
effective cooperation from states like Afghanistan, Burma and (initially) Iran presaged the 
deeper battles that were to follow around implementation. It was one thing to make broad 
international commitments.  It was quite another to implement them in the face of hard 
economic, political, social and other governing realities. 
 
The 1939-64 period also highlighted the extent to which perceptions and politics mattered 
more than facts within the control system. Further it highlighted the consistent utilisation by 
key members to utilise the drug issue as a stick to beat a foreign policy opponent, despite 
facts on the ground. The case of wartime Japan remains debatable, but in the case of 
communist China Anslinger fabricated a global communist opium conspiracy exactly when 
the PRC was undertaking one of the most successful opium eradication campaigns in human 
history – at an incalculable human cost. Latin America was a case of the US turning its 
frustration on its regional neighbour when efforts to interfere with countries further overseas 
stalled. The Middle East represented a veritable game of musical chairs of blame 
displacement for the region’s illicit traffic. The UK was guilty of this also, as in the cases of 
Thailand and Iran. Asia meanwhile saw Britain and other colonial powers pursue essentially 
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pragmatic policies in the last decades of the opium monopolies, only to be castigated as 
protecting naked economic self-interest. The monopoly system had enabled effective 
management of the issue from their perspective. When it was removed, governance became 
more difficult and saw countries like Britain displace blame onto their neighbours, as in the 
case of Thailand. 
 
Drug policy and drug diplomacy fitted within a broader framework of international relations. 
Foreign policy concerns complicated drug diplomacy substantially and vice versa. Each was 
a determining factor of the other. For example within UK policy formulation we have seen 
that struggles between the Home Office and Foreign Office over suzerainty of the issue 
occasionally resulted in mild blow-ups. These were often quickly defused but highlighted the 
complications that pursuing ostensibly technocratic control objectives could produce for 
broader foreign policy concerns – for example when Afghanistan sought to join the 1953 
Protocol’s list of recognised producers. The US meanwhile saw a similar process play out 
between Anslinger and the State Department. Anslinger’s penchant for ‘cowboy diplomacy’ 
was strongly displayed during World War II. He continued his bilateral efforts into peacetime 
via his overseas agents and attempted use of the UN bully pulpit. Nevertheless, the State 
Department wielded an effective means of oversight via ECOSOC and eventually weakened 
Anslinger’s control of CND. 
 
Meanwhile Anslinger had a tremendous knack for blending drug policy into foreign policy 
concerns (for example his use of Japan; the Four Freedoms; anti-colonialism; communist 
China; and the Soviet Union) and using them to his advantage, circumventing State 
Department concerns at a number of junctures. The latter had no desire to see the Single 
Convention torpedoed but watched as the domestic ground shifted and forced them into 
pursuing Anslinger’s revisionist stance. The UK had an almost continual desire to keep drug 
policy separated from broader foreign policy issues. It relished highlighting drug control as a 
shining example of international cooperation in the face of other political struggles and the 
insipid hollowing out of other international institutions by Cold War and regional politics. 
Nevertheless it tried to throw up the sandbags any time drug policy risked encroaching on 
colonial, regional or economic interests. Anslinger was well aware of these UK concerns and 
was more than happy to exploit or accommodate them depending on how it would support his 
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domestic and international agenda, for example overlooking the illicit trade in Hong Kong in 
the 1950s. 
 
Regarding production control, the US attitude remained: the lower the number of producers 
and the lower the global quantity of licit opium, the better. Issues that concerned the US 
generally stemmed from perceived global overproduction and the need to suppress it at all 
costs via regulation, prohibition and strict police enforcement. All control efforts were 
therefore to be geared towards producing less. This was the prohibitionist strand of the 
system. The UK was more concerned with consensus, market protection and a minimisation 
of regulatory costs. They sought a regulated framework that could point towards abuses and 
inadequate controls. They were less concerned about the scale of the market. They were 
happy to highlight regulatory weaknesses provided the costs of correcting those weaknesses 
were born by other states. This was the regulatory strand of the system. Opium and to a far 
lesser extent cocaine were the main focuses. The controls created for these substances were 
extended onto synthetics and other drugs, but the thrust of international efforts remained 
against these two substances. Meanwhile cannabis and coca leaf were of strong interest to the 
US and the control system but expendable in the short-term out of deference to broader 
opium control – for example the US preferring the 1953 Protocol to the 1961 Convention. 
 
With their victory over the US the British vision for regulation can also be said to have won. 
Nevertheless, the prohibitionist aspects built into the system as an accommodation with hard-
line states would be strengthened, via aggressive US drug diplomacy, funding initiatives and 
the solidification of international prohibitionist norms within the system and utilised by the 
United States and other allies to create the modern ‘war on drugs’. Despite this 
implementation the system remained fundamentally one of regulation underpinned by 
prohibitionist aspects. It was a regulatory system with prohibitionist aspects. The core 
remained focused on regulating the flow of ‘licit’ or ‘ethical’ narcotics and minimising their 
leakage into the illicit market.885 
 
Later the US would re-engage and ratify the Single Convention in 1967 and use the 
framework provided under the Single Convention rally states back towards a global 
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prohibitionist model, Yet, the system was ultimately one that had many possible alternative 
outcomes and directions. When the Single Convention came into force it could have 
continued down the path towards regulation and heavy subjugation to other economic and 
foreign policy concerns, or it could become oriented towards eradicating certain types of 
substances and practices via the proliferation of repressive prohibitionist models around the 
globe and the diffusion of police enforcement efforts. The policy and bureaucratic trajectories 
pushed towards the prohibitionist aspects particularly when the US provided leadership, but 
the system itself was malleable.  
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